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Earl Hancock Ellis

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps    

Earl Hancock "Pete" Ellis was born on December 19, 1880 in Iuka, Kansas, a small farming community. His parents, Augustus and Catherine Axline Ellis had migrated from southeast Iowa to Kansas following the Homestead and Preemption Act. He is the 2nd oldest sibling out of six surviving children, Ralph Ellis being born the oldest son; Nellie Ellis who was the first born, died of infantile cholera. Earl was educated in the Pratt school system. He was interested in baseball and was an avid reader. He enjoyed Rudyard Kipling's stories and poems. His inspiration of enlistment was noted by reading magazines and newspapers on the Spanish-American War. Such tales further lured him into enlisting. As a teenager, Ellis read of Robert W. Huntington commanding the First Marine Battalion (Reinforced), known as "Huntington's Battalion", the action at Cusco Well, and the Marine landing parties serving with Admiral George Dewey in the Philippines.



Military Service



















Ellis began his career in the United States Marine Corps by enlisting on September 3, 1900 as the rank of Private in Chicago, Illinois' He joined the Marine Corps at the age of 19 as a Private. By February 20, 1901, he was meritoriously promoted to Corporal. 

A year later, Ellis's parents questioned Chester I. Long, the Kansas State Representative living in nearby
Medicine Lodge, concerning a possible commission of Earl Ellis. Long submitted in a letter of request to Marine Corps Commandant Charles Heywood. As candidates were garnered by the permission of the Commandant, written examinations followed with tests in academic studies that were based on the Commandant's criteria on education. Earl Ellis was tutored by an Army Colonel, earning a satisfactory grade. Ellis was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant on December 21, 1901.

2nd Lieutenant Earl Hancock Ellis reported to Colonel Percival C. Pope, Commanding Officer of Marine Barracks, Charlestown Navy Yard in Boston as his first duty station as an officer on January 11, 1901. Here, newly commissioned officers were taught rudimentary lessons on how to perform inspections of Marines and their weapons. Most of these lessons were done informal by discussions and observation until March 1, 1902 when he was given orders to report to Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C. on March 7, 1902 for further assignment in the western Pacific. He departed on a troop train to San Francisco, California on April 1, 1902 to board a steamboat named the Sheridan. On April, 13 he arrived to Manila, Philippine Islands on a naval base along the Cavite Peninsula and was assigned as adjutant for the 1st Regiment. During this period, boredom and monotonous duty began to affect him. Ellis wrote "I think that this is the laziest life that a man could find - there is not a blamed thing to do except lay around, sleep and go 'bug house'. But the same, I am helping to bear the 'White Man's Burden'."

Earl Hancock Ellis was a brilliant planner and a principal staff officer to General John A. Lejeune in World War I, who forecast the amphibious struggle for the Pacific more than 20 years prior to World War II. Believing war with Japan was inevitable Ellis, traveled among the Japanese in the forbidden Carolines and died there under mysterious circumstances, on 12 May 1923.

In the years preceding World War I, Captain Ellis was sent out on special terrain study and intelligence service in the West Indies and at the Naval Station in Guam. Upon his return from Guam, he served as Aide-de-Camp to Major General Commandant George Barnett. On 16 March 1917, he was detached from Headquarters and ordered to Quantico, Virginia.

On October 25, 1917, Major Earl Ellis left Quantico for temporary foreign shore expeditionary service in Europe for the purpose of obtaining information concerning the methods of training troops. He sailed via the USS Von Steuben from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on September 29, and arrived at Brest, France on November 12. Major Ellis returned to the United States on January 9, 1918. On February 12, 1918, he was detached to duty in the Office of Naval Operations in Washington, D.C., and on May 22, was detached to foreign shore expeditionary service in France on the staff of General John A. Lejeune. He arrived at Brest, France, on June 8, 1918.

From June 18, to July 4, Major Ellis was assigned to duty with the 35th Division in the Wesserling Sector as an observer, and from July 5 to 25 served as Adjutant of the 64th Brigade of that division. He was attached to the 32d Division for several days during the operations of that Division in the Aisne-Marne Offensive, and during the German retreat from the Marne. On August 8, he was detailed as Brigade Adjutant of the Fourth Marine Brigade in the Pont-a-Mousson Sector, north of Nancy, France. On 28 August, he was promoted to temporary rank of Lieutenant Colonel, the rank to be effective as of July 1. He participated in the St. Mihiel (Champagne) Offensive (September 12-16 1918) and in the Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) Offensive September 29 - October 10, 1918) including the attack on and capture of Blanc Mont, and in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive October 31 to1 November 1, 1918).

On November 17, 1918, Earl Ellis was among those who commenced the march to the Rhine River, crossed the Rhine on December 13, 1918, and into the Coblenz Bridgehead Area, Germany.

Lieutenant Colonel Ellis was awarded the French Croix de Guerre with Gold Star, and was cited by the Marshall of France

commanding French Armies of the East as follows: "From the 2nd to the 10th of October, 1918, near Blanc Mont, Lieutenant Colonel Ellis has shown a high sense of duty. Thanks to his intelligence, his courage and hi energy, the operations that this Brigade (Fourth Brigade, Second Division) took part in, have always been successful."

He was awarded the decoration of Chevalier of the Legion of Honor by the President of the French Republic, and the U.S. Army Citation Certificate by the Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces.

On July 25, 1919, Colonel Ellis sailed from Brest, France, aboard the USS George Washington, arrived at Hoboken, New Jersey, on August 3, 1919, and joined the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, on August 9. In November, 1919, Colonel Ellis joined Headquarters Marine Corps, and shortly thereafter was sent to Santo Domingo as Brigade Intelligence Officer. Upon completion of his duty with the Second Marine Brigade, San Domingo (from April to December 11, 1920), Colonel Ellis again joined Headquarters Marine Corps.

In 1920 he foretold the course of the war in the Pacific and that Japan would strike the first blow with a great deal of success. He also reported what the success would be and planned the action necessary for Japan's defeat. Twenty-one years later, his prophecies became reality.

























On November 11, 1920, he was awarded the Navy Cross by the President of the United States: "For exceptionally meritorious and distinguished service. As Adjutant, Fourth Brigade Marines, he displayed utter disregard of personal hardship and danger, energetic application and an unfailing devotion to the duties of his office. He has ever shown himself ready for any emergency, even when he has been without sleep or rest for several days and nights at a time. His keen analytical mind, quick grasp of intricate problems, resourcefulness, decision and readiness to take prompt action on important questions arising during the temporary absence of the Brigade Commander within the Brigade, have contributed largely to the success of the Brigade, rendered his services invaluable and won for him the high esteem and complete confidence of the Brigade Commander."

On April 9, 1921, Ellis submitted a pro forma request to the Commandant to conduct a clandestine reconnaissance mission to the Central Pacific to examine the Marshall and Caroline Islands. He requested that he will have to obtain an 'undated resignation', to travel as a civilian, and whatever may deem necessary to ensure that the United States will not become embarrassed of such operations, if he were to be apprehended as a spy. However, shortly after, he had suffered another carouse of neurasthenia and eventually recovered. On May 4, 1921, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt approved the request] as the acting [Secretary of the Navy, Ellis stood detached from the hospital the same day, reporting to the Commandant at Headquarters Marine Corps.

The request came about when Ellis first submitted it to his 'first' of his chain-of-command, Brigadier General Logan Feland, whose approval was sine qua non before it even reached the desks of Major Generals Asst. Commandant Wendell C. Neville and Commandant John A. Lejeune. The submittal corresponded ostensibly that he were to travel to Europe on a 3-month leave. Such approval had to be sought out by the higher echelon of the Headquarters Marine Corps by the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William Veazie Pratt, who in turn brought the matter to the Office of Naval Intelligence. To cover the identify of having an Intelligence Officer abroad on such a mission, Ellis turned to John A. Hughes, who was commissioned among the ranks as Ellis back in 1902. Hughes was medically retired in 1920 due to injuries sustained in combat and joined his father's business in the import-export business, Hughes Trading Company. Ellis became a representative of the company to suit the convenience of his mission. After a brief visit home in Kansas, he sojourned to San Francisco on May 28, 1921 inbound to New Zealand] and Australia via American President Lines, arriving on September 28, 1921.

For fifteen years he had studied the development of Japanese power in the Orient. He had come to certain conclusions and he had not been reticent about voicing them. Requesting to be sent out to Latin America and Japan on intelligence missions, Colonel Ellis was granted a leave of absence from Headquarters Marine Corps and in the next few years, he visited Australia, Philippine Islands, and Japan. He studied methods and formulated war plans for the Marine Corps in the event that the Japanese should strike. In 1920 he foretold the course of the war in the Pacific and that Japan would strike the first blow with a great deal of success. He also reported what the success would be and planned the action necessary for Japan's defeat. Twenty-one years later, his prophecies became reality.


Colonel Ellis' Death

























Lieutenant Colonel Ellis died under mysterious circumstances, at the age of 43 on the Japanese- held island of Palau in the Caroline Islands on May 12, 1923. In contemporary newspaper accounts and in later years, numerous conspiracy theorists alleged that Ellis was assassinated by Japanese military authorities; however, detractors of such theories note that Ellis was known to have a severe drinking problem and likely died from an alcohol-related illness such as cirrhosis of the liver. Ellis's official medical records indicate that not long before his death, he was admitted to a naval hospital for treatment of delirium tremens and hallucinations.  Ellis had also tendered his undated resignation as a Marine officer shortly before leaving for Palau, in order that he might prevent embarrassment or undue suspicion from falling upon the United States or the Marine Corps should his mission be compromised. An alternate opinion, expressed by researcher Dirk Anthony Ballendorf, is that Ellis' resignation, along with the tremors and hallucinations, are attributable to depression and alcoholism. Ballendorf writes: "That the Japanese would have placed poison in his whiskey is unlikely since, for Ellis whiskey itself was poison enough."

Lieutenant Colonel Ellis had been  hospitalized in Manila, Philippines due to acute nephritis, an inflammation of the kidneys. After his discharge from the hospital, he departed to Yokohama, Japan to arrange a visa and authorization to travel to the mandated islands of the Carolines and the Marshalls, following a request he had sent to the Japanese Consulate at the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo, Japan. As Ellis's drinking habits continued to grow, he had impulsively disclosed to civilians of his apparent classified mission, to include the physicians when he was hospitalized again on September 1, 1922 while his debilitating illness of neurasthenia recurred. Orders by the local naval attaché were issued to Ellis to return home on the next available transport back to the states. He deliberately ignored them and cabled for a draft of one thousand dollars and departed to Saipan.

As he arrived to Saipan at the Tanapag Harbor, he checked into a hotel in Garapan with intentions that he was to stay for a while as he would scout the Mariana Islands, which at that time Japan was using as a central hub of their activities in Micronesia. All in the while, the Office of Naval Intelligence tracked his whereabouts by the withdrawals that Ellis made, from a special bank account that they established to fund his covert objectives. His presence began to gain attention by the Japanese authorities who followed his moves from this moment on. A friend of Ellis, Kilili Sablan, who he contact upon his arrival to the island, suggested that he should check out of his hotel and live with his family. For the next three weeks traveling in and through Saipan, he produced detailed maps and charts. By December 3, 1922, he boarded the ship Matsuyama Maru to the islands of the Carolines, Marshalls, Yap, and the Palaus. He checked into a hotel in Koror then aboarded the Matsuyama Maru once again to Truk, although he was unable to survey this island due to the Japanese authorities denying foreigners passage. The Japanese authorities continued to convey suspicion to Ellis.

During a trip from Kusaie to Jaluit, Ellis became ill aboard the Matsuyama Maru and was again hospitalized. After his recovery in January 1923, he continued to survey the Marshalls, Kwajalein, Ponape, Celebes, and New Guinea. While staying on Koror, he met a Palauan woman named Metauie, who became his wife. By then, he had a coterie of native boys who would obtain his alcohol for him.

One day, he looted the home of William Gibbons, a local friend who had introduced him to Ellis's wife, in search of alcohol. The Japanese police resolved the problem by delivering two bottles of whiskey to the Marine to which he profusely drank; later the same day, Ellis died on May 12, 1923.

Complicating the matter further, the agent sent to investigate the circumstances of Ellis' demise died in a freak
accident, and with him expired the only outside eyewitness knowledge as to the state of Ellis's corpse before it was cremated. Chief Pharmacist Lawrence Zembsch — who had treated Ellis during his hospitalization — travelled on a Japanese steamer to Palau, where he stayed at the Japanese officer's barracks (Ellis had stayed with native Palauan nobility and married a young Palauan chefress). After talking to Japanese authorities who had dealings with Ellis (including the medical officer), Zembsch witnessed and photographed the exhumation of Ellis's body and its cremation, taking custody of the remains when this was completed. Zembsch suffered a nervous breakdown on the return voyage and was admitted to a hospital in Yokohama, which was soon after buried by falling rubble in the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake.

In the end, Ellis's maps and papers were confiscated by Japanese authorities. An inquiry undertaken at the behest of  General Douglas MacArthur after the war found no trace of any of Ellis's effects, nor a report on Ellis's activities by the Japanese governor of the island.  It is not clear how competently Ellis performed his map-making and analysis, given his demonstrated instability in the final months of his life. The Japanese had not yet begun fortifying Palau during his sojourn there, but had Ellis survived, it is surmised that he would have completed addenda to "Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia" that would have presumably provided military authorities with "...useful..." information on the potential military uses of the islands.  In any case, Ellis's overall strategic concerns remain valid in the light of later events. Ellis is remembered today for his military intelligence work and for accurately predicting the bloody Pacific War two decades before it began.


Japan-U.S. Contacts in Tokyo After Ellis's Death

























U.S. Embassy in Tokyo was notified of the death of Ellis by the Japanese South Sea Islands Government Office. At 0620 on 21 May 1923, the following cablegram reached the State Department from U.S. Embassy Tokyo.A copy of the cablegram was passed to the Commandant of the Marine Corps Major General Lejeune via Captain Luke McNamee, the Director of Naval Intelligence.

“I AM INFORMED BY GOVERNOR GENERAL OF JAPANESE SOUTH SEA ISLANDS THAT R.H.ELLIS, REPRESENTATIVE OF HUGHES TRADING

COMPANY, #2 RECTOR ST., NEW YORK CITY, HOLDER OF DEPARTMENT PASSPORT NO.40249, DIED AT PARAO(sic), CAROLINE ISLANDS ON

MAY 12TH. REMAINS AND EFFECTS IN POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS, WILSON ".

Captain Cotten was informed by Washington of the death of Ellis and instructed to receive his remains and effects. He immediately sent Assistant Naval Attache Lieutnant Garnet Hulings, USN to the Ministry of Marine. On 26 May, Lieutnant Hulings visited Commander Yasuo Ko, aide to the Minister of Marines, and notified him that Ellis was not a trader but a naval officer(sic) on active service, and he explained that he was instructed by Washington to receive Ellis' “body and effects" for confirmation purposes and to transport them to the U.S. Naval Hospital, Yokohama.8 Commander Ko informed

Hulings that “although the South Sea Islands Government Office is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Marine, it has been entirely independent of the Navy since April of last year. Therefore, it is considered appropriate for you to conduct future negotiations with the South Sea Islands Government Office through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs". And he also replied to Hulings ; “ We wish to give notification to the local office of the South Sea Island Government

Office for your convenience. However, as regards the matter of sending Ellis' body to Yokohama as you want, we are unable to answer you forthwith because it has been interred temporarily and the situation there is unknown. Therefore, we shall inform Palau by cable of the gist of your request and the fact that Mr Ellis is not a trader as stated in his passport but a United States Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel on active service".

Two days later, on 28 May, Hulings formally submitted the above request in writing.10After Hulings' visit at the Ministry of Marine, the Japanese Navy informed the European and American Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs how the matter had developed, and what had been done about it by the Navy.11 The Navy also asked the Bureau to resolve the matter. Probably for this reason, there is no further record of nogotiations between the American Embassy in Tokyo and the Japanese Navy. Upon obtaining Japanese consent, Captain Cotten decided to send Yokohama Naval Hospital's Chief Pharmacist Lieutnant Zembsch,USN, to Palau and gave him careful instructions on how to gather information.12 Zembsch left Yokohama on 5 July aboard SS Tango Maru of the Nanyo Boeki Kaisha Line, he exhumed the remains of Ellis, cremated them, and started back with Ellis' ashes in a plain wooden box.

When Zembsch visited Palau, the Japanese officials gathered all persons concerned with Ellis, including the immigration officer William Gibbons, Ellis's native wife Matauie, and the native police chief Jose Tellei, and others, and explained the situation to Zembsch. However, Zembsch, who had had no health problems before his departure, was attacked by diarrhea and high fever. He grew so weak in a month that by 14 August he could no longer recognize the people who came to meet him in Yokohama. Upon his return to Japan, he was immediately hospitalized in the U.S Naval Hospital in Yokohama. With medical care, Zembsch's memory had begun to return gradually when the great Kanto earthquake of September 1, 1923 struck, and Zembsch was killed in the collapse of the hospital building.


Reactions In The American Press

Because the cause of Ellis' death was not made known by the Japanese side, the American press, particularly the Hearst papers and the local press in his home state of Kansas, reported his death with imagination and malice. Such newspaper reports can be summed up as follows: Ellis joined the Marine Corps as a private, and he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel as a “most prominent" or “distinguished" Marine officer.

During the First World War, in particular, he was awarded the Legion of Honor, the Croix de Guerre from France,and the Navy Cross from the U.S. Navy for his meritorious wartime services.While touring the Orient on a vacation (or on a special mission,according to some newspapers),
Ellis died on May 21, 1923 in the Caroline Islands, then under the mandate of Japan. The first newspapers said that the Japanese Navy's notification of his death came only two weeks after his death, and the cause of his death had not yet been given. The newspapers described his death as “unexplained" or “mysterious", or referred to the rumor that Ellis was “accidentally killed".

It was also reported that the Caroline where Ellis died constituted a militarily very important strategic point,lying between the Philippines-Guam combination and the United States mainland. Washington had received numerous reports that Japan had built a submarine base there. The newspaper also said that foreigners were not welcomed in the Carolines Islands because Japan had built a naval base and fortifications there in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. In August, two months after Ellis' death, it was reported again that the Japanese side had given no explanation about his death, under a sensational headline to the effect that the fine Marine Corps officer would be buried on a Japanese island with no light shed on the cause of his death. In addition, his forced hospitalization by Captain Cotten was reported in a different version: Ellis had been arrested in Tokyo by the Japanese Army authorities.


Arguments And Evidence Against The Poisoning Charge

(1) Why poison was suspected

Why was the Japanese Navy suspected of poisoning Ellis in the United States, until just recently? It is presumably because American researchers did not refer to Japanese historical sources, but rather believed and drew their conclusions from Hearst papers and Arthur V.Herrman's account before the war, and Secret Mission and LCOL W.W.Worden

USMC's report after the war.Before the war,besides the Hearst papers,Herrman's report were added. Arthur V. Herrman, an American trader of German ancestry,paid a visit on 23 May 1923 to Major General George Barnett at Headquarters, U.S Marine Corps Department of the Pacific, and informed Barnett that::

1) He saw Ellis on Kusaie, Eastern Caroline Islands, on 16 April 1923 and found him in good health. Ellis told him that the Japanese were talking of the possibility of war between the United States and Japan.

2) A great many of the Japanese were drunk, and it was their intention to put Colonel Ellis in jail.

3) The Japanese wanted no foreigners on the island, and they were “very anxious" to get rid of Ellis.

After the war, U.S.Navy Captain, Zacharias's inaccurate memoirs “Secret Mission" added to the confusion. In his book, he expressed suspicion of the Japanese Navy's behavior for the following reasons:

1) The Japanese Navy's notification of Ellis' critical condition came on the day before his death. When Captain Cotten requested Ellis be returned as soon as possible, the Japanese Navy answered  that a concrete response would be given within 24 hours.It was quite unusual for the Japanese  Navy to answer so quickly and positively. Captain Cotten suspected the presence of some evil design behind it. He told Zacharias that Ellis would not come back alive.

2) The next day a notice of Ellis' death came,together with the notification that his remains had been cremated.(Ibn fact,Ellis's body not been cremated and no such notification had been recieved) Cotten concluded that the cremation immediately following death must have been intended to preclude the possibility of poison being detected by an American autopsy,and strengthened his suspicion that Ellis' death was a Japanese Navy plot.

3) When Captain Cotten told the Japanese Navy that he wanted to send Chief Pharmacist Zembsch    to receive Ellis' remains, the Japanese Navy took a long time before approval in contrast with its     previous quick response.

Cotten considered this delay in response attributable to the Japanese Navy's bewilderment by an unexpected American request.

4) After being kept waiting for a long time, Cotten received permisson and Zembsch departed.  Before his departure from Yokohama, many notifications came from the Japanese Navy, but stopped after departure.
Cotten was notified of Zembsch's return only one day in advance, and was given no information whatsoever concerning his mental and physical deterioration.

5) Upon arrival,Zembsch was only able to murmur incoherently. The Commanding Officer of the Naval Hospital suggested that Zembsch's condition resulted from the addition to his food of a powerful narcotic such as morphine or opium.

These were the points which according to Zacharaias,aroused Cotten's suspicion, and Zacharaias concluded: the Japanese,who knew of Ellis' secret objectives, helped him to enter Micronesia. During the voyage, the captain of the Japanese freighter induced Ellis to drink a great deal. In Micronesia, Japanese there held drinking parties for Ellis, serving him sake containing a narcotic which killed him.

Then in 1950, the U.S. Marine Corps sent Lieutenant Colonel Waite W. Worden, USMC to Palau to investigate. Worden interviewed survivors and obtained the following statements from those involved in the case.


Statement Of Ngerdako Gibbons (the widow of immigration officer William Gibbons, half caste son of Jamaican Negro).

"Upon his arrival in Palau, Ellis stayed for a week at the home of Gibbons, the one of only English speaking persons on Koror at that time. Gibbons had, at Ellis' request, obtained for him a house in the native district and introduced him to a 25-year-old native girl,Metauie, who became Ellis' Palauan wife. Ellis went out every day under the pretext of taking a stroll, but his activities were constantly under the watch of the Japanese or native police. Ellis drank all the sake, whisky or beer that he could lay his hands on. Once, when he asked Gibbons for more drink and was told that there was no more. Ellis destroyed a wall of Gibbons's house, suspecting that some might be hidden there.On the day of his death, Ellis was “crazy drunk" from the morning and died at about five o'clock in the afternoon. Gibbons made a coffin and buried Ellis at the native graveyard the next day."


Statement Of Ellis' Native Wife, Metauie

She lived with Ellis for six weeks until his death. He told her that he was a civilian. She did not know that he was a Marine Corps officer.He always went out, saying that he would take a stroll. She did not know what he actually did. Ellis always drank, and particularly in the two weeks preceding his death his drinking increased. She "believed" that “too much sake" killed him.


Statement Of Native Police Senior officer Jose Tellei

"Ellis arived in Koror in April 1923, but nobody suspected he was a spy. However, the police chief, a Japanese, apparently considered him suspicious, for he ordered a plainclothesman to tail and watch Ellis constantly."

These contents were essentially correct, but finally Worden concluded by his own comment that “Ellis was suspected by the Japs as being a spy, and to the extent that they constantly shadowed him, it may be that he was poisoned. With Ellis'apparent unquenchable thirst, and his frantic searches at times for something to drink, it would not have been too difficult to poison him"

(2) Counter-evidence in Japanese Materials. The Tokyo Embassy's cablegram of 21 May to the U.S. State Department contained the expression the “Remains and Effects", Lieutenant Hulings said “Body and Belongings" on the 26th, and he used words “Body and Effects" in the memorandum of 28th May. All this indicates that both Washington and the American Embassy in Tokyo knew that Ellis' body had not been cremated.

There is another relevant record, a cablegram of 31 May from the Resident Naval Officer in the South Sea Islands.

It reads as follows: "TO AIDE TO MINISTER OF MARINE AND NAVY GENERAL STAFF   FROM RESIDENT NAVAL OFFICER, SOUTH SEA ISLANDS   DATE 31 MAY 1923   ELLIS, AMERICAN ALLEGEDLY ON COMMERCIAL INSPECTION TOUR, DIED FROM ALCOHOLISM ON KOROR ON TWELTH MAY. NO MILITARY PAPERS FOUND IN HIS EFFECTSHE IS SAID TO BE COMMANDER ON ACTIVE SERVICE. IF TRUE, HE IS CONSIDERED TO HAVE OBTAINED TRAVEL PERMIT BY FALSIFYING HIS OCCUPATION. IS IT ALL RIGHT TO TURN HIS EFFECTS OVER TO AMERICAN AUTHORITIES URGENTLY AWAITING YOUR NSTRUCTION."

It is considered normal in the case of a premeditated design to make an immediate report on its success to a limited number of people.The above cablegram is remarkable in that:

1) It was sent three weeks after the death of Ellis and ten days after the Japanese Navy's receipt of information on the death from the South Sea Island Goverment Office.

2) It was addressed to both the Aide to the Naval Minister and to the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

In addition, the Bureau of General Affairs official who recieved the cablegram (whose identity is unknown because this seal is undecipherable) wrote a note in the margin of the cablegram : “An improper action, but overlook it so we can use it as a countercharge,in case we are blamed for doing the same thing". Is it not possible to understand from this that the Japanese Navy was not involved in the affair? When Zembsch visited Palau, the Resident Naval Officer in the South Seas reported as follows:

"TO AIDE FOR NAVY MINISTER AND CHIEF OF NAVAL GENERAL STAFF FROM RESIDENT NAVAL OFFICER, SOUTH SEA ISLANDS DATE 29 JULY, 1923  CHIEF PHARMACIST OF U.S.NAVAL HOSPITAL,YOKOHAMA,ARRIVED HERE ON 21 JULY. BRANCH OFFICE CHIEF DELIVERY OF ELLIS' BODY AND EFFECTS TO ZEMBSCH AND OTHER DISPOSALS COMPLETED. CREMATION SCHEDULED FOR TWENTY SEVEN JULY WITHOUT OPENING COFFIN TO EXAMINE DEAD BODY. IT APPEARS AS IF CAUSE OF DEATH IS FULLY UNDERSTOOD."

The above cablegram suggests a sense of relief that American understanding was obtained and that any suspicions were cleared up. The Japanese Navy transferred the matter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in the process the Aide to the Minister of Marine forgot to answer the 31 May cablegram from the Resident South Sea Naval Officer urgently requesting instructions. So on the 14th of June, the Resident South Seas Naval Officer once again sent a cablegram saying that he was waiting for an urgent reply on the matter of the Ellis, as cabled on May.29. Is it not possible to interpret this to show that the Japanese Navy thought so lightly of the matter that the Aide for the Naval Minister forgot to answer?

Who Falsified the Truth ?

Why did the case arouse suspicion in the United States and within its Navy? Probably because neither the South Sea Islands Government Office nor the Japanese Navy did, or rather could tell the American the cause of Ellis's death or the name of his disease.The cablegram received by the Japanese Navy from the South Sea Islands Government Office reads:

"R.H.ELLIS 43, REPRESENTATIVE OF HUGHES & CO., RECTOR ST. 2 NEW YORK, PASSPORT NO.40249, LANDED HERE ABOARD TAIAN

MARU AFTER TOUR ON ISLANDS. BUT WHILE WAITING   FOR SHIP BOUND FOR MENADO, HE DIED FROM SHINSHINSENMOSHO AT SIX PM ON

TWELFTH  MAY. DEAD BODY WAS BURIED TEMPORARILY AND HIS EFFECTS ARE KEPT IN CUSTODAY."

Japanese Navy couldn't understand what the disease name “SHINSHINSENMOSHO" meant, because there is no such name medically. In the margin of the cablegram is the note “A kind of dementia". On 30 May, four days after Hulings' visit to the Japanese Navy Ministry, the Resident Naval Officer in the South Seas Islands reported that Ellis died from alcoholism. But there is no trace that the report was made to the U.S. Naval Attache in Tokyo. Why was the report not made known to the American side? Because just as Zacharaias and Cotten could not believe, in view of Ellis' behavior in Yokohama, that he was going to Micronesia under secret orders from Washington,20the Japanese Navy must have found it hard to accept the fact that a U.S. Naval Commander (misidentified as such by the Japanese Navy) could have died from alcoholism. Particulary because the honor of an individual and the United States Navy was involved, the Japanese Navy may well have hesitated to conclude from a single report of the Resident Naval Officer in the South Sea Islands that Ellis was an alcoholic.

Also because the matter had been transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Navy may have let the matter drop.

As mentioned above, the suspicion that Ellis was poisoned is considered to have arisen from the fact that all relevant writings on the American side were based on contemporary newspaper and Zacharaias' writings which were entirely different from the truth. What caused Zacharaias' misunderstanding? At that time, Zacharaias was a junior officer and language student. Did he misunderstand because he was not directly concerned with the case? However, he writes that he was a “witnessed" the case. Careful perusal of his memoirs reveals that he discussed delicate matters with the Naval Attache while gathering information in Japan.In September 1921, he was ordered to get the Japanese Navy's intentions of the Washington Naval Conference, and dined with Captain Kichisaburou Nomura and Osami Nagano. In consequence, Zacharaias writes, he successfully obtained the information that the Japanese Navy would agree to the American proposal for Naval limitations.

As can be seen, Zacharaias was somewhat involved in intelligence work in Japan. But the next point must be considered that, at that time Captain Nagano was in Washington as the Japanese Naval Attache. According to Zacharaias' memoirs,

Cotten often consulted him and informed him about Ellis' behavior, forced hospitalization, and escape from hospital. Why does Zacharaias' memoirs differ so markedly from the truth? Forethermore, while the English edition of his memoirs contains a chapter on Ellis, as The Strange Case of “Colonel X", but the Japanese edition omits this chapter so closely related to Japan, saying “Several chapters in the original which are not particularly related to Japan are omitted,  partly in compliance with the author's request.

Japanese authorities may have placed Ellis under surveillance because he was a foreigner, but Japan did not know he was a Marine Corps Officer on active service, until the receipt of Hulings' memorandum. If Captain Cotten or the United States Navy had not attempted to get information on Micronesia by turning Ellis' death to good account,24 the Ellis case would have been dealt with simply as the unfortunate case of an American traveler's death. Ellis's accident happened just three months after the Washington Naval Conference, and his mission and behavior were embarrassments to the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps. In order to cover up Ellis's “improper action", and to protect the U.S. Marine Corps, Ellis must be a hero.

So probably, facts were gradually confused because the circumstances of Ellis' death were not clear. The suspicion regarding his death was amplified by Zembsch's death. Ellis served for many years under Lejeune, Commandant of the Marine Corps for thirteen years under three U.S. Presidents, and he acted with Lejeune's understanding. Ellis' adventurous and tragic actions were to the liking of the Americans. From an American point of view, he was a hero who smuggled himself into Micronesia, after long travels to Australia, Philippines and Japan in spite of his illness. He took a native Palauan girl to wife. And finally, he was poisoned by the Japanese Navy while engaging in espionage for the Marine Corps.

The case of Ellis increased the American distrust and suspicion of Japan with regard to Micronesia. The growing distrust and suspicion were capitalized upon by advocates of racial discrimination and those fearful of a perceived military menace. In particular, the Marine Corps felt threatened postwar armament and manning reductions, and they were urging re-expansion,the developmenmt of amphibious operations,and improved amphious landing capability against Japan.





















Today the Amphibious Training building at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, is named Ellis Hall.

A bronze plaque in recognition of his contribution to military science is displayed at Earl Ellis Hall in Quantico, Virginia Marine Base. The sign in front of the Pratt VFW building also bears his name.

"Earl Hancock Ellis
Lieutenant Colonel United States Marine Corps
Pioneer Amphibious Prophet - War Planner
Born At Iuka, Kansas, 19 Dec 1880
He Forecast The Eventual Amphibious Struggle For the Pacific
And Gave His Life For His Country As An Intelligence Officer
At Koror Town In The Japanese Palau Islands 12 May 1923
His Character Was A Most Lovable One And His Heart Was
Dauntless And Full Of Courage - John A Lejeune"


























As time passed, few people in Pratt County remembered the boy who was born there and became a Marine Corps legend. Earl Ellis is now considered to be a miliary genius, the Marines' first spy and a recognized amphibious warfare prophet who in the 1920's wrote a 30,000 word report that predicted the war with Japan, Pearl Harbor, aircraft carriers and the airplanes that could carry bombs and fly off them.

Today, with the help of the Pentagon and many interested parties, Colonel Ellis' achievements are again recognized and the citizen's of Pratt County have another "giant" to be remembered.



Plan 712















Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hancock "Pete" Ellis was an Intelligence Officer, and author of Operations Plan 712: Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, which became the basis for the American campaign of amphibious assault that defeated the Japanese in World War II. His prophetic study helped establish his reputation as one of the forefront of naval theorists and strategist of the era in amphibious warfare, foreseeing the imminent attack from Japan leading to the island hopping campaigns in the Central Pacific.

The all but exclusive concern for the defense of bases was clearly borne out by the writing of Major Earl H. Ellis. Ellis, one of the most brilliant young Marine staff officers, was among the farsighted military thinkers who saw the prospect of war between the United States and Japan prior to World War I. Around 1913, he directed attention to the problems of a future Pacific conflict. To bring military force to bear against Japan, Ellis pointed out, the United States would have to project its fleet across the Pacific. To support these operations so far from home would require a system of outlying bases. Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines, which were the most important of these, we already possessed. Their defense would be of utmost importance and would constitute the primary mission of the Marine advanced base force. Ellis discussed in considerable detail the troops which would be required and the tactics they should employ.

In addition to the bases already in the possession of the United States, Ellis foresaw the need of acquiring others held by Japan. To the Marine Corps would fall the job of assaulting the enemy held territory. Although he did not discuss the problems involved nor take up the tactics to be employed, Ellis foreshadowed the amphibious assault which was to be the primary mission of the Marine Corps in World War II.

Today, we tend to forget that the Germans had extensive holding in the Pacific before World War I. But the division of these possessions following the war led literally led to world changing events: "Nothing seemed changed, but delegates of the Great Powers, meeting at Versailles to write the peace treaty ending World War I, had already taken an action which was to have far-reaching consequences for a future generation of Marines. In the general distribution of spoils, the former German island possessions in the central Pacific had been mandated to the Japanese. At one stroke the strategic balance in the Pacific was shifted radically in favor of Japan. That country now possessed a deep zone of island outposts. Fortified and supported by the Japanese fleet, they would constitute a serious obstacle to the advance of the United States Fleet across the Pacific.

Earl Ellis was one of the first to recognize the significance of this strategic shift. In 1921 he modified his earlier ideas and submitted them in the form of Operations Plan 712, "Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia." In this plan Ellis stressed the necessity for seizing by assault the bases needed to project the Fleet across the Pacific. He envisioned the seizure of specific islands in the Marshall, Caroline, and Palau groups, some of which were actually taken by Marines in World War II. He went so far as to designate the size and type of units that would be necessary, the kind of landing craft they should use, the best time of day to effect the landing, and other details needed to insure the success of the plan. Twenty years later Marine Corps action was to bear the imprint of this thinking:

"To effect [an amphibious landing] in the face of enemy resistance requires careful training and preparation, to say the least; and this along Marine lines. It is not enough that the troops be skilled infantry men or artillery men of high morale; they must be skilled water men and jungle men who know it can be done - Marines with Marine training."

The Commandant, Major General John A. Lejeune, and other high ranking Marines shared Ellis' views. "The seizure and occupation or destruction of enemy bases is another important function of the expeditionary force," he stated in a lecture before the Naval War College in 1923. "On both flanks of a fleet crossing the Pacific are numerous islands suitable for submarine and air bases. All should be mopped up as progress is made. ... The maintenance, equipping and training of its expeditionary force so that it will be in instant readiness to support the Fleet in the event of war," he concluded, "deem to be the most important Marine Corps duty in time of peace."

This, in turn, led to fleet experiments and exercises and to the development of doctrine, in the form of the 1938 "Landings Operations Doctrine," which detailed the role of the "Shore Party."




























    DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
    Headquarters United States Marine Corps
    Washington, DC 20380-0001

    21 August 1992

    FOREWORD

    1. PURPOSE

    Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-46, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, is published to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine or to be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 series are a special category: reprints of historical works which are not available elsewhere.

    2. SCOPE

    Most of this reference publication was written by Major E. H. Ellis in 1921 when he perceived the coming war with Japan and made this effort to describe where the conflict might be fought and the manner in which it would be carried out. Included in this reference publication are a short biography of Major Ellis, the text of the original manuscript, and other war plan papers that seem to have been written at about the same time. The volume is priceless as it shows very clearly Major Ellis' thoughts and his extraordinary accuracy, especially in the light of a 20-year-gap between his writing and the actual outbreak of hostilities. Extremely fascinating, this volume is essential to understand what was evolving in the Marine Corps before World War II to prepare for that conflict.

    3. DISCLAIMER

    Alcoholism was not Ellis' only defect. In parts of his writings, there is a racist tone that is as undeniable as it is regrettable. It accurately reflects the sentiments of a substantial, if not predominant, segment of American society in the early 20th century. These racist views had tragic     consequences. They helped precipitate the diplomatic climate which contributed to the outbreak of war in the Pacific. Further, a belief in an innate racial superiority made military strength seem less critical from a national perspective, and that fostered the lack of preparedness for war against Japan. That belief also caused many Americans - in and out of uniform - to experience a rude shock when U .S. forces encountered firsthand the genuine fighting abilities of the Japanese armed forces. In short, it must be realized today that these racist attitudes helped to cause the war as well as probably to raise the number of American casualties in the early months of the Pacific War.

    The important thing, however, is that this manuscript is not being printed to advance or support the racial biases of Ellis. Instead, we seek only to learn and to gain professional military knowledge from his writings despite their reprehensible aspects. From that perspective, a little analysis reveals some useful gems. While the U.S. did not prevail because of a race-based "superiority in the use of hand weapons and in staying power," it did win because of a superior use of the tools of war and also because of a greater national staying power based on the huge American industrial base and a larger population. These strategic advantages allowed the U.S. to survive its initial defeats and go on to victory.

    If Ellis' views on the Japanese were a reflection of his time, so were his views on gas warfare. Ellis' statements regarding the use of gas reflect both American experience with gas in World War I and the prevailing laws of war. During the fighting in France, American forces had used gas freely against their German enemies, and frequently they had been on the receiving end of German gas weapons. Based on that combat experience, Ellis assumed Americans would use gas in any war against Japan. In the event, however, that did not occur for the U.S. abided by its policy against being the first to use gas on the battlefield.

    The key point to note is that Ellis' text clearly lays out the real reason gas has not been used in wars between modern armies. Since 1981, no army has used gas against an opponent which could respond in kind. Gas is simply too much of a double edged sword - it cuts both ways and can be as dangerous to the using army as to its opponent. Ellis lays out the case well, and it is these problems with gas - not international law - which have been the real grounds for not using gas. International law once prohibited the use of the crossbow in warfare, but it remained on the battlefield until supplanted by firearms. The weapon was simply too useful and effective for armies not to use it. Gas, the double-edged sword, does not meet those criteria.


    4. CERTIFICATION

    Reviewed and approved this date.

    BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

    /s/
    A.C. ZINNI
    Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
    Deputy Commanding General
    Marine Corps Combat Development Command
    Quantico, Virginia

    DISTRIBUTION: 14012460000


Major Earl Ellis' writings and plans made him a major architect in the development of the modern Marine Corp. Ellis Hall, the home of the Marine Corps' Command and Staff College at Quantico, VA, pays tribute to his memory and contributions.