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Friday, August 20, 2010
Battle of Chosin Reservoir
"The fighting at the Chosin Reservoir was the most violent small unit fighting in the history of American warfare. No other operation in the American book of war quite compares with the show [the battle of the Chosin Reservoir] by the First Marine Division [and attached U.S. Army and British Royal Marines]." - General S.L.A. Marshall, Prominent Army Historian
The Battle of Chosin Reservoir, also known as the Chosin Reservoir Campaign or the Changjin Lake Campaign was a decisive battle in the Korean War. About 3000 American Marine and Army soldiers came. Over 1,000 of them stayed forever. They fought and died on a 10-mile stretch of frozen, snow covered dirt road on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir.
It was bitter cold. The temperature was well below zero. The wind howled. Snow fell - a snow so dry that dust from the road mixed with it in yellowish clouds that swirled about the column of trucks. Tundra - like, bleak, and without vegetation in most places, the land was very depressing.
Shortly after the People's Republic of China entered the conflict, the People's Volunteer Army 9th Army infiltrated the northeastern part of North Korea and surprised the United States X Corps at the Chosin Reservoir area. A brutal seventeen day battle in freezing weather soon followed. In the period between November 27 and December 13, 1950, 30,000 United Nations (UN) troops (nicknamed "The Chosin Few") under the command of Major General Edward Almond were encircled by approximately 120,000 Chinese troops under the command of Song Shi-Lun.
Although Chinese troops managed to surround and outnumber the United Nations forces, the United Nations forces broke out of the encirclement while inflicting crippling losses on the Chinese. The evacuation of the X Corps from the port of Hungnam marked the complete withdrawal of United Nations troops from North Korea.
When he was told Of Eight Chinese Divisions attacking X Corps at Chosin: "That's impossible. There aren't two Chinese Communist divisions in the whole of North Korea." -- Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond at noon on November 28, 1950.
Generals at the Yalu (in background), November 21, 1950. Left to Right: Generals Kiefer, Hodes, Almond, and Barr. They were Visiting the 17th Infantry, at Hyesanjin.
The generals seemed to think the war was over, but... Catastrophe is about to strike Eighth Army and X Corps.
Officers of the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, 7th Division, June, 1950
First row: Capt. Erwin B. Bigger; Capt. Ed Scullion; Lt. Col. Don C. Faith, Jr.; Maj. J. O. Donahue; Capt. (later Col.) Robert E. Jones; Capt. Banyon Patterson; Captain Warren.
Second row: Capt. Dale L. Seever, Lt. Harvey Hott, Lieutenant Jackson, Capt. Wayne E. Powell, Lt. Jack Tevis, Lt. James Houghton, Lt. Hugh May, Lt. Carlos Ortenzi.
Third row: Lieutenant Hoddinott; Lieutenant Maher; Lt. Robert D. Wilson, Lt. Henry M. Moore; Lt. Everett F. Smalley, Jr. (top of head showing); Lt. Dixie Neighbors; Lt. E. E. Fitzgerald.
Fourth row: Officer behind Lt. Dixie Neighbors unidentified.
Background
By the mid-1950, after the successful landing at Inchon by the United States X Corps and the subsequent destruction of the Korean People's Army, the Korean War appeared to be all but over. United Nations (UN) forces advanced rapidly into North Korea with the intention of reuniting North and South Korea before the end of 1950. North Korea is divided through the center by the impassable Taebaek Mountains, separating the United Nations forces into two groups. The United States Eighth Army advanced north through the western coast of the Korean Peninsula, while the Republic of Korea (ROK) I Corps and the US X Corps advanced north on the eastern coast.
At the same time, the People's Republic of China entered the conflict after issuing several warnings to the United Nations.
On October 15, 1950, large formations of Chinese troops, dubbed the People's Volunteer Army (PVA), secretly crossed the border and into North Korea. One of the first Chinese units to reach the Chosin Reservoir area was the Peoples Volunteer Aarmy 42nd Corps, and it was tasked with stopping the eastern United Nations advances.
Anyone can only guess how cold it became in the high Taebaek mountains around the Chosin Reservoir during the winter of 1950. At one regimental headquarters the thermometer fell to minus 54 degrees. American Marines shivered in their foxholes, while vehicle drivers were forced to run their engines 24-hour a day. If the engine were shut down, chances were high that it couldn't be restarted. A rare hot meal could quickly freeze in the time it took a Marine to move from the serving line to a place where he could sit down to eat it.
China's Chairman Mao Zedong
China's Chairman Mao Zedong was surprised by the Marine landing at Wonsan. He called for the immediate destruction of the Republic Of Korea Capital Division, Republic Of Korea 3rd Infantry Division, United States 1st Marine Division, and United States 7th Infantry Division in a telegraph to Commander Song Shi-Lun of the Peoples Volunteer Army, 9th Army on October 31. Under Mao's urgent orders, the 9th Army was rushed into North Korea on November 10. Undetected by United Nations intelligence, the 9th Army quietly entered the Chosin Reservoir area on November 17, with the 20th Corps of the 9th Army relieving the 42nd Corps near Yudami-ni.
Following General MacArthur’s orders, a regiment of the Republic of Korea’s 6th Division reached the Yalu on October 26. By the next day, the Chinese 4th Field Army, in vicious righting, had nearly destroyed two of the division’s regiments. The New York Times reported that 200,000 Chinese soldiers were now in Korea. Mao Tse-tung insisted they were only volunteers, and Gemeral MacArthur said they were nothing to worry about. The Chinese, blowing bugles and whistles, attacked the United States 1st Cavalry Division on November 1 and badly mauled its 8th regiment.
After the landing at Wonsan, the United States 1st Marine Division of the X Corps engaged with the People's Volunteer Army, 124th Division on November 2, and the ensuing battle caused heavy casualties among the Chinese. On November 6, the People's Volunteer Army, 42nd Corps ordered a retreat to the north with the intention of luring the United Nations forces into the Chosin Reservoir.
A warning whih had been sent from Karl Lott Rankin, ambassador to Nationalist China, seems not to have taken seriously. In a telegram sent to the Department of State on November 6, Ambassador Rankin asserted: "Chinese military intelligence forwarded to Washington by the Embassy's service attachés during the past few days lends strong support to the assumption that the Chinese communists plan to throw the book at the United Nations forces in Korea and in addition to step up their pressure in Indochina. Allowance evidently should be made for wishful thinking among the Chinese military, most of whom regard a general conflict as the only means of liberating China from the communists. In the present instance, however, such a caveat still leaves an imposing array of apparently established facts, as well as evidence of sincerity among the best informed Chinese, such as to render quite possible the correctness of their consensus of opinion that all-out action in Korea by the Chinese communists should be expected." Quoted in Rankin's book, "China Assignment" (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), p. 65.
As a response, Major General Edward M. Almond, commander of the United States X Corps, formulated a plan on November 21. It called for the United Stares 1st Marine Division to advance west through Yudami-ni, while the United Stares 7th Infantry Division would provide a regimental combat team to protect the right flank at Sinhung-ni.
The United Stares 3rd Infantry Division would also protect the left flank while providing security in the rear area. By then the X Corps was stretched thin along a 400 miles (640 km) front.
B-29 Superfortress of the Far East Air Forces 19th Bomber Group on its 150th combat mission since the start of the Korean war.
The "Home by Christmas" offensive officially began on November 24th, the day after Thanksgiving. In the west the 8th Army began their push to the Yalu, only to be surprised by an unbelievable swarm of hidden Communist soldiers. Within days the Chinese Forces destroyed the ROK II Corps, leaving the 8th Army without flanking cover or general support.
Faced with the sudden attacks by Chinese forces in the Eighth Army sector, General Douglas MacArthur ordered the Eighth Army to launch the "Home by Christmas Offensive". To support the offensive, Gen. MacArthur ordered the X Corps to attack west from the Chosin Reservoir and to cut the vital Manpojin — Kanggye — Huichon supply line.
The United States retreat from Taejon.
The badly battered 8th Army was ordered to fall back on November 19th, a 275 mile withdrawal that in six weeks cost 10,000 casualties.
The 1st Marine Division consisted of 23,608 Marines and Navy hospital corpsmen, supported by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The division was organized in three infantry regiments, the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marines, and an artillery regiment, the llth Marines. After being issued parkas and other cold-weather gear, the 7th Marines, followed by the 5th Marines, started north toward the Chosin Reservoir.
The 1st Marines remained behind to deal with the North Korean army on the coast.
By November 24, the 1st Marine Division occupied both Sinhung-ni on the eastern side of the reservoir, and Yudami-ni on the west side of the reservoir.
Chinese Troops Charge a hill at the Chosin Reservoir.
On the eastern slope of the Taebaek Mountains most of the Marines were unaware of what was happening in the west, or just how badly outnumbered and surrounded they were. The first indication came on the morning of November 27th as two companies of the 5th Marines began the push from Yudam-ni westward. Before noon they ran into an enemy roadblock. Unaware of the numbers of enemy around them, the Marines engaged the Chinese, destroying the road block. Then enemy fire began to rain on them from all directions. The Marines knew they were in for a fight, one that lasted for nearly four hours. Then, when the firing subsided, the Marines attempted to dig in. The intensity of the battle convinced them that they were facing more than straggling units of North Korean soldiers. They knew the enemy would attack again, in force, under the cover of darkness. They did, again and again!
Location, Terrain and Weather
The Chosin Reservoir is a man-made lake located in the northeast of the Korean peninsula. The name Chosin is the Japanese rendition of the Korean place name Changjin, and the name stuck due to the outdated Japanese maps used by United Nations forces.
South End Of TheChosin Reservoir.
The battle's main focus was around the 78 miles (126 km) long road that connects Hungnam and Chosin Reservoir, which served as the only retreat route for the United Nation forces. Through this road, Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni, located at the west and east side of the reservoir respectively, are connected at Hagaru-ri. From there, the road passes through Koto-ri and eventually leads to the port of Hungnam. The area around the Chosin Reservoir was sparsely populated.
Chinese human wave assaults in the Battle of Chosin Reservoir.
The battle was fought over some of the roughest terrain during some of the harshest winter weather conditions of the Korean War. The road was created by cutting through the hilly terrain of Korea, with steep climbs and drops. Dominant peaks, such as the Funchilin Pass and the Toktong Pass, overlook the entire length of the road. The road's quality was poor, and in some places it was reduced to a one lane gravel trail. On November 14, a cold front from Siberia descended over the Chosin Reservoir, and the temperature plunged to as low as -35 °F (-37.2 °C). The cold weather was accompanied by frozen ground, creating considerable danger of frostbite casualties, icy roads, and weapon malfunctions.
Marine Major General O. P. Smith
Although the 1st Marine Division landed at Wonsan as part of General Almond's United States X Corps, Almond and Major General Oliver P. Smith of the 1st Marine Division shared a mutual loathing of each other that dated back to a meeting before the landing at Inchon, during which Almond had spoken of how easy amphibious landings are even though Almond had never been involved in one. Gen. O. P. Smith believed that there were large numbers of Chinese forces in North Korea despite the fact that higher headquarters in Tokyo had said otherwise. General Almond felt that Gen, O, P, Smith was overly cautious. The mutual distrust between the two commanders made Gen. O. P. Smith slow the 1st Marine Division's advance towards the Chosin Reservoir against Gen. Almond's instructions.
Along the way Gen. O. P. Smith established supply points and airfields at Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri. These would be much needed on their escape.
While the United States X Corps was pushing towards the reservoir, the Chinese formulated their strategy based on their experiences in the Chinese Civil War. Working from the assumption that only a light United Nations presence would be at the reservoir, the 9th Army was to first destroy the United States garrisons at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni, then push towards Hagaru-ri. Believing that the bulk of the United States X Corps would scramble to rescue the destroyed units, the 9th Army would then block and trap the main United Nations forces on the road between Hagaru-ri and Hungnam. The 9th Army initially committed six divisions for the battle,with most of the forces concentrated at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni.
The flaw in the Chinese plan was a lack of accurate intelligence on the United Nations forces. Although the United States X Corps was stretched thin over northeast Korea, the slow Marine advance allowed the bulk of the United States 1st Marine Division, including the 5th, 7th and 11th Marines, to be concentrated at Yudami-ni. The strategically important Hagaru-ri, which contained an airfield and a supply dump, was not a priority for the Chinese despite being lightly defended by the 1st and the 7th Marines. Only the Regimental Combat Team 31, an understrength and hastily formed regimental combat team of the United States 7th Infantry Division, was thinly spread along the eastern bank of the reservoir. Those units would later take the brunt of the Chinese assaults.
Rifle platoon of 5th RCT, 24th Division on Korea Front
As for the United Nations strength, the 1st Marine Division had an effective strength of 25,473 men at the start of the battle, and it was further reinforced by the British 41 Royal Marine Commando and the equivalent strength of two regiments from the 3rd and the 7th Infantry Division. Thus the Uniyed Nations forces had an approximate strength of 30,000 during the course of the battle.
The Chinese 9th Army was one of China's elite formations composed of veterans and former POWs from the Huaihai Campaign. Initially the 9th Army was intended to be outfitted in Manchuria during November, but Chairman Mao suddenly ordered the 9th Army into Korea before that could happen. As the result, the 9th Army received almost no winter gear for the harsh Korean winter.
Poor logistics forced the 9th Army to abandon heavy artillery, while working with little food and ammunition. Unable to forage at the sparsely populated reservoir, starvation and exposure soon broke out among the Chinese units. By the end of the battle, more Chinese troops died from the cold than from combat and air raids. As for the Chinese strength, it is normally assumed that the Chinese had 120,000 troops for the battle, due to the fact that the 9th Army were composed of 12 divisions with a nominal strength of 10,000 men per division. But during the course of the battle, the 9th Army employed only eight divisions, while all divisions were at 65 to 70 percent strength at the start of the battle. It is "assumed" the actual Chinese strength for the battle was approximately 60,000.
Seven of the ten Chinese divisions never entered combat again during the Korean War
Upon capturing the above image with his camera, David Duncan couldn't help asking this soldier, "What would you like for Christmas?" His simple answer echoed the hope of so many young Marines facing a hopeless situation at the Chosin Reservoir. He replied: "Give Me Tomorrow."
Huddled together in the back of the trucks, the men of the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, stomped their feet on the truck beds in futile attempts to keep their limbs from becoming stiff and numb. Most of them wore long woolen underwear, two pairs of socks, a woolen shirt, cotton field trousers over a pair of woolen trousers, shoepacs, pile jacket, wind-resistant reversible parka with hood, and rigger finger mittens of wool insert and outer shell. To keep their ears from freezing they tied wool scarves around their heads underneath their helmets. Still the cold seeped through. Occasionally the entire column ground to a halt to permit the men to dismount and exercise for a few minutes.
Lt. Colonel Don C. Faith
Lt.Col. Don C. Faith commanded the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry. As part of the 7th Infantry Division and of X Corps (Maj.Gen. Edward M. Almond), the battalion was moving from Hamhung north to relieve marines on the east shore of Chosin Reservoir and then to continue the attack to the Yalu River. A man could take even stinging, stiffening cold if it meant the end of a war. And that was how things looked on this 25th day of November 1950.
In fact, just before Lt.Col. Faith's battalion left Hamhung some of the men had listened to a news broadcast from Tokyo describing the beginning of a United Nations offensive in Korea designed to terminate the war quickly. Originating in General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's headquarters, the report predicted that U.S. divisions would be back in Japan by Christmas. It had been cheering news.
Having assembled three divisions at the east coast port of Hungnam at the end of October, General Almond had launched his X Corps on an offensive with the objective of reaching the Manchurian border as soon as possible.
By the third week of November the corps was scattered across an area of more than four thousand square miles of bare, bleak, and rugged mountains. The 1st Marine Division, attacking along both sides of Chosin Reservoir, was more than fifty miles inland. One regiment of the 7th Division-the 17th Infantry-had gone more than a hundred miles north of Hungnam and had reached the Yalu River on 21 November. Other units of that division were separated by straightline distances of seventy or eighty miles. Road distances, tortuously slow, were much longer. North Koreans had offered only slight resistance against X Corps advances, but the obstacles of terrain and weather were tremendous.
Passing engineer crews working on the twisted, shelf-like road notched into the side of precipitous slopes, the truck column bearing Colonel Faith and his men northward at last reached Hagaru-ri at the south end of Chosin Reservoir. Several Marine Corps units were located in Hagaruri. The truck column passed a few tents and small groups of marines huddled around bonfires.
When the road forked, Colonel Faith's column followed the right-hand road, which led past the few desolate houses in Hagaru-ri toward the east side of the reservoir.
At least one or two men from each company were frostbite casualties late that afternoon when the battalion closed into defensive positions a mile or so north of Hagaru-ri. The night was quiet. There were warm-up tents behind the crests of the hills and the men spent alternate periods manning defense positions and getting warm.
The morning of 26 November was clear and cold. Since the marines still occupied the area, Colonel Faith waited for more complete orders, which had been promised. Toward noon, the assistant commander of the 7th Division (Brig. Gen. Henry I. Hodes) arrived at Faith's command post with more information on the planned operation. Having flown to Hagaru-ri by light aircraft, he had driven north by jeep. Additional 7th Division units, he explained to Colonel Faith, were then en route to Chosin Reservoir. The commander of the 31st Infantry Regiment (Col. Allan D. MacLean) was to arrive soon to take command of all units on the east side of the reservoir. He was bringing with him his own 3d Battalion, his Heavy Mortar Company, his Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, a detachment of medical personnel, and the 57th Field Artillery Battalion. The last-named unit would be short one of its firing batteries but would have with it Battery D, 15th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion-a unit equipped with halftracks mounting quadruple caliber machine guns (M-16s) and dual 40-mm guns (M-19s).
General Hodes said the Marine regiment would move on the following day to join the rest of the 1st Marine Division in an attack aimed at securing another important road northwest from Hagaru-ri. The mission of MacLean's task force, and thus of Colonel Faith's battalion, was to secure the important road running along the east side of the reservoir and thence north to the Manchurian border.
When Colonel MacLean arrived with his staff later that evening, he stated his intentions of attacking north as soon as his task force arrived. He approved Colonel Faith's plan to take over the northernmost defensive position as soon as the marines vacated it the next morning.
Monday, 27 November, was another clear, cold day. Marine trucks were on the road soon after dawn shuttling troops south. By noon, when the road was clear again, Colonel Faith moved his battalion north. The rest of Colonel MacLean's force arrived that afternoon, moving into position about three or four miles south of Faith's battalion.
The Top Of Funchilin Pass With Eleven Miles To The Bottom After Leaving Koto-ri.
As night fell on November 27, the first order of business was defense, although a continuation of the northward drive the marines had begun was planned for the next day. Lending greater force to common knowledge that Chinese forces in undetermined strength were roaming the mountains in the vicinity of Chosin Reservoir, the marines had told Colonel Faith that on the day before several Chinese prisoners had revealed the presence of three fresh divisions operating in the area of the reservoir. Their mission, the prisoners had said, was to sever the American supply route. The marines also told Faith's men that on the previous night, in this same location, a Chinese patrol had pulled a marine from his foxhole, disarmed him, and beaten him.
The battalion adjutant, having driven a hundred and fifty miles that day from division headquarters, arrived with two weeks' mail. A few minutes later an officer from Colonel MacLean's headquarters brought the operation order for the attack scheduled for dawn the next morning. Colonel Faith called his company commanders, asking them to bring their mail orderlies and to report to his command post for the attack order.
The enemy attacked while the meeting was in progress. Probing patrols came first, the first one appearing in front of a platoon near the road. When the friendly platoon opened fire Company A's executive officer (Lt. Cecil G. Smith), suspecting that the enemy force was a reconnaissance patrol sent to locate specific American positions, tried to stop the fire. He ran up and down the line shouting: "Don't fire! Don't fire!" But by the time he succeeded, the enemy force had evidently discovered what it needed to know and had melted away into the darkness. In the meantime, enemy patrols began to repeat this pattern at other points along the defensive perimeter. A few minutes after midnight the patrolling gave way to determined attack. While one Chinese company struck south along the road, another plunged out of the darkness from the east to strike the boundary between the two rifle companies that were east of the road.
The defensive perimeter began to blaze with fire. In addition to directing steady mortar and small-arms fire against Colonel Faith's battalion, the Chinese kept maneuvering small groups around the perimeter to break the line. As one enemy group climbed a steep ridge toward a heavy machine gun operated by Cpl. Robert Lee Armentrout, the corporal discovered he could not depress his gun enough to hit the enemy. He then picked up his weapon, tripod and all, cradled it in his arms, and beat off the attack.
As the night wore on not every position along the perimeter held as well. Within two or three hours after they first attacked, the Chinese had seized and organized the highest point on the two ridgelines that had belonged to the two companies on the east side of the road. Loss of this ground seriously weakened the defense of both companies, and also permitted the enemy to fire into a native house where Capt. Dale L. Seever had set up his command post. Forced to vacate, he moved his Weapons Platoon and command group to the front line to help defend what ground he had left. On the extreme right flank the Chinese forced two platoons out of position. On the left side of the road they circled wide around the left flank and seized a mortar position.
Wire communications with Colonel MacLean's headquarters and with the 57th Field Artillery Battalion went out soon after the attack started. After establishing radio communication, which was never satisfactory, Colonel Faith learned that the Chinese were also attacking the other units of MacLean's task force. This explained why the artillery, involved with the more immediate necessity of defending its own position, was unable to furnish sustained support to Faith's battalion.
*****
Don Carlos Faith, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army
He was born on August 26, 1918, in Washington, Indiana. He was the son of a career Army officer, Brigadier General Don Carlos Faith. He graduated from Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
He was killed-in-action in the Korean War and his body was never recovered. However, his father, Brigadier General Don Carlos Faith, arranged to have included on the rear of his own stone the words: "In memory of Don Carlos Faith, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army, Medal of Honor, 1918-1950."
He was awarded the Medal of Honor for courage in five days of bloody fighting near Hagaru-ri in the Chosin Reservoir campaign of 1950. When the attack was launched against his battalion, he exposed himself to hostile fire while directing its actions. When the enemy penetrated their perimeter, he personally led a counterattack. His joined his forces with another nearby unit and, although exhausted by the bitter cold and continuous fighting, led yet another attack. He was mortally wounded during the final charge, but managed to hold on until the enemy was overrun, then he fell.
Medal Of Honor
DON C. FAITH JR.
Rank and organization:
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Army, commanding officer,
1st Battalion,
32d Infantry Regiment,
7th Infantry Division.
Place and date:
Vicinity Hagaru-ri,
Northern Korea,
November 27 to December 1, 1950.
Entered service at:
Washington, Indiana.
Born:
August 26, 1918,
Washington, Indiana.
G.O. No.:
59, 2 August 1951.
Citation:
Lt. Col. Faith, commanding 1st Battalion, distinguished himself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity in action above and beyond the call of duty in the area of the Chosin Reservoir. When the enemy launched a fanatical attack against his battalion, Lt. Col. Faith unhesitatingly exposed himself to heavy enemy fire as he moved about directing the action. When the enemy penetrated the positions, Lt. Col. Faith personally led counterattacks to restore the position. During an attack by his battalion to effect a junction with another U.S. unit, Lt. Col. Faith reconnoitered the route for, and personally directed, the first elements of his command across the ice-covered reservoir and then directed the movement of his vehicles which were loaded with wounded until all of his command had passed through the enemy fire. Having completed this he crossed the reservoir himself. Assuming command of the force his unit had joined he was given the mission of attacking to join friendly elements to the south. Lt. Col. Faith, although physically exhausted in the bitter cold, organized and launched an attack which was soon stopped by enemy fire. He ran forward under enemy small-arms and automatic weapons fire, got his men on their feet and personally led the fire attack as it blasted its way through the enemy ring. As they came to a hairpin curve, enemy fire from a roadblock again pinned the column down. Lt. Col. Faith organized a group of men and directed their attack on the enemy positions on the right flank. He then placed himself at the head of another group of men and in the face of direct enemy fire led an attack on the enemy roadblock, firing his pistol and throwing grenades. When he had reached a position approximately 30 yards from the roadblock he was mortally wounded, but continued to direct the attack until the roadblock was overrun. Throughout the 5 days of action Lt. Col. Faith gave no thought to his safety and did not spare himself. His presence each time in the position of greatest danger was an inspiration to his men. Also, the damage he personally inflicted firing from his position at the head of his men was of material assistance on several occasions.
Lt. Col. Faith's outstanding gallantry and noble self-sacrifice above and beyond the call of duty reflect the highest honor on him and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the U.S. Army. (This award supersedes the prior award of the Silver Star (First Oak Leaf Cluster) as announced in G.O. No. 32, Headquarters X Corps, dated 23 February 1951, for gallantry in action on 27 November 1950.)
For his leadership and valor, Lieutenant Colonel Faith was awarded:
The Medal of Honor,
The Silver Star,
The Bronze Star with two Oak Leaf Clusters,
The Purple Heart with Oak Leaf Cluster.
*****
Colonel Faith's battalion was still in place when daylight came on 28 November, but there were serious gaps in the line. Although ordered to launch his attack at dawn, when the time came to carry out the order Colonel Faith had his hands full trying to hang onto his perimeter and recover the ground lost during the night. The night attack had been costly in casualties and morale. When it moved to Chosin Reservoir, Faith's battalion had about ninety per cent of its authorized strength plus 30 to 50 ROK soldiers attached to each company. Morale had been good.
Although casualties during the night had not been alarmingly high, a disproportionately high number of officers and noncoms had been put out of action. In Company A, for instance, when Lt. Raymond C. Denchfield was wounded in the knee, his company commander (Capt. Edward B. Scullion) set out to temporarily take charge of Denchfield's platoon. An enemy grenade killed Scullion. Colonel Faith then sent his assistant S-3 (Capt. Robert F. Haynes) to take command of Company A. He was killed by infiltrators before he reached the front lines. Colonel Faith telephoned the executive officer (Lieutenant Smith) and told him to take command of the company.
"It's your baby now," Colonel Faith told him.
The strength and determination of the enemy attack was also a blow to morale. It now appeared to Faith's men that, in addition to the severe weather, their troubles were to be compounded by fresh enemy troops. The cold weather was bad enough, especially as there were no warm-up tents within the perimeter. During the night, when they had not been engaged in beating off enemy attacks, the men could do nothing for relief but pull their sleeping bags up to their waists and sit quietly in their holes watching for another attack, or for morning. The light machine guns did not work well in the cold. This was especially true during the night when the temperature dropped sharply. The guns would not fire automatically and had to be jacked back by hand to fire single rounds. The heavy machine guns, however, with antifreeze solution in the water jackets, worked all right.
Similar attacks had fallen against the perimeter enclosing Colonel MacLean's force four miles to the south of Faith's battalion. Chinese had overrun two infantry companies during the early morning and got back to the artillery positions before members of two artillery batteries and of the overrun companies stopped them. After confused and intense fighting during the hours of darkness, the enemy withdrew at first light. Both sides suffered heavy casualties.
Colonel MacLean had another cause for concern. Soon after arriving in that area the night before, he had dispatched his regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon to patrol the surrounding area. Twelve hours after the platoon had set out, no member had returned.
Colonel Faith tried all day to recover the ground lost during the night. The most critical loss was the prominent knob at the boundary of the two companies east of the road. Lt. Richard H. Moore led his platoon in counterattacks on 28 November and succeeded in recovering all but the important knob itself. Repeatedly, Moore got his platoon to the bottom of the knob only to have the Chinese-many of whom were firing Americanmade weapons-drive it back again. The friendly counterattacks were greatly aided by mortar fire and by very close and effective air support by carrier-based Corsairs. There were planes in the air most of the day. Front-line observers communicated with the planes by the regular assault-wire lines to battalion headquarters, where a Marine tactical air control officer (Capt. Edward P. Stamford) relayed the instructions to the pilots. The planes made some passes so close to friendly troops that several targets were marked with white phosphorus grenades thrown by hand. More frequently the infantrymen used rifle grenades to mark their targets. In spite of these efforts, the Chinese managed to hold the important knob.
Late in the afternoon both Lieutenant Moore and the battalion sergeant major were put out of action by the same burst from an American caliber .45 Thompson submachine gun. One bullet killed the sergeant. Another one struck Moore squarely on the forehead, raised a bump and dazed him for a short time, but did not otherwise hurt him. Unable to recover the main terrain feature within its perimeter, Company C organized a reverse-slope defense directly in front of the knob.
Sixty or more casualties gathered at the battalion aid station during the day. By evening about twenty bodies had accumulated in front of the two-room farm house in which the aid station was operating. Inside, the building was crowded with wounded; a dozen more wounded, some wearing bandages, stood in a huddle outside.
Battle
On the night of November 27, the Peoples Volunteer Army 20th and 27th Corps of the 9th Army launched multiple attacks and ambushes along the road between the Chosin Reservoir and Koto-ri. At Yudam-ni, the 5th, 7th and 11th Marines were surrounded and attacked by the Peoples Volunteer Army 59th, 79th and 89th Division. Similarly, RCT-31 was isolated and ambushed at Sinhung-ni by the PVA 80th and the 81st Division. Finally, the Peoples Volunteer Army 60th Division surrounded elements of the 1st Marines at Kotor-ri from the north. Caught by complete surprise, the United Nations forces were cut off at Yudam-ni, Sinhung-ni, Hagaru-ri and Kotor-ri by November 28.
Actions at Yudam-ni
Acting on General Almond's instruction, General O. P. Smith ordered the 5th Marines to attack west toward Mupyong-ni on November 27. The attack was soon stalled by the Peoples Volunteer Army, 89th Division and forced the Marines to dig in on the ridges surrounding Yudam-ni. As night came, five Chinese battalions of the 79th Division attacked the ridges on the north and northwest of Yudam-ni, hoping to annihilate the garrison in one stroke. Close range fighting soon developed as the attackers infiltrated Marine positions, but the 5th and 7th Marines managed to hold the line despite suffering heavy casualties. As day broke on November 28, all five Chinese battalions were rendered combat ineffective.
Bodies of U.S. Marines, British Royal Marines Soldiers and Republic of Korea troops are gathered for a mass burial.
While the battle was underway at Yudam-ni, the Peoples Volunteer Army 59th Division blocked the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri by attacking the defending Charlie and Fox Companies of the 7th Marines. The successful assault forced Charlie Company to retreat into Yudam-ni which left Fox Company trapped in Toktong Pass, a vital pass that controlled the road. On November 29, several efforts by the 7th Marines failed to rescue Fox Company despite inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese. Aided by artillery from Hagaru-ri and air support, Fox Company managed to hold out for five days while enduring constant attacks by the Peoples Volunteer Army 59th Division.
Canadian Soldier at the Chosin.
After the devastating losses suffered by the Peoples Volunteer Army 79th Division at Yudam-ni, 9th Army headquarters realized that the bulk of the 1st Marine Division was stationed at Yudam-ni, with a garrison strength that was double the initial estimate. Believing that any further assaults would be futile, Song Shi-Lun ordered the 9th Army to switch their main attacks toward Sinhung-ni and Hagaru-ri, leaving Yudam-ni alone from November 28 to 30 November.
During the afternoon of November 28, a helicopter landed near the battalion's command post buildings. General Almond (X Corps commander), on one of his frequent inspections of his front lines, stepped out of the craft. He discussed the situation with Colonel Faith. Before leaving, General Almond explained that he had three Silver Star medals in his pocket, one of which was for Colonel Faith. He asked the colonel to select two men to receive the others, and a small group to witness the presentation. Colonel Faith looked around. Behind him, Lt. Everett F. Smalley, Jr., a platoon leader who had been wounded the night before and was awaiting evacuation, sat on a water can.
"Smalley," said Colonel Faith, "come over here and stand at attention.
Lt. Smalley did so. Just then the mess sergeant from Headquarters Company (Sgt. George A. Stanley) walked past.
"Stanley," the colonel called, "come here and stand at attention next to Lieutenant Smalley."
Sgt. Stanley obeyed. Colonel Faith then gathered a dozen or more men-walking wounded, drivers, and clerks-and lined them up behind Smalley and Stanley.
After pinning the medals to their parkas and shaking hands with the three men, General Almond spoke briefly to the assembled group, saying, in effect: "The enemy who is delaying you for the moment is nothing more than remnants of Chinese divisions fleeing north. We're still attacking and we're going all the way to the Yalu. Don't let a bunch of Chinese laundrymen stop you."
Unfolding his map, General Almond walked over and spread it on the hood of a nearby jeep and talked briefly with Colonel Faith. He gestured toward the north, and then departed. As the helicopter rose from the ground, Colonel Faith ripped the medal from his parka with his gloved hand and threw it down in the snow. His operations officer (Major Wesley J. Curtis) walked back to his command post with him.
"What did the General say?" Major Curtis asked, referring to the conversation at the jeep.
"You heard him," muttered Colonel Faith; "remnants fleeing north!"
Lieutenant Smalley went back to his water can. "I got me a Silver Star," he remarked to one of the men who had observed the presentation, "but I don't know what the hell for!"
That afternoon Colonel MacLean came forward to Colonel Faith's battalion. Toward evening, however, when he attempted to leave, he was stopped by a Chinese roadblock between the two battalions. He was confronted with the grim realization that the enemy had surrounded his position. Colonel MacLean remained at the forward position.
Just before dark, on November 28, American planes struck what appeared to be a battalion sized enemy group that was marching toward the battalion perimeter from the north. They were still two or three miles away. The fighting, even during the daytime, had been so serious that many of the units did not take time to carry rations to the front line. When food did reach the soldiers after dark, it was frozen and the men had no way to thaw it except by holding it against their bodies. By this time most of the men realized the enemy was mounting more than light skirmishes, as they had believed the previous evening.
"You'd better get your positions in good tonight," one platoon leader told his men that evening, "or there won't be any positions tomorrow."
As darkness fell on November 28, Colonel Faith's battalion braced itself for another attack. The most critical point was the enemy-held knob between the two companies east of the road. Lt. James G. Campbell (a platoon leader of Company D) had two machine guns aimed at the knob, and between his guns and the Chinese position there was a five-man rifle squad. Lieutenant Campbell was particularly concerned about this squad. He was afraid it was not strong enough to hold the position.
The Chinese harassing fire, fairly constant all day, continued to fall within the battalion perimeter after dark. It had been dark for three or four hours, however, before the enemy struck again, hitting several points along the perimeter. As expected, one enemy group attacked the vulnerable area east of the road. Lieutenant Campbell heard someone shout and soon afterward saw several figures running from the knoll held by the five-man squad. In the darkness he counted five men and shot the sixth, who by then was only ten feet from his foxhole.
Expecting more Chinese from the same direction, he shouted instructions for one of his machine-gun crews to displace to another position from which it could fire upon the knoll that the five men had just vacated. At that moment Lieutenant Campbell was knocked down. He thought someone had hit him in the face with a hammer, although he felt no pain. A mortar fragment about the size of a bullet had penetrated his cheek and lodged in the roof of his mouth. He remained with his gun crews. After the first Chinese had been driven back, enemy activity subsided for about an hour or two.
While this fighting was taking place, General Almond was flying to Tokyo at General MacArthur's order. The corps commander reported to General MacArthur November 28, and received orders to discontinue X Corps' attack and to withdraw and consolidate his forces for more cohesive action against the enemy.
Five hours after this meeting, on November 29, Colonel Faith's executive officer (Major Crosby P. Miller) went to the frontline companies with orders from Colonel MacLean to prepare at once to join the rest of his force four miles to the south. Because of the enemy roadblock separating the two elements of his task force, Colonel MacLean ordered Colonel Faith to abandon as much equipment as necessary in order to have enough space on the trucks to haul out the wounded, and then to attack south. All wounded men (about a hundred by then) were placed on trucks that formed in column on the road. Because of the necessity of maintaining a blackout, it was not wise or practical to burn the vehicles, kitchens, and other equipment that they left behind.
When the withdrawal order reached the rifle platoons, the plan for withdrawing the battalion segment by segment collapsed as the men abruptly broke contact with the Communists, fell back to the road, and assembled for the march. Enemy fire picked up immediately since the movement and the abrupt end of the firing made it obvious to the Chinese that the Americans were leaving.
Colonel Faith directed two companies to provide flank security by preceding the column along the high ground that paralleled the road on both sides for about two miles. Movement of the 1st Battalion column got under way about an hour before dawn on November 29.
Because Captain Seever (CO, Company C) had been wounded in the leg the day before, he instructed one of his platoon leaders (Lt. James 0. Mortrude to lead the company. Slipping and stumbling on the snow covered hills, Mortrude and the rest of the company set out along the high ground east of the road. Company B was on the opposite side.
Lieutenant Mortrude could hear the vehicles below, but could see nothing in the dark. He encountered no enemy. The column moved without opposition until, at the first sign of daylight, it reached the point where the road, following the shoreline, turned northeast to circle a long finger of ice. The Chinese roadblock was at the end of this narrow strip, and here enemy fire halted the column. The battalion's objective, the perimeter of the rest of MacLean's task force, was now just across the strip of ice and not much farther than a mile by the longer road distance.
Halting the vehicular column, Colonel Faith sent two companies onto a high hill directly north of the strip of ice with orders to circle the roadblock and attack it from the east. At the same time, he told Lieutenant Campbell to set up his weapons on a hill overlooking the enemy roadblock. Carrying two heavy machine guns and a 75-mm recoilless rifle, Lieutenant Campbell's group climbed the hill and commenced firing at the general roadblock area. From this hill he and his men could see the friendly perimeter on the opposite side of the narrow strip of ice, and to the south beyond that they could see enemy soldiers. A hundred or more Chinese were standing on a ridgeline just south of the friendly force. About a dozen Chinese, in formation, marched south on the road. They were beyond machine-gun range, but the recoilless rifle appeared to be effective on the ridgeline.
Down on the road, Colonel Faith's column suddenly received fire from the vicinity of the friendly units across the finger of ice. Believing that the fire was coming from his own troops, Colonel MacLean started across the ice to make contact with them and halt the fire. He was hit four times by enemy fire-the men watching could see his body jerk with each impact-but he continued and reached the opposite side. There he disappeared and was not seen again.
It now became evident that the fire was Chinese. Colonel Faith assembled as many men as he could and led them in a skirmish line directly across the ice. As it happened, a company-sized enemy force was preparing to attack positions of the 57th Field Artillery Battalion when Faith's attack struck this force in the rear. Disorganized, the Chinese attack fell apart. Colonel Faith's men killed about sixty Chinese and dispersed the rest. In the meantime, the two rifle companies approached the enemy force manning the roadblock. Now surrounded itself, the roadblock force also fell apart and disappeared into the hills. With the road open, the column of vehicles entered the perimeter of the other friendly forces.
After a search for Colonel MacLean failed to discover any trace of him, Colonel Faith assumed command and organized all remaining personnel into a task force. Friendly forces, although consolidated, still occupied a precarious position. During the afternoon Faith and his commanders formed a perimeter defense of an area about 600 by 2,000 yards into which the enemy had squeezed them. This perimeter, around a pocket of low, slightly sloping ground, was particularly vulnerable to attack. Except for the area along the reservoir,
Colonel Faith's task force was surrounded by ridgelines, all of which belonged to the Chinese. There were firing positions on a couple of mounds of earth within the perimeter and along the embankments of the road and single-track railroad that ran through the area. Several Korean houses, all damaged, stood within the perimeter. There were many Chinese bodies on the ground, one of which wore a new American field jacket that still had its original inspection tags. Rations were almost gone. Ammunition and gasoline supplies were low.
The men were numbed by the cold. Even those few who had managed to retain their bedrolls did not dare fall asleep for fear of freezing. The men had to move their legs and change position occasionally to keep their blood circulating. Automatic weapons had to be tried every fifteen to thirty minutes to keep them in working order.
American C-119 dropping supplies to Marines and Army troops while they are surrounded at Chosin Reservoir.
Three factors prevented the situation from being hopeless. 1st - airdrops were delivered on the afternoon of October 29. The first drop landed on high ground to the cast, and friendly forces had to fight to get it. They recovered most of the bundles, and captured several Chinese who had also been after the supplies. A second drop went entirely to the Chinese, landing outside the perimeter to the southwest. A third drop was successful. One airload consisted of rations, the other of ammunition.
2nd - The Marine tactical air support, which constantly harassed the enemy with napalm, rockets, and machine-gun fire. Throughout November 29 and 30, the Corsairs hit the enemy even during the night between the two days, when they operated by bright moonlight. Pilots later reported that so many enemy personnel were in the area, they could effectively drop their loads anywhere around the perimeter.
3rd - The hope that friendly forces would break through the Chinese from the south and effect a rescue. There was talk (which was true) that the assistant commander of the 7th Division (General Hodes) had even then formed a task force and was attempting to join them.
Colonel MacLean had asked for help the day before (November 28) when he realized he was surrounded. In a message to X Corps he had asked that his 2d Battalion, then at Hamhung awaiting orders from corps, be dispatched to him at once, even if it had to fight its way north.
Although corps failed to act promptly upon Colonel MacLean's request, it did form a task force from several small units then located at Hudong-ni, a small lumber town about a third of the distance north between Hagaru-ri and Colonel MacLean's force. Under command of General Hodes, this task force started north at mid-morning, November 28, but a strong enemy force halted it just north of the village, and forced it to withdraw.
The 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry, meanwhile waited for orders. Late on the afternoon of the 28th, corps ordered it to set up a blocking position at Majon-dong, a third of the distance from Hamhung to Hagaruri. It was to move by rail, with its trucks following by road. A little later corps changed the orders. The 2d Battalion was to move by rail to Majon-dong, the next morning. From there X Corps would furnish trucks to haul the battalion north to help Colonel MacLean.
The battalion arrived at Majon-dong and spent the entire day waiting for X Corps trucks. None came. When the battalion's own trucks arrived, as part of the initial plan for establishing a roadblock in the village, X Corps ordered them off the road. Because of confusion at X Corps headquarters, the battalion's own trucks were not released to it, even though the promised X Corps trucks did not arrive.
Two entire days passed without progress in providing relief for Colonel MacLean's surrounded battalions. It was while his 2d Battalion waited at Majon-dong that Colonel MacLean disappeared at the enemy roadblock.
On the morning of November 30, the relief battalion got under way. Before it had gone halfway to Hagaru-ri, it came under enemy attack, and did not reach Koto-ri until the following morning. By then, the road between Hagaru-ri and Hamhung was threatened by the enemy and it became necessary to divert the 2d Battalion to help protect the entire corps withdrawal route, and it was therefore held in Koto-ri.
Ten miles above Hagaru-ri, Colonel Faith's task force beat off enemy probing attacks that harassed his force during the night of 29-30 November. The Chinese concentrated on the two points where the road entered the perimeter, and on the south they succeeded in overrunning a 75-mm recoilless rifle position and capturing some of the crew. There were no determined attacks, however, and the perimeter was still intact when dawn came. It was another cold morning. The sky was clear enough to permit air support. Inside the perimeter, soldiers built fires to warm themselves and the fires drew no enemy fire. Hopefully, the men decided they had withstood the worst part of the enemy attack.
A litter-bearing helicopter made two trips to the area on 30 November, carrying out four seriously wounded men. Fighter planes made a strike on high ground around Task Force Faith, and cargo planes dropped more supplies, some of which again fell to the enemy. As the afternoon wore on, it became apparent that no relief column was coming that day.
Colonel Faith and Major Curtis organized a group of men to serve as a counterattack force to repel any Chinese penetration that might occur during the coming night. As darkness settled for another sixteen-hourlong night, commanders tried to encourage their troops: "Hold out one more night and we've got it made."
On November 3o, again the Chinese made another of their dishearteningly regular night attacks. This one showed more determination than those of the two previous nights, although it did not appear to be well coordinated, nor concentrated in any one area. Capt. Erwin B. Bigger (CO, Company D), in an attempt to confuse the Chinese, someone hit upon the idea of firing a different colored flare every time the enemy fired one, and blowing a whistle whenever the enemy blew one.
Soon after midnight, when the enemy attack was most intense, a small group of Chinese broke into the perimeter at one end. Faith sent his counterattack force to patch up the line. From then until morning there were five different penetrations, and as many counterattacks. One of the penetrations, just before first light on December 1, resulted in enemy seizure of a small hill within the perimeter, thus endangering the defenses. Battalion headquarters called Company D to ask if someone there could get enough men together to counterattack and dislodge the Chinese.
Lt. Robert D. Wilson, a platoon leader, volunteered for the job. "Come on, all you fighting men!" he called out. "We've got a counterattack to make."
During the night Lieutenant Wilson had directed mortar fire, but the ammunition was gone by this time. Assembling a force of 20 or 25 men, he waited a few minutes until there was enough light. His force was short of ammunition-completely out of rifle grenades and having only smallarms ammunition and three hand grenades.
Lieutenant Wilson carried a recaptured tommy gun. When daylight came the men moved out, Lieutenant Wilson out in front, leading. Near the objective an enemy bullet struck his arm, knocking him to the ground. He got up and went on. Another bullet struck him in the arm or chest. "That one bit," he said, continuing. A second or two later, another bullet struck him in the forehead and killed him.
SFC Fred Sugua took charge and was in turn killed within a few minutes. Eventually, the remaining men succeeded in driving the Chinese out of the perimeter.
Even after daylight, which usually ended the enemy attacks, the Chinese made one more attempt to knock out a 75-mm recoilless rifle that guarded the road. In about two-platoon strength, they came up a deep ditch along the road to the south. Lieutenant Campbell rushed Corporal Armentrout forward to plug the gap with his machine gun. Hit by a mortar round the night before, the water jacket on the machine gun was punctured and, after several minutes, the gun jammed. Armentrout sent his assistant back for the other heavy machine gun, the last good one in the section. With it, and by himself, Corporal Armentrout killed at least twenty enemy soldiers and stopped the attack.
On December 1, as Lieutenant Campbell was telling the battalion S4 (Capt. Raymond Vaudrevil) that everything was under control, a mortar shell landed ten feet away and knocked him down. Fragments sprayed his left side, and wounded two other men. Someone pulled Campbell under a nearby truck, then helped him to the aid station. The aid-station squad tent was full; about fifty patients were inside. Another thirty-five wounded were lying outside in the narrow-gauge railroad cut where the aid station was located.
Dazed with shock, Lieutenant Campbell lay outside about half an hour. Colonel Faith appeared at the aid station, asked all men who could possibly do so to come back on line. "If we can hold out forty minutes more," the Colonel pleaded, "we'll get air support."
There was not much response. Most of the men were seriously wounded. "Come on, you lazy bastards," Colonel Faith said, "and give us a hand."
That roused several men, including Lieutenant Campbell. Because he could not walk, he crawled twenty yards along the railroad track and found a carbine with one round in it. Dragging the carbine, Campbell continued to crawl to the west. He collapsed into a foxhole before he reached the lines, and waited until someone helped him back to the aid station. This time he got inside for treatment. The medical personnel had no more bandages. There was no more morphine. They cleansed his wounds with disinfectant, and he dozed there for several hours.
As it was everywhere else in the perimeter, the situation at the aid station was most difficult. Near the medical tent a tarpaulin had been stretched over the railroad cut to shelter additional patients, and other wounded were crowded into two small Korean huts. Company aid men, when they could, assisted the medical officer (Capt. Vincent J. Navarre) and three enlisted men who worked continuously at the aid station.
Two thirds of the No. 2 medical chests were lost during the withdrawal from the first positions. The jeep hauling them had simply disappeared. Most of the surgical equipment was gone. Aid men improvised litters from ponchos and field jackets. One splint set was on hand, however, and there was plenty of blood plasma. The aid station had one complete No. 1 chest. When the bandages were gone, aid men used personal linens, handkerchiefs, undershirts, and towels. They gathered up parachutes recovered with the airdropped bundles, using white ones for dressings and colored ones to cover the wounded and keep them warm. Sgt. Leon Pugowski of the Headquarters Company kitchen had managed to save two stoves, coffee, and some cans of soup. He set the stoves up in the aid station, and some of the seriously wounded got hot soup or coffee.
Task Force Faith had been under attack for eighty hours in sub-zero weather. None of the men had washed or shaved during that time, nor eaten more than a bare minimum. Frozen feet and hands were common. The weather appeared to be getting worse, threatening air support and aerial resupply. Few men believed they could hold out another night against determined attacks.
Captain Seever (CO, Company C) sat on the edge of a hole discussing the situation with Major Curtis (battalion S-3). An enemy mortar shell landed 10 to 15 feet away and exploded without injuring either of them. Seever shrugged his shoulders. "Major," he said, "I feel like I'm a thousand years old."
An A-10 Thunderbolt II firing a AGM-65 Maverick missile.
A single low-flying Marine fighter bomber appeared over the surrounded task force about 1000 on 1 December. Establishing radio contact with the tactical air control party, the pilot stated that if the weather improved as forecasted, he would guide more tactical aircraft into the area shortly after noon. He also stated that there were no friendly forces on the road between Colonel Faith's perimeter and Hagaru-ri.
Colonel Faith decided to try to break out of the perimeter and reach Hagaru-ri in a single dash rather than risk another night where he was. He planned to start the breakout about 1300 so that it would coincide with the air strike. He ordered the artillery batteries and the Heavy Mortar Company to shoot up all remaining ammunition before that time and then to destroy their weapons. He placed the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, in the lead, followed by the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, the Heavy Mortar Company, and the 3d Battalion of the 31st Infantry. Halftrack vehicles of Battery D, 15th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion, were interspersed throughout the column.
To minimize danger from enemy attack, Colonel Faith wanted the column to be as short as possible -only enough vehicles to haul out the wounded. All other men would walk. Vehicles, equipment, and supplies that could not be carried, or that were not necessary for the move, he ordered destroyed. The men selected twenty-two of the best vehicles-2 1/2-ton, 3/4-ton and l/4-ton trucksand lined them up on the road. They drained gasoline from the other vehicles and filled the tanks of the ones they were going to take. Then they destroyed the remaining vehicles with white phosphorus or thermite grenades.
Lieutenant Campbell and the other wounded men-several hundred of them by this time-were placed in the vehicles. They lay there for about an hour while final preparations for the breakout attempt were made. Enemy mortar shells began dropping in the vicinity.
There was little danger at the beginning of the breakout from the direction of the reservoir, which was to the west.
Lieutenant Mortrude moved his platoon out about 1300. Lieutenant Smith led out Company A. The men of these units had walked barely out of the area that had been their defensive perimeter when enemy bullets whistled past or dug into the ground behind them.
At almost the same time, four friendly planes, in close support of the breakout action, missed the target and dropped napalm bombs on the lead elements. The halftrack in which Mortrude planned to ride was set ablaze. Several men were burned to death immediately. About five others, their clothes afire, tried frantically to beat out the flames. Everyone scattered. Disorganization followed.
Up to this point, units had maintained organizational structure, but suddenly they began to fall apart. Intermingling in panic, they disintegrated into leaderless groups of men. Most of the squad and platoon leaders and the commanders of the rifle companies were dead or wounded. Many of the key personnel from the battalions were casualties. Capt. Harold B. Bauer (CO, Headquarters Company), Major Crosby P. Miller (battalion executive officer), Major Curtis (battalion S-3), Capt. Wayne E. Powell (battalion S-2) and Lt. Henry M. Moore (Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon leader) had all been wounded. The same was true of the important non-coms.
No one had slept for several days. One thought drove the men: they had to keep moving if they were to get out. Even those who were not wounded were strongly tempted to lie down and go to sleep; but they knew they would be lost if they did.
Lieutenant Mortrude gathered ten men around him and proceeded to carry out his orders. Firing as they advanced, they dispersed twenty or more enemy soldiers who fled. As they ran down the road screaming obscenities at the enemy, Mortrude and his men encountered several small Chinese groups, which they killed or scattered. One such group was putting in communication lines. Another was repairing a wrecked jeep. Out of breath and hardly able to walk on his wounded leg, Lieutenant Mortrude and those men still with him reached a blown-out bridge two miles or more south of the starting point. Attracting no enemy fire, they stopped there to rest and wait for the column. A little later a Company A platoon leader (Lt. Herbert E. Marshburn, Jr.) came up with a group of men and joined them. Together they crossed under the bridge and moved to the east, then south, to reconnoiter. Enemy fire came in from the high ground to the northeast. Most of the men fell to the ground to take cover. Lieutenant Mortrude wondered why the vehicles were not coming down the road, since he had expected the column to follow closely. As he lay on the slope of the ridge, a bullet struck him in the head and knocked him unconscious.
It was mid-afternoon or later when the truck column stopped at the blown-out bridge where it was necessary to construct a bypass over the rough and steep banks of the stream. A half-track towed the trucks across while the able-bodied men with the column took care to prevent them from overturning. In the middle of this tediously slow process, Chinese riflemen began firing at the trucks and men. One truck-the one in which Lieutenant Campbell was lying-stalled in the middle of the stream bed. Enemy fire struck some of the wounded men in the truck. Campbell, figuring it would be better for him to get out and move under his own power, crawled out of the truck. He started walking up the ditch toward the lead vehicles, which had stopped again a third of a mile ahead. After he had gone about two hundred yards enemy riflemen began shooting at him, forcing him to the ground. He discovered his head was clear now, and the feeling of weakness had vanished. Although his leg and side pained him, and although his cheek and mouth were swollen from the wound he had received three days before, he felt pretty good. When a 3-ton truck came by after about twenty minutes, he got on it. He never did learn what happened to the truck he had left.
When Lieutenant Mortrude regained consciousness on the slope of the ridge, he noticed friendly troops moving up the hill in the area south of the blown-out bridge. An aid man (Cpl. Alfonso Camoesas) came past and bandaged his head. Then Lieutenant Mortrude stumbled across the ridgeline, passing many American dead and wounded on the slope. Dazed and in a condition of shock, he followed a group of men he could vaguely see ahead of him. The group went toward the reservoir and walked out onto the ice.
Colonel Faith selected Company C, 32d Infantry, as advance guard for the column. Lieutenant Mortrude's platoon, the unit least hurt, was to take the point position for the company. Supported by a dual 40-mm halftrack, this platoon would clear the road for the vehicle column. Lieutenant Mortrude, who was wounded in the knee, planned to ride the halftrack. Company A, followed by Company B, would act as flank security east of the road.
Back at the blown-out bridge the column moved forward as fast as the halftrack could drag the trucks through the bypass. The battalion motor officer (Lt. Hugh R. May) stood in the road supervising the operation. He appeared to be unconcerned about the enemy fire, which remained heavy as long as there were men and trucks at the roadblock. It was late in the afternoon before the last truck was across.
Vital Air Support.
The main body of the column, meanwhile, waited until Colonel Faith could reorganize it. Since Company C and part of Company A were disorganized by the burning napalm, he ordered Company B to take the lead and to advance with marching fire to the blown-out bridge. The vehicular column moved slowly down the road, keeping abreast of Company B, which was sweeping the high ground. Air cover was continuous.
Colonel Faith, a blanket around his shoulders, walked up and down the line of trucks as he organized a group to assault the enemy who were firing from positions east of the road. Each time he passed his jeep in the center of the column he fired several bursts from the caliber .50 machine gun mounted on it.
One group of men, under Captain Bigger (CO, Company D), was to clear out the area between the road and the reservoir. Colonel Faith instructed the S-2 of the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry (Major Robert E. Jones), to gather all available men and move them onto the high ground south of the hairpin curve, while he himself organized another group to move onto the high ground just north of the roadblock at the hairpin curve. They would then attack from opposite directions at the same time.
Captain Bigger, blinded in one eye by a mortar fragment and wounded in the leg, supported himself on a mortar aiming stake and waved his group up the hill, hobbling up himself. Like Captain Bigger, the majority of his group was walking wounded.
Heavy enemy fire also came from the west side of the road, from the direction of the reservoir. This fire raked the truck column, hitting the wounded men in the trucks. Darkness was not far off. Colonel Faith was desperately anxious to get his column moving and the wounded men out before the Chinese closed in on them. He got some wounded into the ditch to form a base of fire and then organized several groups to assault the enemy positions.
It was almost dark when Major Jones and Colonel Faith, each with a hundred men or less, launched their attacks against the roadblock and knocked it out. Colonel Faith, hit by grenade fragments, was mortally wounded. A man next to him, hit by fragments of the same grenade. tried to help him down to the road, but was unable to do so. Some other men came by, carried him down to the road, and put him in the cab of a truck.
Colonel Faith's task force, which had started to break up soon after it got under way that afternoon, now disintegrated completely because those men who had commanded the battalions, companies, and platoons were either dead or wounded so seriously they could exercise no control. The task force crumbled into individuals, or into groups of two or ten or twenty men.
Major Jones, with the help of several others, took charge of the largest group of men remaining-those who stayed to help with the trucks carrying the wounded. Enemy fire had severely damaged the truck column. Several trucks were knocked out and blocked the column, and others had flat tires. The time was about 1700, December 1, and it was almost dark.
Those who were able, now removed all wounded men from three destroyed 2 1/2-ton trucks which blocked the column, carried the wounded to other trucks, and then pushed the destroyed vehicles over the cliff toward the reservoir. Someone shouted for help to gather up all men who had been wounded during the roadblock action. For half an hour the able-bodied men searched both sides of the road. When the column was ready to move again the wounded were piled two deep in most of the trucks. Men rode across the hoods and on the bumpers, and six or eight men hung to the sides of each truck. After re-forming the truck column with all operating vehicles, Major Jones organized as many able-bodied and walking wounded men as he could-between a hundred and two hundred men and started south down the road. The trucks were to follow.
The group of men that had gone with Captain Bigger, after having run the Chinese off of the high ground on the west side of the road, found that there were still enemy soldiers between it and the road. Rather than fight back to the road, Bigger led his men west and south to the reservoir shore, and then out onto the ice. Another group of about fifteen men, including Lieutenant Smith (who had commanded Company A), Lt. Richard E. Moore (one of his platoon leaders), and Lieutenant Barnes (an artillery forward observer), after knocking out one of the enemy machine guns on the same side of the road, watched Captain Bigger and his men heading toward the ice. They debated what they should do. They could see the trucks stalled along the road. They were out of ammunition. Deciding there was no reason to go back, they continued toward the reservoir ice. A group of 15 or 20 Chinese, trying to head them off, came as far as the reservoir bank and fired at them without effect. One enemy soldier, however, did follow them out on the ice to bayonet a man who had fallen behind. Six men of this group, including Smith, were wounded or had frostbitten feet.
Lieutenant Campbell stayed with the column of trucks following the men with Major Jones. Just before leaving the last roadblock position, Campbell happened to meet his platoon sergeant (MSgt. Harold M. Craig). Craig was wounded in the middle of his back and was about to throw away his carbine and rely on his bayonet. Figuring that he would have to make a break for it as soon as darkness came, Craig felt his carbine would encumber him. Campbell gladly accepted the carbine. It had a "banana clip" in it, with thirty rounds.
As the trucks moved forward Lieutenant Campbell found one with a place on the side to which he could cling. There were five other men clinging o the same side. It was a ragged and desperatelooking column of men and vehicles. They were a mixture of the remnants of all units, a large percentage being walking wounded. About 15 of the original 22 trucks were left.
A mile or two beyond the roadblock two burned-out tanks partly blocked the road and delayed the column until men could construct a bypass. Beyond that, the column made steady but slow progress for another mile or so. Some of the men began to believe they were safe. There were stragglers along the road-men who had struck out for themselves during previous delays. Some of them swung onto the passing trucks. By 2100 and the column had covered more than half of the approximate ten miles between the last defensive perimeter and Hagaru-ri. The column approached Hudong-ni, a small lumber village. As the leading truck, which was some distance ahead of the rest of the column, entered the town, Chinese soldiers opened fire and killed the driver.
The truck overturned and spilled out the wounded men, a few of whom managed to work back up the road to warn the rest of the column. At this point Major Jones decided it would be advisable to get away from the road and follow the railroad tracks south. The railroad paralleled the road but was closer to the reservoir shoreline. Some of the men followed him.
About 75 to 100 men stayed with the vehicles. An artillery officer collected all who could walk and fire a weapon, and led them forward. At the edge of the village they began to receive fire from rifles and at least one automatic weapon of an enemy unit of undetermined size. After returning the fire for a few minutes, the group returned to the vehicles. They picked up several wounded men from the overturned truck and took them back. The trucks moved a little closer to the village and halted. It was then 2200 or later, 1 December.
A group of officers and men decided they would wait where they were. Word of their situation, they argued, must surely by then have gotten through to Hagaru-ri. Aid would undoubtedly arrive soon.
They waited about an hour or so until the rear of the column began to receive small-arms and mortar fire. Then they decided to make a run for it. Lieutenant Campbell was still hanging to one of the trucks. "We'll never make it through," he thought.
As the column proceeded through the village, moving slowly, enemy fire killed the drivers of the first three trucks. The column halted and an enemy machine gun immediately raked it at point-blank range. Jumping off the tailgate of the third truck, Lieutenant Campbell scrambled for the right side of the road where an embankment separated it from a small plot of cultivated ground eight or ten feet beneath. In the darkness he could see only outlines of the trucks on the road and the flashes of a machine gun firing from a hill on the opposite side of the road. Leaning against the embankment, he fired his carbine at the machine gun's flashes. A body, an arm torn off, lay nearby on the road. The overturned truck, its wheels in the air, rested in the small field below the road. Someone pinned under it kept pounding on the truck's body. Wounded men, scattered nearby, screamed either in pain or for help. Up on the road someone kept yelling for men to drive the trucks through. Chinese soldiers closed in on the rear of the column.
Campbell turned in time to see a 3/4-ton truck coming over the embankment toward him. As he scrambled to one side, the truck ran over his foot, bruising the bones. Someone had decided to try to get the lead vehicles off the road. Pushed by the fourth, the first three trucks, without their drivers, jammed together, rolled off the embankment, and overturned. Wounded men inside were spilled and crushed. The frantic screams of these men seemed to Lieutenant Campbell like the world gone mad. He fired his last three rounds at the enemy machine gun, headed for the railroad track on the opposite side of the tiny field, and dived into a culvert underneath the railroad. It began to snow again-a fine, powdery snow.
Everyone scattered. Corporal Camoesas (company aid man) found himself in a group of about fifteen men, none of whom he knew. Carrying six wounded, the group reached the reservoir. As Camoesas walked out on the ice, he looked back. Several trucks were burning.
Lieutenant Campbell crawled through the culvert. He found a man, wounded in the leg, who could not walk. Two other soldiers came over the embankment and joined him. Dragging the wounded man, the group walked in a crouch across the rice paddy to a large lumber pile in the middle of the field. There, two more soldiers joined them. At the edge of the reservoir, three quarters of a mile away, several others joined Campbell's party. Staying close to the shoreline, the men walked on the reservoir ice. Campbell was not sure where Hagaru-ri was, but he felt they would reach it if they followed the reservoir shore.
The reservoir ice was not slippery. The wind had blown off most of the snow, leaving a rough-surfaced crust, and it was so thick that 76-mm shells had ricocheted off without appreciable effect.
American, United Nations and Republic Of Korea Prisoners Of War.
Most of the men who had served with Task Force Faith were left where the truck column stopped near the lumber village of Hudong-ni, or were strewn along the road from there to the northernmost position. When those few men who could move had left, the others were either captured or frozen.
The men who went with Major Jones, after following the railroad tracks for some distance, had been fired on by an enemy machine gun. Many of the men took off toward the reservoir and began arriving at the Marine perimeter soon after midnight.
Faced with tough fighting between the blocking Chinese divisions and the retreating Marines, Gen, O. P. Smith remarked: "Retreat, hell! We're not retreating, we're just advancing in a different direction."
For the breakout, the Marines formed into a convoy with a single M4A3 Sherman tank as the lead. The plan was to have 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5) as the vanguard of the convoy, with three battalions covering the rear. At the same time, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7) would attack towards Fox Company in order to open the road at Toktong Pass. To start the breakout, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (3/7) had to first attack south and capture Hill 1542 and Hill 1419 in order to cover the road from Chinese attacks.
During a lull in the fighting, the Marines taking a break by the convoy.
On the morning of December 1, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (3/7) engaged the Peoples Volunteer Army 175th Regiment of the 59th Division at Hill 1542 and Hill 1419. The tenacious Chinese defenders soon forced the Marines to dig in on the slopes between the road and the peaks when the convoy passed 3/7's position by the afternoon. With Hagaru-ri still not captured, the Peoples Volunteer Army High Command scrambled the 79th Division to resume attacks on Yudam-ni while the 89th Division rushed south towards Koto-ri. The Chinese struck at night, and the ferocious fighting forced the rear covering forces to call in night fighters to suppress the attacks. The fighting lasted well into the morning of December 2, until all the Marines managed to withdraw from Yudam-ni.
At the same time, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7) also tried to break the Chinese blockade at Hill 1419 on December 1. Despite being badly reduced by combat, hunger and frostbite, the Peoples Volunteer Army 59th Division sent in its last five platoons and refused to yield. As night approached, 1/7 finally captured the peak and started to march through the hills on the east side of the road. Relying on the element of surprise, 1/7 managed to destroy several Chinese positions along the road. On the morning of December 2, a joint attack by Fox Company and 1/7 secured the Toktong Pass, thus opening the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri.
Chinese soldiers captured in vicinity of the Treadway bridge site in the Funchilin Pass on 9 December 1950.jpg
Although the road had been opened between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the convoy still had to fight through the numerous Chinese positions on the hills overlooking the road. On the first night of the retreat, the Chinese struck the convoy in force and inflicted heavy casualties upon 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5).
Although strong air cover suppressed most of the Chinese forces for the rest of the march, the cold weather, harassing fire, raiding parties, and road blocks slowed the retreat to a crawl while inflicting numerous casualties. Despite those difficulties, the convoy reached Hagaru-ri in an orderly fashion on the afternoon of December 3, with the withdrawal completed on December 4.
Task Force Faith
Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Faith, Jr. RCT-31 was later known as "Task Force Faith" due to his leadership.
Regimental Combat Team 31 (RCT-31), later known as "Task Force Faith", was a hastily formed regimental combat team from the 7th Infantry Division that guarded the right flank of the Marine advance towards Mupyong-ni. Before the battle, RCT-31 was spread thin with main elements separated on the hills north of Sinhung-ni, the inlet west of Sinhung-ni, and the town of Hudong-ni south of Sinhung-ni. Although the Chinese believed RCT-31 to be a reinforced regiment, the task force was actually under strength with one battalion missing, due to the bulk of the 7th Infantry Division being scattered over northeast Korea.
Chinese human wave assaults in the Battle of Chosin Reservoir.
On the night of November 27, three regiments from the 80th Division attacked the northern hills and the inlets, completely surprising the defenders. The ensuing battle inflicted heavy casualties on the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry to the north of Sinhung-ni, while the 57th Field Artillery Battalion and the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry were almost overrun at the inlet. The Chinese also sent the 242nd Regiment of the 81st Division towards Hill 1221, an undefended hill that controlled the road between Sinhung-ni and Hudong-ni. As the night's fighting ended, RCT-31 was separated into three elements.
Believing that the defenders were completely destroyed at the inlet, the Chinese stopped their attacks and proceeded to loot the United States positions for food and clothing. As the morning came on November 28, the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry counterattacked the Peoples Volunteer Army 239th Regiment at the inlet, sending the surprised Chinese back in a complete rout.
While RCT-31 was under siege, General Almond finally instructed the 1st Marine Division to rescue RCT-31 by breaking out of Yudam-ni — an impossible order for General Smith to implement. Only the 31st Tank Company tried to rescue RCT-31 by attacking Hill 1221, but without infantry support, the two armored attacks on November 28 and 29, were stalled by slippery roads, rough terrain, and close infantry assaults. By November 30, the United States forces evacuated Hudong-ni in order to defend Hagaru-ri, leaving the rest of RCT-31 completely stranded.
On November 30, Major General David G. Barr, the commander of the 7th Infantry Division, flew into the Sinhung-ni inlet and met with Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr., who by now had assumed command of RCT-31. Don Faith expressed the difficulties for a breakout, particularly the 500 wounded that RCT-31 had to carry.
On the same day, the Peoples Volunteer Army 94th Division arrived as reinforcements for the 80th Division. By midnight, four Chinese regiments renewed their attacks and Zhan Danan, the commander of the 80th Division, ordered the complete destruction of RCT-31 before dawn. Again, the 57th Battalion's AA guns held the Chinese at bay, but the shell supplies were running desperately low. On the day of December 1, Col. Faith finally ordered RCT-31 to breakout from Sinhung-ni and withdraw to Hagaru-ri.
A column of troops and armor of the 1st Marine Division move through communist Chinese lines during their successful breakout from the Chosin
The breakout began as soon as the weather allowed air cover on December 1. As the soldiers formed a convoy and tried to leave the perimeter, the Peoples Volunteer Army 241st Regiment immediately swarmed over the American forces, with three other regiments closing in.
Napalm Carrier - One hundred and fifty gallons of flaming death, seventy five gallons of napalm in each of the dark colored wing tanks, speeds on its way toward the enemy.
The Marines watch F4U Corsairs drop napalm on Chinese positions.
Left with no choice, the covering aircraft dropped napalm right in front of RCT-31, causing casualties among both Chinese and United States troops. The resulting firestorm wiped out the blocking Chinese company, allowing the convoy to advance. As the front of RCT-31 made their way forward, heavy small arms fire caused many members of the rear guard to seek shelter below the road instead of protecting the trucks.
Chinese fire also killed or wounded those already in the trucks as well as the drivers, who viewed the job as a form of suicide. Slowly, the convoy approached a roadblock under Hill 1221 in the late afternoon. Several parties tried to clear Hill 1221, but after taking part of the hill, the leaderless soldiers continued out onto the frozen reservoir instead of returning to the column.
As Col. Faith led an assault on the roadblock, he was hit by a Chinese grenade and subsequently died of his wounds.
The convoy managed to fight past the first road block, but as it reached the second at Hudong-ni, RCT-31 disintegrated under Chinese attacks. About 1,050 survivors managed to reach Hagaru-ri, and out of which only 385 were able-bodied. The remnants of RCT-31 were formed into a provisional army battalion for the rest of the battle.
Actions at Hagaru-ri
A Direct Air Support Center at Hagaru-ri.
To support the marine attack towards Mupyong-ni, Hagaru-ri became an important supply dump with an airfield under construction. General Smith and the 1st Marine Division headquarters were also located at Hagaru-ri. With the bulk of the 1st Marine Division gathered at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri was lightly defended by two battalions from the 1st and 7th Marines, the rest of the garrison being composed of engineers and rear support units from both the Army and the Marines.
The original Chinese plan called for the 58th Division to attack Hagaru-ri on the night of November 27, but the division was lost in the countryside due to the outdated Japanese maps it used. It was not until the dawn of November 28 that the 58th Division arrived at Hagaru-ri. Meanwhile, with the fighting and ambushes that had occurred the previous night, the garrison at Hagaru-ri noticed the Chinese forces around them. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge, commander of 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1), predicted the Chinese attack would come on the night of November 28. Almost everyone, including rear support units that had little combat training, was pressed into the front line due to the manpower shortage, and the entire perimeter was on full alert by 21:30.
It was not long before the Peoples Volunteer Army 173rd Regiment attacked the western and the southern perimeter, while the 172nd Regiment struck the hills on the northern perimeter. Despite the preparations, the understrength garrison was soon overwhelmed, with the Chinese opening several gaps in the defense and reaching the rear areas. The resulting chaos, however, caused a breakdown in discipline among the Chinese soldiers, and the attackers started to loot food and clothing instead of exploiting the situation. The defending Americans destroyed the Chinese forces in counterattacks, while a breakdown of communications between the two Chinese regiments allowed the gaps to close. When the fighting stopped, the Chinese had only gained the East Hill on the northern perimeter Another attack was planned for the night of November 29, but air raids broke up the Chinese formations before it could be carried out.
Wounded marines are evacuated by a HO3S-1 helicopter from VMO-6.
Given the critical manpower shortage at Hagaru-ri, Gen. O. P. Smith ordered a task force to be sent north from Koto-ri to open the road south of Hagaru-ri. In response, a task force was formed with 41 Royal Marine Commando, G Company of the 1st Marines and B Company of the 31st Infantry. The task force was dubbed "Task Force Drysdale" after its commander Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, who also commanded 41 Commando.
*****
The Royal Marines were in Korea in several guises, the most famous one probably being 41st (Independent) Commando which fought with the United States Marine Corps at Chosin.
During the Korean War 41 Commando was reconstituted as 41 (Independent) Commando following a request from the United Nations Command for more amphibious raiding forces. The "Independent" designation meant that their commander had sole responsibility for their unit and did not have to consult with higher headquarters on operational and logistical matters. On 16 August 1950 219 Royal Marine volunteers were assembled in Bickleigh which then was the Commando School.
They were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale DSO, MBE an experienced World War II Commando veteran who was the Chief Instructor at the Royal Marines Officer school.
The commandoes travelled to Japan in civilian clothes, with most of the civilian clothing issued by the Admiralty. The unit received more volunteers en route from 3 Commando Brigade involved in the Malayan Emergency. Arriving in Japan on 15 September 1950, the Commandos were issued American winter uniforms and weapons but retained their green berets, battle dress and boots. The first mission of the unit was in October where the Commandos embarked on two American high speed transports the USS Horace A. Bass (APD-124) and USS Wantuck (APD-125) supported by the destroyer USS De Haven (DD-727), where they executed a series of raids on the North Korean coast near Wonsan to disrupt North Korean transportation facilities.
On November 10, 1950, 41 (Independent) Commando joined the United Nations advance in North Korea where they served with the United States Marine Corps; the second time the two organisations had served together, the first being the Boxer Rebellion. During the Battle of Chosin Reservoir Lt. Col. Drysdale was given command of a 900 man unit of his own Commando, American, and South Korean forces called Task Force Drysdale. Their hard fighting together with the American Marines led to 41 Independent Commando being awarded the American Presidential Unit Citation that the 1st Marine Division earned. However it was not awarded until 1957.
The Commando reformed in Japan and in April 1951 were assigned to what eventually became the 1st Commonwealth Division. They raided the North Korean coast with the Republic of Korea Marine Corps until 41 Commando returned to England in December 1951. They were disbanded in on 2 February 1951, the Commando having 31 Marines killed and 17 captured with one Royal Marine choosing to stay in North Korea.
"As for the impression that the Royal Marines made on their American colleagues, one U.S. Marine spoke for most, if not all survivors of the "Frozen Chosin": "I walked into Hagaru from Yudam-ni where I learned that the British had supplied us with a fighting force. Before that we laughed at the words `U.N. Forces' because we had not seen the troops of any other nation except the Chinese. I was delighted to meet the British. When they came around you could stop looking for a fight, because they would be right in the middle of it...."
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On the afternoon of November 29, Task Force Drysdale pushed north from Koto-ri while under constant attack from the Peoples Volunteer Army 60th Division.
The task force's harrowing experience later earned the road the nickname "Hell Fire Valley". As the Chinese attacks dragged on, the task force became disorganized, and a destroyed truck in the convoy later split the task force into two segments. Although the lead segment of the task force fought its way into Hagaru-ri on the night of November 29, the rear segment was destroyed. Despite the heavy losses, the task force managed to bring in 300 badly needed infantrymen for the defence at Hagaru-ri.
John William Watlington died on November 29, 1950 at Chosin Reservoir, North Korea, at age of 29.
As more reinforcements arrived from Hudong-ni on November 30, the garrisons attempted to recapture the East Hill. All efforts failed despite the destruction of a Chinese company. When darkness settled, the Peoples Volunteer Army 58th Division gathered its remaining 1,500 soldiers in a last ditch attempt to capture Hagaru-ri. The reinforced defenders annihilated most of the attacking forces, with only the defences around the East Hill giving way. As the Chinese tried to advance from the East Hill, they were cut down by the 31st Tank Company.
By December 1, the Peoples Volunteer Army 58th Division was virtually destroyed, with the remainder waiting for reinforcements from the 26th Corps of the 9th Army. But much to the frustration of Song Shi-Lun, the 26th Corps did not arrive before the marines broke out of Yudam-ni.
The airfield was opened to traffic on December 1, allowing United Nation forces to bring in reinforcements and to evacuate the dead and the wounded. With the marines at Yudam-ni completing their withdrawal on December 4, the trapped United Nations forces could finally start their breakout towards the port of Hungnam.
GIs and Korean service corpsmen stack up the enormous pile of empty artillery and mortar shell casings at a collecting point near the front, pointing to the huge amount of lead thrown at the enemy in four days of fighting.
Breakout
Map of the Retreat from the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir.
After a short period of rest, the breakout began on December 6, with the 7th Marines as the vanguard of the retreating column while the 5th Marines covered the rear. At the same time, the belated Peoples Volunteer Army 26th Corps arrived at Hagaru-ri with its 76th and 77th Division relieving the 58th and 60th Divisions. As the 7th Marines pushed aside the Peoples Volunteer Army 76th Division south of Hagaru-ri, the 5th Marines took over the Hagaru-ri perimeter and recaptured the East Hill from the 76th Division. In a last effort to stop the breakout, the customary Chinese night attack returned with the 76th and 77th Division striking the Hagaru-ri perimeter from all directions. The marines repulsed the Chinese attacks, inflicting heavy casualties.
An F86 Sabre Jet peels off for an attack on a communist troop and supply concentration in the snow-covered Korean village.
Meanwhile, the 7th Marines opened the road between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri by capturing the high ground surrounding the road. But as soon as the marines pulled out, the 77th Division returned to the peaks and attacked the column. Chaotic fighting broke out within the column and the retreat was slowed to a crawl. The air cover, however, returned to subdue the Chinese forces, and the fighting destroyed most of the blocking troops. On December 7, the rest of the column managed to reach Koto-ri with little difficulty with the last elements arrived at Koto-ri that night.
After the failure of the 26th Corps at Hagaru-ri, the Peoples Volunteer Army High Command ordered the 26th and the 27th Corps to chase the escaping United Nations force with the 20th Corps blocking the escape route. But with most of the 20th Corps destroyed at Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the only forces between Koto-ri and Hungnam were the remnants of the 58th and the 60th Divisions. In desperation, Song Shi-Lun ordered these troops to dig in at Funchilin Pass while blowing up the vital treadway bridge, hoping the terrain and obstacles would allow the 26th and the 27th Corps to catch up with the retreating United Nations forces.
The Peoples Volunteer Army 180th Regiment that occupied Hill 1081 blew up the bridge three times, believing the bridge was rendered irreparable. In response, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1) attacked Hill 1081 from the south, and the hill was captured on December 9 after the defenders fought to the last man.
At the same time, the 7th Marines and RCT-31 attacked the treadway bridge from the north, only to encounter defenders that were already frozen in their foxholes.
The blown nridge at Funchilin Pass. The Only Way Out. It was replaced by a Treadway Span, that was parachuted in by the United States Air Force.
The 58th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company rebuilt the bridge by December 9.
Outmaneuvered, the Chinese 58th and 60th Divisions still tried to slow the United Nations advance with ambushes and raids, but after weeks of non-stop fighting, the two divisions, together, had only 200 soldiers left. The last United Nations forces left Fuchilin Pass by December 11.
Thatched huts go up in flames after B-26 bombers unload napalm bombs on an enemy supply collection point near Hanchon in North Korea.
One of the last engagements during the retreat was an ambush at Sudong by the pursuing Peoples Volunteer Army 89th Division, which Task Force Dog of the 3rd Infantry Division repulsed with little difficulty. The trapped United Nations forces finally reached the Hungnam perimeter by 21:00 on December 11.
Evacuation at Hungnam
By the time the United Nations forces arrived at Hungnam, General MacArthur had already ordered the evacuation of the United States X Corps on December 8 in order to reinforce the United States Eighth Army, which by then was badly depleted and retreating rapidly towards the 38th parallel. Following his orders, the ROK I Corps, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment, the United States 3rd Infantry Division and the United States 7th Infantry Division had also set up defensive positions around the port.
Some skirmishes broke out between the defending United States 7th, 17th and 65th Infantry and the pursuing Peoples Volunteer Army 27th Corps, but against the strong naval fire support, the badly mauled 9th Army was in no shape to approach the Hungnam perimeter. In what United States historians called the "greatest evacuation movement by sea in United States military history", a 193-ship armada assembled at the port and evacuated not only the United Nations troops, but also their heavy equipment and the Korean refugees.
Evacuation port at Hungnam - December 1950.
The last United Nations unit left at 14:36 on December 24, and the port was destroyed to deny its use to the Chinese and North Korean forces. The Peoples Volunteer Army 27th Corps entered Hungnam on the morning of December 25.
The USS Begor observes the destruction of Hungnam's port facilities.
When news about the breakout from the Chosin Reservoir reached the United States, there was a great deal of media attention about it. That attention eventually transferred into American history textbooks. The Korean War hardly receives more than a paragraph or two in those books, but what little mention is made of it generally includes some commentary about the Chosin campaign. In doing so, the hard fighting and misery of the remaining months of the war have often been overlooked through the decades.
Soldiers and Marines who paid the ultimate price.
Warren Wiedhahn helped collect the frozen dead.
Warren Wiedhahn described how he collected the frozen bodies after the American defeat at the Chosin Reservoir. He snapped their limbs to stack them like cordwood on a truck. for the withdrawal to the city of Hungnam on the coast, where they were evacuated in December 1950.
Sgt. Charles Bielecki (right), and Sgt. Frank Monfette wounded on June 5, 1951, died June 6, 1951.
Chosin Reservoir veterans are justly proud of their accomplishment, but most who fought in Korea also know that American blood ran just as red in 1951-53 as it did during the Chosin Reservoir campaign. No time between June of 1950 and July of 1953 was a "good" time to serve in the Korean War. Combat veterans who fought in the deadly outpost wars in 1953, who dug in to hold strategic hills in 1952, who chased the Communist enemy back north in 1951, and who held the Pusan perimeter in the early days of the war in 1950, each had to endure their own unique hardships, as well as fight overwhelming numbers of enemy troops. The entire Korean War was a series of cold, bloody, and forgotten events and battles that claimed over 33,000 American lives. To this day, not all of our war dead and missing have been returned to the United States.
Aftermath
"...Casualties had reached a 40,000 high. The Central [Government] expresses its deepest sorrow..." - Mao Zedong
While the US X Corps was being evacuated from the eastern front, the United States Eighth Army had already retreated to the 38th parallel on the western front in the aftermath of the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River. With the entire United Nations front collapsing, the race to Yalu was ended with the communist forces of China recapturing much of North Korea. The Korean War would drag on for another two and a half years before the armistice was signed on July 27, 1953.
Despite the loss of North Korea, the United States X Corps preserved much of its strength. About 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped from Hungnam to Pusan, and they would later rejoin the war effort in Korea. General O. P. Smith was credited for saving the United States X Corps from destruction, while the 1st Marine Division and RCT-31 were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for their tenacity during the battle. The United Nations troops that served at Chosin were later honored with the nickname "The Chosin Few".
China was also catapulted into the status of a major military power following the victory at Chosin, but the victory came with a staggering cost. With the escape of the United States X Corps and the ROK I Corps, Mao's vision for Chosin was not realized, and the failure caused Song Shi-Lun to offer his resignation. At the same time, heavy casualties caused by both combat and poor logistical support destroyed much of the eight elite divisions under the 20th and the 27th Corps. Of those eight divisions, two divisions were forced to disband, and not until March 1951 did the 9th Army return to its normal strength and become combat effective. With the absence of nearly 40 percent of the Chinese forces in Korea in early 1951, the heavy Chinese losses at Chosin ultimately enabled the United Nations forces to maintain a foothold in Korea.
Operation Glory
During the battle, the United Nations casualties were buried at temporary grave sites along the road. Operation Glory occurred from July to November 1954, during which the dead of each side were exchanged. The remains of 4,167 United States Soldiers and Marines were exchanged for 13,528 North Korean and Chinese dead. In addition, 546 civilians who died in UN prisoner of war camps were turned over to the South Korean government. After Operation Glory, 416 Korean War "unknowns" were buried in the Punchbowl Cemetery. According to a Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) white paper, 1,394 names were also transmitted during "Operation Glory" from the Chinese and North Koreans, of which 858 proved to be correct. The 4,167 returned remains were found to be 4,219 individuals, of whom 2,944 were found to be Americans, with all but 416 identified by name. Of the 239 Korean War unaccounted for, 186 are not associated with the Punchbowl unknowns.
From 1990 to 1994 North Korea excavated and returned more than 208 sets of remains that possibly containing 200 to 400 remains of United States servicemen, but very few have been identified due to the co-mingling of remains. From 1996 to 2006, 220 remains were recovered near the Chinese border.
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Chosin Reservoir, An Epic of Endurance
One of the most well-known campaigns in the Korean War took place in the Chosin Reservoir area of North Korea in November/December 1950. The goal of the Chinese and North Koreans was to completely annihilate their enemy. They failed in their mission. Instead, allied troops displayed great tenacity and determination as they fought their way out of the Chosin Reservoir area, causing tremendous enemy casualties in the process.
Amazing feats of accomplishment and endurance took place during the Chosin campaign. Against overwhelming odds, including massive numbers of enemy and extreme cold temperatures, allied participants succeeded in avoiding annihilation by fighting their way out of the deadly trap that had been set by the Communist enemy. Meanwhile, thousands of United States Navy personnel miles away at sea were involved in close air support efforts for the ground forces in the Chosin campaign. As one Navy veteran commented, "I did not have anyone shooting at me, but I assure you it was just as cold 25 miles out to sea as it was in the hills and valleys of Korea."
Statistics
* Participants
o China - 9th Army Group CCF
o United States - 1st Marine Division (1st, 5th, 7th & 2 battalions of the 11th Marine Regiments)
o United States - 7th Infantry Division (32nd and 31st Regiments)
o England - 41st Independent Commando Royal Marines
o South Korea - Marines
* Strength of Forces (approximate)
o China - 120,000
o United Nations - 20,000
* Casualty Figures*
o China - 25,000 dead; 12,500 wounded; 30,000 frostbite casualties
o United Nations - 718 dead; 192 missing; 3,508 wounded; 7,500 cold-related injuries
*Casualty figures for the Chosin Reservoir vary due to the unavailability of accurate records. When fighting under such conditions, nobody stops to count bodies.
Table of Marine Casualties - 30 November 1950-3 December 1950 (1stMarDiv SAR, annex E (Division Adjutant), appendix II, 3
Total Total
Date KIA DOW MIA WIA Battle Non-Battle
30 November 27 6 6 183 222 102
1 December 27 14 6 111 158 134
2 December 55 2 33 231 321 180
3 December 16 1 6 194 217 196
Totals 135 29 55 921 1140 1194
*****
General Oliver P. Smith
General Oliver P. Smith was named Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division in June 1950, Major General Smith led his division through the bitter campaigns of the Korean conflict — from the late summer assault at Inchon, to the sub-zero winter drive north to the Chosin Reservoir.
In October 1950, the 1st Marine Division landed at Wonsan on the eastern side of Korea under the command of the Army's X Corps commanded by Gen. Edward Almond. Gen. Almond and Gen. Smith shared a mutual loathing of each other that dated back to a meeting between the two in Japan before the landing at Inchon. During the meeting Gen. Almond had spoken of how easy amphibious landings were although he had never planned or taken part in one and then referred to Gen. Smith as Son although he was only 10 months older than him.
Gen. O. P. Smith and the Marine command also felt Gen. Almond was overly aggressive and were sure that there were large numbers of Chinese Forces in North Korea when higher headquarters in Tokyo was telling them it was not the case. Although ordered to go north to the Yalu River as fast as he could, Gen. Smith continuously slowed the division's march to the point of near insubordination. Along the way he established supply points and an airfield.
In November 1950, with the 1st Marine Division surrounded at the Chosin Reservoir, he directed the breakout and subsequent 70-mile march to the seaport of Hungnam. In the end his careful march north and ability to keep the division together saved it from total destruction and quite possibly the entire X Corps.
Many accounts, including those later written by Gen. Edward Almond, indicate that his hesitancy to engage and failure to support other X Corps units contributed to, or were the cause of, many of X Corps problems in that operation.
*****
Extracts From a Letter of General Oliver P. Smith
December 17, 1950
From the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, to the Commandant of the Marine Corps
At the present moment I am in Masan. I sailed on the U.S.S. BAYFIELD from Hungnam on December 15th for Pusan. With the exception of certain Shore Party elements, elements of the AmphTrac Battalion, and NGF [naval gunfire] teams and TAC Parties, which are being retained by Corps at Hungnam for the time being, the entire division should close Masan today. What our mission will be I do not know. When the remainder of the X Corps arrives in the Pusan area, the Corps will become a part of the 8th Army. Lem Shepherd has made representations to Corps regarding the need for a period of time in which the division can integrate replacements, repair equipment, and be resupplied. The Corps is aware of this need, not only for us but also for the 7th Division, which lost practically en toto two infantry battalions and a field artillery battalion. However, Corps will not be calling the turns here.
You have probably read a lot of misinformation in the newspapers and it might be well to give you a factual account of what we have been doing for the past two weeks.
When I last wrote you the 8th Army had not yet launched its attack. At that time my mission was to establish a blocking position at Yudam-ni and with the remainder of the division to push north to the Manchurian border. As I explained to you I did not press the 5th and 7th Marines, which had reached the Chosin Reservoir, to make any rapid advances. I wanted to proceed cautiously for two reasons. First, I had back of me fifty miles of MSR [main supply route], fourteen miles of which was a tortuous mountain road which could be blocked by bad weather, and I wanted to accumulate at Hagaru-ri at the southern end of the reservoir a few days supply of ammunition and rations before proceeding further. Secondly, I wanted to move Puller up behind me to protect the MSR and he had not yet been entirely released from other commitments.
By November 23d both the 5th and 7th Marines were in contact with the CCF [Chinese Communist Forces], the 5th to the east of the Chosin Reservoir and the 7th to the west thereof. The 7th was advancing to the blocking position assigned by Corps at Yudam-ni. In the fifteen-mile stretch of road between Hagaru-ri and Yudam-ni the 7th had to traverse a 4000 foot mountain pass and was impeded by the enemy, road blocks, and snow drifts. Patrols of the 5th pushed to the north end of the reservoir.
On November 24th the 8th Army’s attack jumped off. With the attack came General MacArthur’s communiqué which explained the “massive compression envelopment” that was to take place. I learned for the first time that the 1st Marine Division was to be the northern “pincers” of this envelopment. At a briefing on November 25th the details were explained. I was to make the main effort of the Corps in a zone of action oriented to the westward. I was to advance along the road from Yudam-ni toward Mupyong-ni, cut the road and railroad there, send one column on to the Manchurian border at Kuup-tong, and another column north to Kanggye. The 7th Infantry Division was to take over my former mission of advancing north up the east side of the reservoir and thence to the Manchurian border. The 3d Infantry Division was to take over the protection of the MSR up to Hagaru-ri. (This never transpired and to the end of the operation I had to retain one battalion of the 1st Marines at Chinhung-ni at the foot of the mountain and another battalion of the 1st Marines at Koto-ri at the top of the mountain. Otherwise there would have been no protection for this vital part of the MSR. Under the plan the Corps assumed responsibility for engineer maintenance of the MSR to Hagaru-ri. It also agreed to stock ten days of supplies at Hagaru-ri. I doubt if the Corps would have been able to do this. In any event the enemy gave us no opportunity to prove whether or not it could be done.
D-Day H-Hour for the attack to the westward was fixed by the Corps as 27 November, 0800. By November 26th Litzenberg, with all of the 7th, was at Yudam-ni. I decided to have him remain in the Yudam-ni area and pass the 5th through him for the attack to the westward. The 5th had not been in a serious engagement since the attack on Seoul.
The attack jumped off on schedule but it was not long before both the 5th and 7th were hit in strength by the CCF. By November 28th reports of casualties left no doubt as to the seriousness of the attack. At the same time the 8th Army front was crumbling. No word was received from Corps regarding discontinuance of the attack or withdrawal. Under the circumstances I felt it was rash to have Murray [Col Raymond L. Murray, Commanding Officer (CO), 5th Marines] attempt to push on and I directed him to consolidate on positions he then held west of Yudam-ni. At the same time I directed Litzenberg [Col Homer L. Litzenberg, CO, 7th Marines] to open up the MSR between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri which had been blocked by the Chinese, as had also the stretch of road between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri. On this same day, November 28th, I moved my operational CP [command post] to Hagaru-ri. The movement was made by helicopter, the only feasible method in view of the cutting of the MSR. Fortunately, we had been able to get some vehicles and working personnel into Hagaru-ri before the road was cut.
Litzenberg’s efforts to clear the MSR between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri were unsuccessful on the 28th. He reported he would make another effort with a battalion the following day, November 29th.
On November 28th Puller [Col Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, CO, 1st Marines] organized Task Force Drysdale to open up the MSR between Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri. This force was under command of LtCol. [Douglas B.] Drysdale of the RM [Royal Marines] Commandos. It consisted of the RM Commandos, 235 strong, G Company of 3/1 [3d Battalion, 1st Marines] coming north to join its parent unit at Hagaru-ri, and a rifle company of the 31st Infantry which was moving north to join its parent unit east of the Chosin Reservoir. (The 7th Infantry Division had pushed north a battalion of the 31st, a battalion of the 32d, and a field artillery battalion to relieve the 5th Marines on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir.) In addition to the units enumerated, the Drysdale column included two companies of our M-26 tanks, each less a platoon, and a truck convey. The column was to move out on the 29th. I will cover its operations later.
During the night of November 28–29 the enemy attacked Hagaru-ri in force. The attack started at 2130 and lasted all night. First the attack came in from the south, then shifted to the west and then to the east. Our defense force consisted of 3/1, less G Company, and personnel of our Headquarters and Service units. Our casualties were 500, of whom about 300 were from the infantry and 200 from Headquarters and Service units. The Headquarters Battalion alone had 60 casualties.
We had at an early date realized the importance of Hagaru-ri as a base. On November 16th Field Harris [MajGen Field Harris was the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing] and I had tentatively approved a site for a C-47 strip at Hagaru-ri. Work has begun by our 1st Engineer Battalion on November 19th and the strip was first used by C-47s on December 1st, although at the time it was only 40% completed. This strip was essential for the evacuation of wounded and air supply in case our road went out either due to weather or enemy action. Hagaru-ri had to be held to protect this strip and the supplies, which we were accumulating there. The movement of the Drysdale column from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri would not only open the road, but would also furnish us needed reinforcements for the defense of Hagaru-ri.
The Drysdale column started north from Koto-ri on the morning of November 29th. About halfway to Hagaru-ri it became engaged in a heavy fire fight. Embarrassed as he was by a truck convoy, Drysdale was on the point of turning back to Koto-ri, but I sent him a message to push on through if at all possible. He started the truck convoy back toward Koto-ri under the protection of a company of tanks and some infantry while the remainder of the column continued to fight its way toward Hagaru-ri. The truck convoy returning to Koto-ri was jumped by the Chinese who had closed in on the MSR again. There was also a considerable number of personnel casualties. Drysdale continued to fight toward Hagaru-ri and toward evening arrived with about 150 of his commandos and G Company of the 1st Marines. The Army company never arrived although some stragglers came in to Koto-ri. The conclusion was inescapable that a considerable force would be required to open up the MSR between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri. We would not have any such force until the 5th and 7th Marines joined us at Hagaru-ri.
On November 29th the 7th Marines started a battalion back along the MSR to open up it, but the battalion got nowhere. I then ordered Litzenberg to employ the entire 7th Marines on the following day, November 30th, to open up the MSR. At the same time I ordered Murray to pull back his regiment to Yudam-ni. Late in the day of November 29th I received a telephone call (radio link) from Corps stating that the whole scheme of maneuver was changed, that the Army battalions on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir, who were now cut off from us were attached to me and I was to extricate them, and that I was to withdraw the 5th and 7th Marines and consolidate around Hagaru-ri.
On November 30th the Corps turned over to me command of all troops as far south as Sudong, which is four or five miles below the foot of the mountain. These comprised a battalion of the 31st Infantry, which was on its way up the mountain and miscellaneous engineer and service units.
During the day of November 30th Puller was attacked rather heavily at Koto-ri but kept his perimeter intact.
On the afternoon of November 30th General Almond flew up to see me. By this time he had given up any idea of consolidating positions in the vicinity of Hagaru-ri. He wanted us to fall back in the direction of Hamhung and stressed the necessity for speed. He authorized me to burn or destroy equipment and supplies, stating that I would be supplied by airdrop as I withdrew. I told him that my movements would be governed by my ability to evacuate the wounded, that I would have to fight my way back and could not afford to discard equipment, and that, therefore, I intended to bring out the bulk of my equipment.
The problems of the 5th and 7th Marines could not be separated. By November 30th, between them, they had accumulated about 450 wounded who had to be protected. The only feasible thing to do was to pool their resources. The two regimental commanders drew up a joint plan (an ADC [assistant division commander] would have come in handy at this point), which was flown to me by helicopter and which I approved. Briefly, the 7th was to lead out from Yudam-ni and the 5th was to cover the rear. Artillery and trains were in the middle. The walking wounded were given weapons and marched in column on the road. Other wounded were loaded in trucks. The route these two regiments had to traverse was tortuous. From Yudam-ni the road first led south up a narrow mountain valley and then turned eastward toward Hagaru-ri. At about the halfway point the road crossed a 4000 foot mountain pass and then descended toward Hagaru-ri. This last section of the road more or less followed the ridgelines and did not offer the same opportunities to the enemy to block the road, as did the first part of the road out of Yudam-ni. As events transpired the 7th and 5th did have a hard fight to get up to the pass, but the descent to Hagaru-ri, although opposed, was relatively easier.
During these operations one company of the 7th Marines had a unique and remarkable experience. This was F Company. In his initial advance to Yudam-ni, Litzenberg had left E and F Companies in occupancy of high ground along the road to the rear. Litzenberg was able to extricate E Company, but could not reach F Company which was in position at the top of the mountain. It was completely surrounded but held excellent positions. By pinpoint air drops we were able to keep the company supplied with ammunition and rations. It had 18 killed and 60 wounded but held out for over three days when it was relieved by 1/7 pushing back up the mountain from Yudam-ni.
During the night of November 30th-December 1st Hagaru-ri was again heavily attacked but the perimeter held. We were stronger this time as G Company of 3/1 and the Commandos had joined our defense force. The attacks were from the southeast and the east. The attack from the east fell on the sector manned by the Service Battalion. LtCol. [Charles L.] Banks, an ex-raider, was in command of the Service Battalion. He did an excellent job in beating back the attack.
By December 1st the situation with regard to care of casualties was becoming serious. Dr. Hering [CAPT Eugene R. Herring, MC, USN, Division Surgeon]had at Hagaru-ri 600 casualties awaiting evacuation. These were being cared for by C and E Medical Companies. It was estimated 400 casualties would be brought in if the Army battalions east of the reservoir broke out. (Actually we eventually evacuated over 900 men from these battalions). We estimated the 5th and 7th would bring in 500 casualties. (Actually they brought in 1500).
It was manifest that the only solution to our casualty problem was completion of the C-47 strip. (0Ys and helicopters could not make a dent in our casualty load.) Our engineers had worked night and day on the C-47 strip. On two nights work had to be interrupted because of enemy attacks and the engineers manned their part of the perimeter near the field. The front lines were only 300 yards from the end of the runway. The strip was rather crude; 3800 feet long, 50 feet wide, no taxiways, and a 2% grade to the north. The soil was black loam but it was frozen. Our equipment had considerable difficulty with the frozen ground. On December 1st the strip as I have described it, was considered to be 40% completed. On the advice of the aviators it was decided to bring in a C-47 for a trial run on the afternoon of December 1st. The plane landed successfully at about 1500 and took off 24 wounded. It takes about a half hour to load a plane with litter patients. Ambulatory patients go very much faster. At first we could accommodate only two planes on the ground simultaneously. Eventually, as the field was improved we were able to accommodate six planes on the ground without blocking the runway. Hours of daylight were from about 0700 to 1745 and use of the strip was limited to those hours. After the first plane landed more planes came in. Five additional planes loads of wounded were taken out that afternoon. We would have gotten out more but an incoming plane, loaded with 105mm ammunition, collapsed its landing gear. The plane was too heavy, with its load, to push off the runway and we had to unload it, thus losing valuable time. (We attempted to have incoming planes loaded with ammunition and other needed supplies to supplement air drop.)
I will complete the story of evacuation of casualties from Hagaru-ri out of chronology, as it is all one story and a very remarkable accomplishment when viewed as a whole. On the evening of December 1st stragglers from the break-up of the Army battalions east of the lake began to drift in. During the day of December 2d we evacuated 919 casualties by air, the majority of them from the Army battalions. During the morning of December 3d the doctor cleaned out by air evacuation all his remaining casualties. This gave us an opportunity to fly out our accumulation of dead. The estimate of casualties of the 5th and 7th Marines had now risen to 900. At 1935, December 3d, the advance guard of the 7th Marines arrived at the perimeter. It was closely followed by the column of walking wounded. The column continued the movement during night and each vehicle brought in more wounded, some on the hoods of jeeps. By morning the doctor’s hospital installations were full. On the day of December 4th 1000 casualties were evacuated by air. On the day of December 5th 1400 more casualties were evacuated by air. When we moved out from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri on December 6th we had no remaining casualties to evacuate.
I believe the story of this evacuation is without parallel. Credit must go to the troop commanders whose determination and self-sacrifice made it possible to get the wounded out, to the medical personnel whose devotion to duty and untiring efforts saved many lives, and to the Marine and Air Force (including fatal accident in spite of the hazards of the weather and a rudimentary landing strip.)
To get back to the story of the operation in its proper chronological sequence. At 1335, December 1st, we got our first air drop from Japan. These drops were known as “Baldwins.” Each “Baldwin” contained a prearranged quantity of small arms ammunition, weapons, water, rations and medical supplies. Artillery ammunition had to be requested separately. A “Baldwin” could be dropped by about six C-119 planes. We were required to make request on Corps for the number of “Baldwins” desired, modified as desired. We usually requested “Baldwins” less weapons and water and plus given quantities of artillery ammunition.
Air drop did not have the capability of supplying a Marine division in combat. When the drops were started the total capability of the Far East Air Force was 70 tons a day. This was stepped up to 100 tons a day. But to support an RCT [regimental combat team] in combat requires 105 tons a day. What gave us some cushion was the fact that with our own transportation, before the roads were cut, we had built up at Hagaru-ri a level of six days rations and two units of fire.
The air drops continued until we left Hagaru-ri and were also made at Koto-ri where Puller had to be supplied and where we had to accumulate supplies in anticipation of the arrival of the bulk of the division there. The drops were not always accurate and we had personnel and materiel casualties as a result of inaccurate drops; however, we owe a considerable dept of gratitude to the Air Force for their efforts.
During the afternoon of December 1st a deputy chief of staff of the Corps arrived and gave me the outline of the latest plan. Under this plan the 3d Infantry Division was to move elements to Majong-dong (about 10 miles south of the foot of the mountain) and establish a covering force through which I would withdraw. Upon withdrawal I was to occupy a defensive sector west and southwest of Hungnam and the 7th Division was to occupy a sector northwest and north of Hungnam.
Toward evening of December 1st some 300 stragglers of the cut off Army battalions up the reservoir drifted into camp, having made their way in over the frozen surface of the reservoir. They continued to drift in during the night and for three or four days thereafter. I have never found out exactly what happened. Apparently the two battalions which had holed up at Sinhung-ni started south and had made some progress, with the support of a considerable amount of Marine aviation (10 plan[e]s on either side of the road). Then the acting regimental commander was killed and the column must have fallen apart and men made the best of their way out to the lake and thence down the lake to our perimeter. For some unknown reason the Chinese did not do much firing at people on the surface of the lake. We evacuated some 900 men of the two infantry battalions and artillery battalion. There remained with us some 385 more or less able-bodied men whom I had the senior Army officer present form into a provisional battalion. We brought these out with us.
During the day of December 2d LtCol. Beall [LtCol Olin L. Beall commander, 1st Motor Transport Battalion] and other volunteers conducted a remarkable rescue operation on the lake: Air cover was provided. They drove jeeps, often towing improvised sleds, as far as four miles over the surface of the reservoir, and picked up wounded and frostbitten men. Although the Chinese did not often fire on the wounded on the lake, they did fire at the jeeps. During the day 250 men were rescued by these jeeps. Operations were continued the following day but a lesser number were found. Beall was awarded the DSC by the Corps Commander.
The 5th and 7th made some progress up the mountain during December 2d. Enemy opposition was still strong.
On December 3d Litzenberg reached the top of the mountain between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri. However, there was still a buildup of enemy between him and us and he was running short of gasoline. In a slow-moving column there is considerable idling of motors and in any event, in cold weather, motors have to be started up frequently. All this consumes a large quantity of gasoline. At Litzenberg’s request we made a pinpoint drop of gasoline to the head of the truck column. Unfortunately, he did not request diesel fuel, a lack of which later was responsible for the loss of several artillery pieces.
During the day of December 3d Litzenberg continued to push over and down the mountain. At 1630 we sent out tanks with the Commandos to clean out the Chinese who were on the road near camp. At 1935 the advance guard of the 7th Marines arrived at the perimeter. Movement continued during the night, the 5th Marines following in after the 7th. In the darkness it takes a long time to get units in from covering positions and on to the road. When they were only a few miles from Hagaru-ri some of the tractors drawing the 155mm howitzers ran out of diesel fuel. This stopped the column. The Chinese closed in with the mortar and automatic weapon fire. Some of the tractors were disabled. We later sent a column back with diesel fuel, but not all the guns could be gotten out because of disabled tractors. We lost 10 out of 18 155mm howitzers and 4 out of 30 105mm howitzers. The guns were spiked and later an air strike was put down on them. Despite the losses it was still a remarkable feat to bring out three battalions of artillery minus these guns.
The last elements of the 5th and 7th Marines did not arrive at Hagaru-ri until about noon of December 4th. I was considerably relieved to have these two regiments rejoin. I considered that the critical part of the operation had been completed. Even with two depleted RCTs I felt confident we could fight our way to Koto-ri where we would gain additional strength. The terrain was not as difficult, it lent itself well to air support, and we were able to lay down preparatory artillery fires all the way to Koto-ri. Artillery emplaced at Hagaru-ri could reach half way to Koto-ri and Puller’s artillery at Koto-ri could reach back to meet our fires.
After their grueling experience the regiments were not in condition to continue the advance on December 5th. Also we wanted to be sure that all our casualties were evacuated. Our order, therefore, provided for an advance on Koto-ri at first light on December 6th.
The order for the advance on Koto-ri provided for an advance in two RCT columns. RCT 7 led out. The RCT was normal as to combat troops, with the provisional Army battalion attached. In addition, Litzenberg had within his column his own regimental train and Division Train No. 1. RCT 5 was to follow RCT 7. Its composition was normal except for the attachment of 3/1. Murray also had within his column his own regimental train and Division Train No. 2. He was to hold the perimeter until RCT 7 had gained sufficient distance to permit him to move out on the road.
The embarrassing part of this move was the trains. Over a thousand vehicles were involved. We carried two days’ rations and two units of fire. We brought out all usable equipment and supplies, including tentage and stoves. Even the engineer pans were used as trucks to carry tentage.
Litzenberg had not advanced more than two miles before he ran into trouble. Using maximum air and artillery support it required until 1400 to break through. Peculiarly enough all the opposition came from the east side of the road.
At 1420 I moved my operational CP by OY [Stinson L-5/OY flown by Marine Corps Observation Squadron 6] plane and helicopter to Koto-ri. My radios, vans and working personnel were mostly in Division Train No.1.
By 1800, December 6th Litzenberg had reached the half-way point and was progressing satisfactorily. However, during the night the Chinese cut into the train in two places. There was confused and close range fighting. We lost men and vehicles, but remarkably few vehicles.
The column continued to move during the night and by 0500, December 7th, the leading elements of the 7th Marines began to arrive at Koto-ri.
The 5th Marines did not clear Hagaru-ri until December 7th. Murray had quite a rear guard action at that place, but came off with 200 prisoners. His last elements did not close Koto-ri until 2135, December 7th.
The advance from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri cost us more than 500 casualties. Puller had an OY strip only. However, Field Harris agreed to land TBM [the TBM-2 Avenger was a utility aircraft] planes, of which he had three, on this strip. During the day of December 7th, between OYs and TBMs, 200 casualties were evacuated. However, there were still 300 more casualties to evacuate. The aviators stated that if 400 feet was added to the strip it would be possible for C-47s to land. Therefore, during the night of December 7-8 our engineers lengthened the strip by 400 feet. Unfortunately, the strip was periodically under enemy fire. On December 8th C-47s began to land and we soon completed evacuation of our casualties.
Koto-ri is about two miles north of the lip of the mountain. From the lip of the mountain the road descends tortuously to Chinhung-ni about 10 road miles distant. At Chinhung-ni was Puller’s 1st Battalion. On December 7th the Corps had moved an Army battalion to Chinhung-ni in order to free 1/1. Theoretically, the road was open from Chinjung-ni to the south.
Our plan for getting down the mountain was simple. (However, it must be borne in mind that the enemy surrounded Koto-ri as they had closed in behind our columns.) The 5th and 7th Marines were to seize and hold the commanding ground to about the half way point. 1/1 was to push up from Chinhung-ni and seize and hold commanding ground about half way up the mountain. The 1st Marines, which had remained 3/1 from Hagaru-ri and additionally had a battalion of the 31st Infantry attached, was to hold the perimeter at Koto-ri until the trains cleared when it was to follow out. (We now had 1400 vehicles as a result of the addition of Puller’s train and Army vehicles). Once the commanding ground was seized it was our intention to push the trains down the mountain. As the trains cleared, infantry would leave the high ground and move down the road. The last vehicles in the column were the tanks. We realized that if an M-26 ever stalled or threw a tread on a one-way mountain road it would be very difficult to clear it out of the way.
In all this planning there was one serious catch. The Chinese had blown out a twenty-four foot section of a bridge about a third of the way down the mountain. They could not have picked a better spot to cause us serious trouble. At this point four large pipes, carrying water to the turbines of the power plant in the valley below crossed the road. A sort of concrete substation was built over the pipes on the uphill side of the road. A one-way concrete bridge went around the substation. The drop down the mountainside was sheer. It was a section of this bridge, which was blown. There was no possibility of a by-pass.
Partridge [LtCol John H. Partridge, Commander, 1st Engineer Battalion], our engineer, got together with the commanding officer of Treadway Bridge unit, which was stranded at Koto-ri and they devised a plan. This involved dropping by parachute at Koto-ri the necessary Treadway Bridge sections. These were dropped on December 7th. As a precaution additional sections were spotted at Chinhung-ni at the foot of the mountain.
At 0800 on December 8th the 7th Marines jumped off to seize Objectives A and B at the lip of the mountain; then it pushed on to Objective C further along. The 5th moved out and captured Objective D above the bridge site. 1/1 moved up the mountain and captured Objective E. All this was not accomplished as easily as it is described. There were delays and casualties. The bridging material did not get to the bridge site until December 9th. The bridge was completed at 1615 that date. In anticipation of completion of the bridge the truck column had been moved forward and the leading truck was ready to cross as soon as the bridge was completed. Unfortunately, another block developed further down the mountain where the road passed under the cableway. This block was caused partly by enemy fire and partly by additional demolition. This block was not opened until 0600, December 10th.
What we had feared regarding the tanks occurred. As I explained previously we had placed them last in the column. As they were proceeding down the mountain the brake on the seventh tank from the tail of the column locked. The tank jammed into the bank. Efforts to bypass the tank or push it out of the way were fruitless. To complicate matters the Chinese closed in with mortar fire and thermite grenades and mingled with the crowds of refugees following the column. The tankers dismounted and fought on foot with the Reconnaissance Company, which was covering the tail of the column. There were casualties. Finally the tankers did their best to disable the seven tanks and moved down the mountain. Next morning an air strike was put in on the tanks as well as the bridge, which we had laboriously constructed.
During the day of December 10th both Division Trains Nos.1 and 2 cleared Chinhung-ni at the foot of the mountain and leading elements of the trains began arriving at Hamhung that afternoon. After the trains cleared the road, empty trucks were sent up for troops.
At 1300, December 11th, the last elements of the division cleared Chinhung-ni. The 3d Division was supposed to keep the road open south of Chinhung-ni, but Puller’s regimental train was ambushed near Sudong. He lost a couple of trucks and had some casualties. However, Puller arrived at his assembly area with more vehicles than he had started down the mountain with. He had picked up and towed in some vehicles he had found at the scene of a previous ambush of Army trucks. Puller’s last elements arrived in the assembly area at 2100, December 11th. This completed the move of the division from the Chosin Reservoir area.
Our rear echelon had set up 150 tents with stoves for each regiment. Hot food was available when the troops arrived.
While Puller was closing his assembly area on December 11th, the 7th Marines was embarking in the MSTS [Military Sea Transportation Service] Daniel I. Sultan. The 5th Marines embarked December 12th and the 1st Marines on December 13th.
Loading out of the division was completed about midnight December 14th, and the last ship of the convoy sailed at 1030, December 15th.
An approximation of the casualties from the date (November 27th) we jumped off in the attack to the westward until we returned to Hungnam (December 11th) is as follows:
KIA 400
WIA 2265
MIA 90
Total Battle 2755
Non-Battle 1395 (Mostly frostbite)
Grand Total 4150
This is not the complete picture as there are many more frostbite cases which are now being screened. I am understandably proud of the performance of this Division. The officers and men were magnificent. They came down the mountains bearded, footsore, and physically exhausted, but their spirits were high. They were still a fighting division.
*****
General Smith returned to the United States, in May 1951, and was assigned duties as Commanding General, Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California.
*****
You cannot exaggerate about the Marines. They are convinced to the point of arrogance, that they are the most ferocious fighters on earth- and the amusing thing about it is that they are. - Father Kevin Keaney 1st Marine Division Chaplain, Korean War
Don't you forget that you're First Marines! Not all the communists in Hell can overrun you! - Col. Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, USMC rallying his First Marine Regiment near Chosin Reservoir, Korea, December 1950
This was the first time that the Marines of the two nations had fought side by side since the defence of the Peking Legations in 1900. Let it be said that the admiration of all ranks of 41 Commando for their brothers in arms was and is unbounded. They fought like tigers and their morale and esprit de corps is second to none. - Lt Col. D.B. Drysdale, Commanding 41 Commando, Chosen Reservoir, on the 1st Marine Division
Do not attack the First Marine Division. Leave the yellowlegs alone. Strike the American Army. - Orders given to Communist troops in the Korean War; shortly afterward, the Marines were ordered to not wear their khaki leggings.
If I had one more division like this First Marine Division I could win this war. - General of the Armies Douglas McArthur in Korea, overheard and reported by Marine Staff Sergeant Bill Houghton, Weapons/2/5
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