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The Korean War


Note - Much of the following is from government and public sources as well as from William Manchester's book: "American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964"


In June 1950, after North Korea invaded South Korea, General Douglas MacArthur was designated commander of the United Nations forces defending South Korea. Gen. MacArthur conceived and executed an amphibious assault at Inchon, beginning on September 15, 1950, for which he was hailed as a hero.

Seven months later on April 11, 1951, President Harry S Truman  fired him for making public statements that contradicted the official policies of the United States Government, especially with regard to Truman's order to restrict military interaction with the media.

The Communists had declared victory in mainland China the previous year. MacArthur had been the General who had forged a victory in the Pacific and was now in Japan where, since the end of the war in August 1945, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) he had conducted the occupation and democratization of Japan with cultural sensitivity and respect. 

Douglas MacArthur was a highly intelligent and independent general and had tangled with other generals and United States presidents before.  He had dabbled in presidential politics in 1948, in the Republican primaries with very poor results.

















North Korean troops occupy Seoul just three days after the invasion.
















The people of Seoul welcome the North Korean tanks.


After Kim Il Sung's North Korean army  had taken Seoul, Gen. MacArthur's responsibility was expanded to cover Korea. His immediate call for more troops had been rejected by the Joint Chiefs who were more concerned about Europe. There were press reports that cited General Chiang Kai-shek  of Formosa (Taiwan) misquoting MacArthur about his intentions for China.  The State Department's roving envoy Averell Harriman was sent by Truman to make sure MacArthur understood the Administration's position.  Harriman reassured Truman "he was convinced that the Supreme Commander was loyal to 'constitutional authority'... and he felt that 'political and personal considerations should be put to one side and our government [should] deal with General MacArthur on the lofty level of the great national asset which he is." [Manchester, p. 566]

But within the week, MacArthur got further instructions from the Secretary of Defense regarding Formosa and the mainland.




















"The General tartly replied that he fully understood the presidential determination 'to protect the Communist mainland.'  That was insolent.  If Washington meant to take a hard line with him, this was the time to do it.  Instead Truman encouraged him by altering his stand on Formosa [more in line with what MacArthur wanted]." (p. 567)

The reason for Truman's policy change was political, not military.  He was trying to ward off Republican attacks that he was soft on Communist China at the expense of Formosa.  Immediately after this MacArthur was invited to send a message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) convention. Manchester continues: "One of MacArthur's sidekiicks, Major General Courtney Whitney tells us, "MacArthur decided that this was an excellent opportunity to place himself on the record as being squarely behind the President.

The reason for President Truman's policy change was political, not military.  He was trying to ward off Republican attacks that he was soft on Communist China at the expense of Formosa.  Immediately after this Gen, MacArthur was invited to send a message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) convention.

[William Manchester p. 568]continues: "It was an excellent opportunity to remain silent. The United States policy in his theater was changing so swiftly that even those close to the oval office had trouble keeping up with it, and a General halfway around the globe, anxious to see in it what he wanted to see, had no business interpreting it for veterans or anybody else."

The message Douglas MacArthur sent strongly argued that  "Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument" that "if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia" and continued with a lecture on Oriental psychology and "The geographic location of Formosa is such that in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very center"

The Administration got copies of the speech three days before it was to be read to the VFW meeting, but it was already being printed in Life, and the U.S. News and World Report and in England.

As Wayne Morse later pointed out, its impact could hardly have been greater had it already been delivered in person.  And the timing, from the President's point of view, could not have been worse.  He had just proposed that the United Nations investigate the Formosa situation in the hope of reducing the areas of conflict in the Far East.  He felt that "General MacArthur's message - which the world might mistake as an expression of American policy - contradicted this"... [William Manchester p. 569]



















An angry President Truman toyed with relieving Gen. MacArthur of his command (but leaving him in Command of Japan) but did not want personally hurt MacArthur.  He demanded a retraction of the message before it was delivered.

Douglas MacArthur instantly complied, but he was, he said, "utterly astonished"... "My message was most carefully prepared to fully support the President's policy position.  My remarks were calculated only to support his declaration and I am unable to see wherein they might be interpreted otherwise."  He was hurt and angry, and with some justification.  He was capable of impudence and provocation, but in this instance his only sin was taking Truman's pronouncements on Formosa at face value.  The President was following one course in the United Nations and another in fencing with his critics on Capitol Hill.  MacArthur, believing that the administration was determined to keep the island out of hostile hands as a link to the United S. defense system, had unintentionally embarrassed the chief executive in the world forum.  He was wrong to have said anything - the contretemps over his trip to Taipei should have taught him that - but right in his paraphrasing of what the White House was telling the American people.  He was a casualty of rough politics, a loser in a game whose rules he never mastered.  [William Manchester p. 570]


The Battle Of Inchon

The Battle of Inchon  (code name: Operation Chromite) was an amphibious invasion and battle of the Korean War that resulted in a decisive victory and strategic reversal in favor of the United Nations.


















The battle began on September 15, 1950, and ended around September 17. Through a surprise amphibious assault far from the Pusan Perimeter that United Nations and South Korean forces were desperately defending, the largely undefended city of Incheon was secured after being bombed by United Nation forces. The battle ended a string of victories by the invading North Korean People's Army (NKPA). The subsequent United Nations recapture of nearby Seoul partially severed North Korean People's Army's supply lines in South Korea.

The majority of United Nations ground forces involved were U.S. Marines, commanded by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Gen. MacArthur was the driving force behind the operation, overcoming the strong misgivings of more cautious generals to a risky assault over extremely unfavorable terrain.


Planning

The idea to land United Nation forces at Incheon was suggested by General MacArthur after he visited the Korean battlefield on June 29, 1950, four days after the war began. Douglas MacArthur thought that the North Korean army would push the South Korean army back far past Seoul. He decided that the battered, demoralized, and under equipped South Korean Army, many of whom did not support the South Korean government, which had been put in power by the United StatesS, could not hold off the North Korean People's Army, who also defeated the American reinforcements. Gen. MacArthur felt that he could turn the tide if he made a decisive troop movement behind enemy lines. 

General MacArthur hoped that a landing near Incheon would allow him to cut off the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) and destroy that army as a useful fighting force, thus winning the war.

In order to accomplish such a large amphibious operation, MacArthur requested the use of United States Marine Corps expeditionary forces, having become familiar with their ability to integrate amphibious operations in the Pacific during World War II. However, the Marines at that point were still recovering from a series of severe program cutbacks instituted by the Truman administration and Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson. Louis Johnson had tried to eliminate the Marines entirely and slashed Marine expeditionary forces from a World War II peak of 300,000 men to just over 27,000. Much of the Marines' landing craft and amphibious carriers had been sold off, scrapped, or transferred to the exclusive use of the U.S. Army.

After hastily re-equipping Marine forces with aging World War II landing craft, withdrawing Marine units from the Pusan perimeter, and stripping recruitment depots bare of men, the Marine commanders were just able to mount a force capable of undertaking offensive operations against the small North Korean forces.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur decided to use the Joint Strategic and Operations Group (JSPOG) of his Far East Command (FECOM). The initial plan was met with skepticism by the other generals because Incheon's natural and artificial defenses were formidable. The approaches to Incheon were two restricted passages, (Flying Fish and Eastern channels) which could be easily blocked by mines.

The current of the channels was also dangerously quick—three to eight knots. Finally, the anchorage was small and the harbor was surrounded by tall seawalls. Commander Arlie G. Capps noted "We drew up a list of every natural and geographic handicaps — and Incheon had 'em all."

General MacArthur cancelled an initial plan, Operations Bluehearts, which called for an attack on Incheon on July 22, because of the difficulties of a complicated amphibious assault and a lack of sufficient training of his troops.

An briefing on Incheon took place on August 23, at MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. Army Chief of Staff Joseph Lawton (Joe) Collins, Chief of Naval Operations Forrest Sherman, and Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edward, the Air Force operations deputy, all flew from Washington to Japan to take part in the briefing. The Marine Corps staff, who were to be responsible for leading the landing at Incheon, were not invited, which became a contentious issue. During the briefing nine members of the staff of Admiral James Henry Doyle spoke for nearly 90 minutes on every technical and military aspect of the landing; after his staff spoke, Doyle stood up and said, "General, I have not been asked, and I have not volunteered my opinion about this landing. If I were asked, however, the best I can say is that Inchon is not impossible," and then sat down.


























Joseph Lawton (Joe) Collins.

General Collins suggested that alternatives sites to the south of Incheon such as Gunsan or Posung-Myon some 20 miles south of Incheon be considered instead, a suggestion that Gen. MacArthur had expected. He was determined to win approval for an assault on Incheon, and he aimed to convince Admiral Forrest Sherman of the necessity of an Incheon landing. Drawing an analogy to the Battle of the Plains of Abraham at Quebec in 1759, in which British troops under James Wolfe had caught French troops under the Marquis de Montcalm by surprise, Gen. MacArthur argued that the difficulties presented by an Incheon landing could be overcome, and that the North Koreans would be caught unprepared, reasoning that "no one would be so brash to make such an attempt."






















General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (center) grasps General J. Lawton Collins (the Army Chief of Staff, left) and Admiral Forrest Sherman (the Chief of Naval Operations right). MacArthur used their meeting to convince other military leaders that the assault on Incheon was necessary.

General MacArthur told the officers that though a Gunsan landing would bring a relatively easy linkup with the Eighth Army, a landing there "would be an attempted envelopment that would not envelop" and would place more troops in a vulnerable pocket of the Pusan Perimeter. Gen, McArthur won over Sherman by speaking of his affection for the Navy and relating the story of how the Navy carried him out of Corregidor to safety during the Pacific War. Admiral Sherman agreed to support the Incheon operation, and Admiral Doyle was furious.

Despite these obstacles, in September Gen. MacArthur issued a revised plan of assault on Incheon: Plan 100-B, codenamed Operation Chromite. Gen. MacArthur spent 45 minutes after the briefing explaining his reasons for choosing Incheon.

He said that because it was so heavily defended, the enemy would not expect an attack there, that victory at Incheon would avoid a brutal winter campaign, and that, by invading a northern strong point, the United Nation forces could cut off North Korean lines of communication. Incheon was also chosen because of its proximity to Seoul. Admiral Forrest P. Sherman and General J. Lawton Collins returned to Washington, D.C., and had the invasion approved.

The landing at Incheon was not the first large-scale amphibious operation since World War II. That distinction belonged to the July 18, 1950, landing at Pohang. However, that operation was not made in enemy held territory and was unopposed.


Prelude To Battle

























Incheon, South Korea, in pink coloring.


Seven days before the main attack on Incheon, a joint Central Intelligence Agency – military intelligence reconnaissance effort, codenamed Trudy Jackson, placed a team in Incheon. The group, led by Navy Lieutenant Eugene F. Clark, landed at Yonghung-do, an island in the mouth of the harbor. From there, they relayed intelligence back to U.S. forces.

With the help of local Koreanss, they gathered information about tides, mudflats, seawalls and enemy fortifications. The mission's most important contribution was the restarting of a lighthouse on Palmi-do.

When the North Koreans discovered that the agents had entered the peninsula, they sent an attack craft with 16 infantrymen. Lieutenant Clark mounted a machine gun on a sampan and sank the attack boat. In response, the North Koreans killed up to 50 civilians for helping Lieutenant Clark.

*****















Commander Eugene F. Clark, USN, was deployed (as a Lieutenant) to the Flying Fish Channel, leading into Inchon. Quickly surveying the area, he and two accompanying South Korean officers Lieutenant Youn Joung (Navy) and Colonel Ke In-Ju (Counterintelligence) landed Yonghung-do Island in Incheon Harbor in advance of the US forces led invasion of Inchon leading to the Battle of Inchon.

Lieutenant Clark, and his Korean officers secured the help of the people on the island and using captured junks began to run raids on the North Korean occupied islands of Taebu-do and the harbor fortress of Wolmi-do. He also ran daily mine patrols up and down the channel to ensure the invasion fleet would not be so hampered. LieutenantClark was also assisted by Commander Lee Sung Ho, the captain of one of South Korea's four gunboats, at the direction of Admiral Sohn Won-Yil, Chief of Naval Operations, South Korean Navy. He also armed and assisted organized resistance groups hiding out in the hills near Inchon. By doing this he was able to gain valuable information about the layout of troops in the city.
 

The North Koreans had been slowly infiltrating men onto Yonghung-do for many days and on the night of September 14, the day before the invasion, they struck. Lieutenant Clark and his men bravely fought off the assault by a numerically superior force of North Koreans. However, they were forced to evacuate themselves and all who assisted them to the previously secured lighthouse island of Palmi-do. A day later, at the request of Lieutenant Clark, a battalion of Marines was deployed to take Taebu-do and Yonghung Do. They stormed the islands with vengeance for the brave Koreans who died to help Lieutenant Clark. However, the North Koreans had already murdered over fifty people who had helped Clark and his men but refused to leave the island with them. Lieutenant Clark was awarded the Silver Star for "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity" in obtaining "vital intelligence information". He was also awarded the Legion of Merit.

Later, in advance of the United Nation Forces making their way to the Yalu River, Lieutenant Clark, Lieutenant Youn Joung, and 150 South Korean guerillas went island hopping up the west coast of North Korea. After several fierce firefights, Lieutenant Clark was secure and began infiltrating agents. When they reached the Yalu, in late October, they made a shattering discovery. Large numbers of Chinese Communist troops were crossing the Yalu into North Korea. Clark fired this information off to the Far East Command in Tokyo, but they ignored it. Soon faced with a million Chi-Com "volunteers", the UN Forces and General Matthew B. Ridgway were driven back across the 38th Parallel before being able to counterattack. Lieutenant Clark received another Silver Star for that mission.

In his last mission in early 1951, Clark escorted Brigadier General Crawford Sams, one of the Army's top doctors into Chi-Com held Wonsan to investigate a reported outbreak of bubonic plague. Killing the sentries, Clark's team penetrated a small hospital and Brig. Gen. Sams concluded that it was a brand of smallpox. For his actions, Eugene Clark was awarded the Navy Cross.

Commander Eugene Franklin Clark retired from the United States Navy in 1966, and died in 1998 at 86. He wrote his account for his Korean comrades who fought and died with him on the Flying Fish Islands. However, he never attempted to publish it at all in his lifetime. It wasn't until the summer of 2000, Lt. Clark's family remembered the narrative he had written shortly after returning home, along with a Department Of Defence clearance to tell the story as he had experienced it. The book is titeld: "The Secrets of Inchon: The Untold Story of the Most Daring Covert Mission of the Korean War".

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Bombardments of Wolmi-do Fortress and Incheon






Wolmi-Do island under bombardment.



Wolmi-Do island under bombardment on September 13, 1950, two days before the landings, seen from the USS Lyman K. Swenson.

A series of drills and tests and raids were conducted elsewhere on the coast of Korea, where the conditions were similar to Incheon, before the actual invasion. These drills were used to perfect the timing and performance of the landing craft.























On September 10, 1950, five days before the Incheon landing, 43 American warplanes flew over Wolmi-do island, dropping 93 napalm canisters to “burn out” its eastern slope in an attempt to clear the way for American troops.

As the landing groups neared, cruisers and destroyers from the United States and Canada shelled the fortified Wolmi-do Island and checked for mines in Flying Fish Channel. The first Canadian forces entered the Korean War when HMCS Cayuga, HMCS Athabaskan and HMCS Sioux bombarded the coast. The Fast Carrier Force flew fighter cover, interdiction, and ground attack missions. Hundreds of Korean civilians were killed in these attacks on the lightly defended port.


























General MacArthur observing the landing battles at Incheon with General Almond of X Coprs pointing to the shelling of Incheon from the USS Mt. McKinley, September 15, 1950.


Destroyer Squadron Nine, headed by the USS Mansfield, sailed up Eastern Channel and into Incheon Harbor, where it fired upon enemy gun emplacements at Wolmi-do. The attacks tipped off the North Koreans that a landing might be imminent.























David H. Swenson is buried at sea


Throughout the naval bombardment, one U.S. sailor was killed and six U.S. others were wounded. The dead sailor, David H. Swenson from USS Lyman K. He was later reported by the world media as being the nephew of Captain Lyman Knute Swenson, USS Swenson's namesake, but this was later found to be false. Significant damage was inflicted on three of the attacking warships; USS Swenson which suffered the one dead sailor and another man wounded.


USS Collett




















The USS Collett received the most damage; she took nine 75-millimeter hits, which wounded five men. USS Gurke sustained three hits resulting in light damage and no casualties. Over a thousand 5-inch shells were fired by the Canadian/American destroyer force, after inflicting severe damage on Wolmi-do's fortifications for an hour. Canadian casualties were unknown if any.

The destroyers withdrew and allied cruisers proceeded to bombard the North Korean batteries from the south of the island.


The Landing at Incheon.

























40th Infantry Division arriving at Inchon.


The flotilla of ships that landed during the battle was commanded by VADM Arthur Dewey Struble, an expert in amphibious warfare. Admiral Struble had participated in amphibious operations in World War II, including the Battle of Leyte and the Battle of Normandy.


















Green Beach

At 06:30 on September 15, 1950, the lead elements of X Corps hit "Green Beach" on the northern side of Wolmi-do island. The landing force consisted of the 3rd Battalion 5th Marines and nine M26 Pershing tanks from the 1st Tank Battalion. One tank was equipped with a flamethrower (flame tank) and two others had bulldozer blades. The battle group landed in LSTs designed and built during World War II. The entire island was captured by noon at the cost of just 14 casualties.

The North Korean forces were outnumbered by more than 6 to 1 by the United Nations troops. North Korean casualties included over 200 killed and 136 captured, primarily from the 918th Artillery Regiment and the 226th Independent Marine Regiment. The forces on Green Beach had to wait until 19:50 for the tide to rise, allowing another group to land. During this time, extensive shelling and bombing, along with anti-tank mines placed on the only bridge, kept the small North Korean force from launching a significant counterattack. The second wave came ashore at "Red Beach" and "Blue Beach."

The North Korean army had not been expecting an invasion at Incheon. After the storming of Green Beach, the North Korean People's Army assumed (probably because of deliberate American disinformation) that the main invasion would happen at Gunsan. As a result, only a small force was diverted to Incheon. Even those forces were too late, and they arrived after the United Nations forces had taken Blue Beach and Red Beach. The troops already stationed at Incheon had been weakened by Lieutenant Clark's guerrillas, and napalm bombing runs had destroyed key ammunition dumps. In total, 261 ships took part.


Red Beach

The Red Beach forces, made up of the Regimental Combat Team 5, which included the 3rd Battalion of the Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC), used ladders to scale the sea walls. After neutralizing North Korean defenses, they opened the causeway to Wolmi-do, allowing the tanks from Green Beach to enter the battle. Red Beach forces suffered eight dead and 28 wounded.


Blue Beach

























Under the command of then - Colonel Lewis Burwell "Chesty" Puller, the 1st Marine Regiment landing at Blue Beach was significantly south of the other two beaches and reached shore last. As they approached the coast, the combined fire from several North Korean People's Army gun emplacements sank one LST. Destroyer fire and bombing runs silenced the North Korean defenses. When they finally arrived, the North Korean forces at Incheon had already surrendered, so the Blue Beach forces suffered few casualties and met little opposition. The 1st Marine Regiment spent much of its time strengthening the beachhead and preparing for the inland invasion.


Beachhead


























Lieutenant Baldomero Lopez.


Lieutenant Baldomero Lopez of the Marine Corps is shown scaling a seawall after landing on Red Beach (September 15). Minutes after this photo was taken, Lopez was killed after smothering a live grenade with his body. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.





















Men of the 1st Cav Div go ashore somewhere in Korea.


Immediately after North Korean resistance was extinguished in Incheon, the supply and reinforcement process began. Seabees and Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs) that had arrived with the U.S. Marines constructed a pontoon dock on Green Beach and cleared debris from the water. The dock was then used to unload the remainder of the LSTs.

Documents written by Kim Il Sung and recovered by United Nations troops soon after the landing said, "The original plan was to end the war in a month, we could not stamp out four American divisions... We were taken by surprise when United Nations troops and the American Air Force and Navy moved in."

On September 16, the North Koreans,  sent six columns of T-34 tanks to the beachhead. In response, two flights of F4U Corsair from squadron VMF-214 bombed the attackers. The armored columns suffered extensive damage and the US forces lost one airplane. A quick counter-attack by M26 Pershing tanks destroyed the remainder of the North Korean armored division and cleared the way for the capture of Incheon.





















Troops of Company. B, 519th Military Police Battalion in position with a .30 caliber air-cooled machine guns.


On September 19, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers repaired the local railroad up to eight miles (13 km) inland. The Kimpo airstrip was captured, and transport planes began flying in gasoline and ordnance for the aircraft stationed there.




















All airfields required heavy maintenance.


The South Korea's airfields required a lot of heavy maintenance. These United States airmen are moving the plane to firmer ground so that the pilot can take off to be reloaded with the much needed supplies.

The Marines continued unloading supplies and reinforcements. By September 22, they had unloaded 6,629 vehicles and 53,882 troops, along with 25,512 tons (23,000 tonnes) of supplies.


Second Battle of Seoul

The United States Marines engaged in urban warfare during the battle for Seoul in late September 1950.  The American troops carried M1 Garand semi-automatic rifles and Browning Automatics. On the streets were the bodies of, Korean civilians that  had died in the battle. In the distance you could hear the rumbling of  M4 Sherman tanks.

In contrast to the quick victory at Incheon, the advance on Seoul was slow and bloody. The North Korean People's Army launched another T-34 attack, which was trapped and destroyed, and a Yak bombing run in Incheon harbor, which did little damage. The North Korean People's Army attempted to stall the United Nations offensive in order to allow time to reinforce Seoul and withdraw troops from the south.

Though warned that the process of taking Seoul would allow remaining North Korean People's Army forces in the south to escape, General MacArthur felt that he was bound to honor promises given to the South Korean government to retake the capital as soon as possible.

On the second day, vessels carrying the United States Army's 7th Infantry Division arrived in Incheon Harbor. General Almond was eager to get the division into position to block a possible enemy movement from the south of Seoul. On the morning of September 18, the division's 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment landed at Incheon and the remainder of the regiment went ashore later in the day.




















The Navy provided close air support. An F4U Corsair prepares for takeoff from the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Sicily.


The next morning, the 2nd Battalion moved up to relieve an United States Marine battalion occupying positions on the right flank south of Seoul. Meanwhile, the 7th Division's 31st Regiment came ashore at Incheon. Responsibility for the zone south of Seoul highway passed to 7th Division at 18:00 on September 19. The 7th Infantry Division then engaged in heavy fighting with North Korean soldiers on the outskirts of Seoul.









 
Before the battle, North Korea had just one understrength division in the city, with the majority of its forces south of the capital.  General MacArthur personally oversaw the 1st Marine Regiment as it fought through North Korean positions on the road to Seoul.

















The 1st Marine Division had all its regiments together north of the Han River.Its troops meet little opposition as they move on Seoul.























Seoul as Seen From the Air.


The 32d Infantry's mission was to first to seize and secure South Mountain, then to secure Hill 120 situated two miles eastward at the southeast edge of Seoul, and finally to seize and secure Hill 348, a large, high hill mass five miles east of Seoul and dominating the highway and rail line entering the city from that side. The regiment had a strength of 4,912 men as it prepared for the crossing - 3,110 Americans and 1,802 Republic Of Korea troops.

Control of Operation Chromite was then given to Major General Edward Almond, the X Corps commander. It was Gen. Almond's goal to take Seoul on September 25, exactly three months after the beginning of the war.





















On September 22, the Marines entered Seoul to find it fortified. American tanks entered Seoul through clearings that the troops made through the barricades. The casualties mounted as the forces engaged in house-to-house fighting. On September 26, the Hotel Bando (which had served as the US Embassy) was cleared by Easy Company of 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment.






















Colonel "Chesty" Puller's 1st Marines fought some of the most vicious engagements in taking Seoul. That terrible fighting, was overshadowed in the media by the brilliance and seeming ease of the invasion at Inchon.

During this fight about 12 North Korean P.O.W.s were killed (apparently while naked and unarmed) in the building's basement.






















American and ROK troops round up suspected spies and collaborators in Seoul.


General Almond declared the city liberated on September 25 even though Marines were still engaged in house-to-house combat.


























Massacre Of Korean Civilians.

Both sides in the war were guilty of shooting thousands of civilians that they suspected of being enemy sympathizers.

General MacArthur underestimated the skill and determination of the North Koreans, but recognized his error, when he concluded that more than four United States divisions were needed to defeat the enemy. The combined efforts of the United States and Republic Of Korea armies led by General Walker, supplemented by air and naval superiority, slowed the southward drive of the North Koreans and ended in a difficult but successful defense of the Pusan Perimeter.

The fighting was intense, as reflected in American casualties to mid September 1950 — 4,599 battle deaths, 12,058 wounded, 401 reported captured, and 2,107 reported missing in action. North Korean losses were also high in both men and tanks.






















United States Marines treat a casualty from the front line of the battle.


The bitter weeks of retreat and death would soon change, however, with MacArthur’s "hammer against the anvil": the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter coupled with the landing at Inch’on by the 1st Marine Division and the Army’s 7th Infantry Division during the third week of September.


Breakout of Pusan





















M26-Pershing tank, on the road west of Pusan during the Summer of 1950.


The M26 Pershing tank enjoyed domination over North Korean T-34 tanks at Inchon. One tank (B41) of B Company, 1st Tank Battalion, U.S Marines, landed on Pusan port on August 2, 1950, destroying a large number of tanks of the North Korean 42nd Armored Regiment.





































United States Marines disembark at Pusan on their way to the front lines.

The last North Korean troops in South Korea still fighting were defeated when Walker's 8th Army broke out of the Pusan perimeter, joining the Army's X Corps in a coordinated attack on North Korean People's Army forces. Of the 70,000 North Korean People's Army troops around Pusan, more than half were killed or captured.  However, because the United Nations forces had concentrated on taking Seoul rather than cutting off the North Korean People's Army's withdrawal north, the remaining 30,000 North Korean soldiers escaped to the north across the Yalu River, where they were soon reconstituted as a cadre for the formation of new North Korean People's Army divisions hastily re-equipped by the Soviet Union. The allied assault continued north to the Yalu River until the intervention of the People's Republic of China in the war.




















Task Force Smith arrives at the Taejon rail station. 


On July 5, 1950, near Osan, this untried force of about half a battalion, mostly teenagers, stood alone against a North Korean division and a large tank force.

The Pusan battle is considered by some as one of the most decisive military operations in modern warfare. However, Russell Stolfi argues that the landing itself was a strategical masterpiece but it was followed by an advance to Seoul in ground battle so slow and measured that it constituted an operational disaster, largely negating the successful landing. He contrasts the United States style of war fighting with that of Germany by examining the United States military's 1950 Incheon-Seoul operation and the German offensive in the Baltic in 1941.

"American forces achieved a strategic masterpiece in the Incheon landing in September 1950 and then largely negated it by a slow, tentative, 11-day advance on Seoul, only twenty miles away. By contrast in the Baltic region in 1941 the German forces achieved strategic surprise in the first day of their offensive and then, exhibiting a breakthrough mentality, pushed forward rapidly, seizing key positions and advancing almost two hundred miles in four days. The American advance was characterized by cautious, restrictive orders, concerns about phase lines, limited reconnaissance, and command posts well in the rear, while the Germans positioned their leaders as far forward as possible, relied on oral or short written orders, reorganized combat groups to meet immediate circumstances, and engaged in vigorous reconnaissance."





















American troops secure another mountain top.


Since Douglas MacArthur couldn't get more troops right away, he started a buddy program pairing United States troops with ROK (Republic of Korea) troops.  But these troops were being pummeled by the North Korean troops and MacArthur came up with a plan to bring in a force behind enemy lines and cut off their supplies and take back Seoul.  His target was Inchon and everyone else said this was impossible.  He was given a reluctant green light and he pulled it off to everyone's surprise. 

As the United Nation troops routed the North Koreans and retook Seoul, Douglas MacArthur rubbed the Preident Truman the wrong way again, when he reinstalled the Republic Of Korea, President Rhee, who was not particularly liked in Washington,

The latest victories led to new policy dilemmas. Should Douglas MacArthur stop at the 38th parallel, the dividing point between North Korea and the Republic Of Korea, or should he go on north to reunite the two Koreas?  His directives were vague as Washington and the United Nations debated this. Nobody knew if China and/or Russia would be provoked to enter the battle?

"...on September 27 [barely a week after landing at Inchon] Douglas MacArthur had been directed to "conduct military operations north of the 38th Parallel leading to "the destruction of the North Korean armed forces." 

Just two restraints were imposed upon him.  He was forbidden to send aircraft over Sino- Russian territory, and only ROK troops could approach the Yalu River.  In forty-eight hours Doulas MacArthur replied, accepting these limitations and proposing to capture Pyongyang with the Eighth Army, land X Corps at the east-coast port of Wonsan, and, after wide sweeps to effect a "juncture" of the two.  The White House agreed, but then, having committed itself, Washington felt uneasy.

Gen. MacArthur also had reservations.  He wanted a firmer mandate, and the day after the Seoul ceremony the new secretary of defense, George Marshall, gave it to him in an "eyes only" cable:  "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel."  The General replied, "Unless and until the enemy capitulates, I regard all Korea as open for our military operations."


























Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall


Generall Marshall agreed, and the issue seemed resolved.  It wasn't quite.  When MacArthur submitted a directive he planned to issue to the Eighth Army on October 2, launching the coming offensive, Marshall wired him:  "We desire you to proceed with your operations without any further explanation or announcement and let actions determine the matter.  Our government desires to avoid having to make an issue of the 38th Parallel until we have accomplished our mission." 

The Chinese started making statements that they wouldn't stand by idly if Gen. MacArthur crossed the 38th Parallel.  The United Nations called for the unification of the two Koreas. Mao's foreign minister, Chou En-lai broadcast that: The United Nations' resolution was illegal... American soldiers were menacing Chinese security, and "we cannot stand idly by... The Chinese people love peace, but, in order to defend peace, they will never be afraid to oppose aggressive war."  That afternoon Mao's divisions began to slip over the Yalu to prepare a counterattack.  Meanwhile McArthur's men, unaware of the Chinese buildup, continued to roll forward over the disintegrating units of Kim's (Il Sung) army. [William Manchester p.587]






















President Truman called for a meeting with Douglas MacArthur and flew all the way to Wake Island to confer with him for two hours.  There was much debate about what was said at the meeting and whether it even should have been held.  It allowed both Truman and MacArthur to make claims about what they had said and the press to make their own claims.  Manchester suggests it was to boost Truman's flagging political popularity, but he also writes that "MacArthur affected to reject that interpretation. He would write in his Reminiscences:  "Such reasoning, I am sure, does Mr. Truman an injustice. I believe nothing of the sort animated him, and that the sole purpose was to create good will and beneficial results to the country."


























Gen. MacArthur gave stories to various news outlets defending his actions and rejecting all blame.  Manchester's account basically agrees with MacArthur's assessment, but says he should have let others do the defending.  Nevertheless, Truman again leaves him in place.  However, a general directive is sent out to all agencies including the military banning all but minor issues being discussed with the press without prior approval from higher up.  It was clear that this was aimed at Douglas MacArthur, who didn't take long to violate it.
























Another important development occurs when General Ridgeway goes to Korea to replace General Walker, who was killed, as commander of all United Nation  ground forces. He began to win battles and make assessments that challenged MacArthur's stories of defeat if not given permission to go for all out victory. This changed Washington's confidence in MacArthur and his indispensability.   

Basically, there was a disagreement between MacArthur who believed that he should be allowed to win or he should withdraw.  The White House asked him to maintain the status quo - a divided Korea pretty much back, geographically, to the way it was before hostilities erupted.  Politically, this was echoed by hard line Republicans who said that Truman had lost China and was about to lose Korea versus the Democrats and Europeans who saw Korea as of minor importance geopolitically and wanted to avoid war with the most populous nation in the world.

In the end, it seems that Douglas MacArthur, who then was 70, decided to go over the President's head and appeal to the U.S. public.  He issued stories to three different media that challenged the administration's position. 



















The Joint Chiefs of Staff. Left to Right - Adm. Forrest P. Sherman; General of the Army Omar N. Bradley (chairman), General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and General J. Lawton Collins


After conferring with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Harry Truman ordered Douglas MacArthur relieved of his duties.  When word came back to the White House that MacArthur might resign first, the poorly worded memo was rushed to Tokyo.


























Manchester writes, "Here, as so often in his feisty administration, he had done the right thing, in this case avoiding the hazards of a general war, in the wrong way.  Because he insisted that MacArthur be fired, instead of permitting him to retire gracefully, millions questioned the President's motives."

Larger issues of foreign policy and civilian control were at stake and had to be preserved at the relative minor expense of a subordinate. Even today, Gen. MacArthur's dismissal remains a controversial topic in the field of civil-military relations.

The Korean War was not a total war, and a complete victory was not its goal.  Korea was fought as a political war for political goals:  initially to insure that the boundary at the 38th parallel would be maintained.  (That policy was later changed to complete unification, but without success.)  It was a limited goal and clearly within the framework of Harry Truman's overall foreign-policy strategy.  Korea was not the only factor Truman had to consider.  It must be kept in mind that President Truman's first priorities lay in Europe where the principle enemy was the Soviet Union - not Korea or China.  He was much more concerned with building up the defenses in Western Europe and maintaining a cohesive NATO alliance. 

Generally, President Harry Truman followed a policy of containment. This policy had worked in Turkey, Iran, and Greece, and Harry Truman meant for it to work in Korea.  The war had to be viewed in the context of possible repercussions with the United State's allies and other foreign governments.  Therefore, Harry Truman pursued a policy of limited war in Korea.  The concept of a limited war as opposed to total war was a political judgement of the conflict by civilian authorities and for political, not for military, objectives.

The concept of limited war was new to most Americans and to the military who were used to waging total war until a complete victory had been obtained.  Wars were fought until the enemy was completely defeated and subjugated.  In all previous wars this had been the case,  especially in the  so recently fought World War II.

Gen. MacArthur's view was that war should be waged utilizing every means possible - totally - or war should not be waged at all.  He had lots of support from the American public, as well as from some members of  Congress,  notably Senator  Taft  and Representative Martin.

Being an ardent "Asia-firster", Douglas MacArthur was convinced that Communist China was the real enemy of the Western world, and the force behind the North Korean aggression.  Of the relationship between Europe and Asia, Gen. MacArthur stated unequivocally that "here in Asia... the communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest... that here we fight Europe's wars with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia, the fall of Europe is inevitable."

General Douglas MacArthur tried to influence the policies of his government by "force" in misinterpreting and violating specific directives from his superiors.

President Harry Truman's order issued June 26, 1950 to refrain from attacking North Korean positions beyond the 38th parallel was broadly interpreted by MacArthur and perceived as not a direct prohibition to move beyond the 38th.  To Douglas MacArthur, the field commander should have the authority to ascertain the immediate combat situation and respond accordingly, despite the political repercussions.  In Gen. MacArthur's mind, President Truman and his Washington entourage clearly did not understand the situation on the battlefield.

The fact that Douglas MacArthur disagreed with the President Truman Administration's foreign policy caused him to disobey his orders and try to seek a change over to his own policies.  In disobeying his orders, Douglas MacArthur violated the first duty of a military man: to obey the orders of his superiors.  A soldier can disagree with policy within the command structure on a private basis but not publicly. In the event that a soldier cannot carry out his orders, he is duty-bound to resign.

There were no half-way measures to deal with insubordination without dire results politically and militarily.  In this case, President Truman would lose a brilliant military mind, as well as a popular figure, who, to date had basically supported his policies.  When conducting a war, the Commander-in-Chief should not have to deal with an unsympathetic field commander at every juncture who cannot uphold policies in which he does not believe.  President Harry Truman could not afford to continue placating  Douglas MacArthur politically or militarily.

There is a political realm in which the military has no jurisdiction.  Negotiations, settlements, peace initiatives, etc. are the prerogative of the President and his designated subordinates.  Afterall, the whole purpose of diplomacy is to achieve goals without the use of military force. It was not Douglas MacArthur's right to present a virtual ultimatum to the North Koreans with unpleasant consequences if it were not heeded.  That right clearly belonged exclusively to  President Truman.  And to make it more unpalatable to Harry Truman was the fact that Gen. Douglas MacArthur's announcement, labeled a "military appraisal", undermined and negated his own pending request for peace negotiations.  In doing so, General MacArthur ignored an executive order issued December 6. 1950 stating that all public statements be submitted for review first by the Defense or State Departments.  It would have been less effective if President Harry Truman had gone ahead and issued his own statement and, at the same time to try to discount Douglas MacArthur's.  The damage to President Truman's credibility had already been done.


General Matthew Ridgway

























General Matthew Ridgway summed up the personality and experience of  MacArthur that played such a large part in formulating the way he viewed the world and his place in it:

"The hunger for praise that led him on some occasions to claim or accept credit for deeds he had not performed, or to disclaim responsibility for mistakes that were clearly his own; the love of the limelight that continually prompted him to pose before the public as the actual commander on the spot at every landing and at the launching of every major attack in which his ground troops took place; his tendency to cultivate the isolation that genius seems to require, until it became a sort of insulation (there was no telephone in his personal office in Tokyo) that deprived him of the critical comment and the objective appraisals a commander needs from his principle subordinates; the    headstrong quality (derived from his success in forcing through many brilliant plans against solid opposition) that sometimes led him to persist in a course in defiance of all seeming logic; a faith in his own judgment that created an aura of infallibility and that finally led him close to insubordination."


United States Allies

In a limited war situation, when politics are dominant, civilian control must be maintained to insure that only those goals are attained. Had Douglas MacArthur been allowed to pursue his own policies, the war would have been enlarged to involve Communist China, Nationalist China, and most likely, the Soviet Union, and undoubtedly would have caused some allies to withdraw their support. 

Our allies, especially Great Britain and France, were already worried that Harry Truman might not be able to control Gen. MacArthur. Douglas MacArthur's continued publicly voicing opposition to Administration policy, disobeying orders, thwarting diplomatic efforts, and generally frustrating the effective execution of Presidential policy all equaled insubordination to Truman as the Commander in Chief.  Harry Truman thought that his authority as President was being undermined by Gen. Douglas MacArthur and therefore, damaging his effectiveness and credibility in conducting foreign policy. 

As the Joint Hearings of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees investigated Douglas MacArthur's dismissal, most members' conclusions had finally concurred with Harry Truman; many thought that MacArthur should have been dismissed even sooner. The President clearly had the constitutional prerogative to dismiss a military commander when deemed necessary.

Harry Truman was not unaware of the great risks involved in firing Gen. MacArthur. This awareness of risks delayed his final decision to the detriment of his credibility at home and abroad. But these are decisions, risks and consequences that must be borne by that person holding the office.  In this case the consequences were loss of prestige for the office of the President and possibly World War III.  However, when the military situation outruns the political objectives, the military situation must be realigned with the political considerations. In firing MacArthur on 10 April 1951, President Harry Truman began the long haul in trying to get the military situation back on track with his foreign policy and reinstate his credibility with the United States' Allies.

The real story is not that Harry Truman dismissed General MacArthur; it is that it took him so long to do it in the face of persistent provocation that he woul later call “insubordination.”

David Halberstam in his book "The Coldest Winter", said Harry Truman feared Gen. MacArthur. It is true that Douglas MacArthur certainly had substantial public and political support that would make any government official hesitate. However, it appears that President Truman was more intimidated by his internalized concept of civil (meaning political) - military relations based on his own reading of history.

Harry Truman’s best biographers — David McCullough, Alonzo Hamby, and Robert Ferrell — all note his captivation with "Great Men and Famous Women", a Victorian anthology of biographical portraits he received from his mother when he was 10 years old. Harry Truman particularly gravitated to the depictions of military commanders, especially his heroes, Hannibal and Gen. Robert E. Lee. He, of course, would have to wonder why neither one would ultimately triumph. Harry Truman answered the question in an entry to his diary, on May 14, 1934, when he was contemplating leaving county government and running for the United States Senate: “Of all the military heroes Hannibal and Lee were to my mind the best... they won every battle [but] lost the war due to crazy politicians.”

Harry Truman’s reading of history reinforced this point of view. His favorite book was Douglas Southall Freeman’s four-volume biography, "R. E. Lee". Harry Truman  met Douglas Freeman while observing military maneuvers in the 1944 and called upon his counsel to the Truman Committee providing Senate oversight of the war effort.

Douglas Freeman constantly warned against political mistreatment of military commanders purportedly exemplified in the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the [Civil] War. “They abused General Meade like a pickpocket — you read that” Truman subsequently said. Such doubt about civilian politicians miring military operations was hardly a mind-set suitable to confront a commander as seemingly confident as Gen, Douglas MacArthur.

General MacArthur was also a great devotee of Douglas Freeman, whom he hoped would write the history of General MacArthur’s campaigns in World War II: no one “has the divine gift of inspiration like yourself. It would be a contribution of military science beyond compare.” Freeman as a biographer was averse to criticizing his protagonist, who happened to be the standard of excellence that MacArthur’s mother held for MacArthur. “I am of Virginia,” he wrote Freeman, and have studied Lee and Stonewall Jackson, “all my professional life.... In some of my lonely vigils with momentous decisions pending... it seemed to me almost as though those great Chieftains of the Gray were there to comfort and sustain me.”

According to one close aide of Douglas MacArthur, the general feared he could not measure up to the Lee benchmark when having to make those “momentous decisions.” As if to vanish doubt, he chronically sought more glory to prove himself to himself, the world, and history. Korea, said by Gen. MacArthur to be “Mar’s last gift to a warrior,” might provide a final claim to military immortality to be gained: overthrowing the communist regime by invading China from across the Taiwan Strait in late 1950 or early 1951.

President Truman, although chronically disinclined to discipline a field commander, finally said no, although doing it quite politely until Douglas MacArthur did what  President Truman felt was unacceptable for a soldier, namely acting like a politician. When the general endorsed a campaign statement from a highly partisan Republican, he struck a historical analogue such as often guided the president’s way of thinking.

Matters came to a head on April 5, 1951. House Minority Leader Joe Martin read a letter he had received weeks earlier from Gen. MacArthur discussing the situation in Asia. "Virtually all that he said was bound to provoke Truman," the historian David McCullough later wrote.

Chinese nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek should be committed to the Korean war, MacArthur wrote. "Here [in Asia] we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words," MacArthur had written. "If we lose the war to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom.... There is no substitute for victory."

Several days of meetings ensued involving President Truman's staff and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, though by all outward appearances, McCullough later wrote, the White House assumed an "unnatural calm." Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall and Secretary of State Dean Acheson urged caution. "If you relieve MacArthur, you will have the biggest fight of your administration," Dean Acheson told Truman. Vice President Alben Barkley and Supreme Court Chief Justice Fred Vinson advocated Marshall's firing.

By Monday, April 9, President Truman's advisers, including the Joint Chiefs, concluded that MacArthur must go. President Truman signed the orders and arranged for their delivery to General MacArthur. They were transmitted via State Department channels (at Marshall's suggestion — such momentous news would surely leak if sent through the military chain of command) to the U.S. ambassador in Korea, who would in turn give them to Pace. He would then personally deliver them to Gen. MacArthur. The news would be publicly announced the following morning.

Glitches immediately started popping up in the communications system. Pace was delayed getting the orders. Meanwhile back in Washington, a rumor surfaced at the Pentagon that a Chicago Tribune reporter was preparing to break the story of a "major resignation" in the Far East. White House aides started panicking — the general couldn't be allowed to quit prematurely. Truman, living at the Blair House while the White House was renovated, was informed late in the evening. ("They caught me in my pajamas," he later said.) He ordered a wire be sent directly to MacArthur informing him. "I wasn't going to let the SOB resign on me," Truman told aide George Elsey the next day. "I wanted to fire him!"

Operators on the White House switchboard started calling reporters at home: There would be a 1 a.m. press conference. By the time White House Press Secretary Joe Short was handing the order out to reporters, Truman was back at Blair House, asleep. He slept well: "The thing you have to understand about me is if I've done the right thing and I know I've done the right thing, I don't worry over it," he said. "There's nothing to worry over."

President Harry Truman back in 1950 entered the Korean War on the basis of a belief that Stalin was probing his will like Hitler probed that of Britain and France, who had brought on World War II by concessions at Munich. In 1951, when he finally fired Douglas MacArthur, President Harry Truman again reached into history wherein Douglas MacArthur became a George McClellan who “worked with the minority to under cut the Administration when there was a war on.”

“I can show,” President Truman told his staff, "just how the so and so double crossed us... [MacArthur] is going to be regarded as a worse double-crosser than McClellan.”


Support For President Harry Truman

In an April 19, 1951, Pentagon press release, a Pentagon spokesman stated that "the action taken by the President in relieving General MacArthur was based upon the unanimous recommendations of the President's principal civilian and military advisers including the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

In congressional hearings during May 1951, Secretary of Defense George Marshall testified for seven days. MacArthur's removal, he stated, stemmed from "the wholly unprecedented position of a local theater commander publicly expressing his displeasure at and his disagreement with the foreign and military policy of the United States."


Support for Douglas MacArthur

Senator Robert Taft in the Chicago Tribune called for immediate impeachment proceedings against Truman: "President Truman must be impeached and convicted. His hasty and vindictive removal of Gen. MacArthur is the culmination of series of acts which have shown that he is unfit, morally and mentally, for his high office. The American nation has never been in greater danger. It is led by a fool who is surrounded by knaves.

On April 18, 1951, Gen. MacArthur received a ticker-tape parade in San Francisco, attended by hundreds of thousands of people. Douglas MacArthur received another ticker-tape parade in New York City, on April 22, 1951. At that time, the New York City parade was the largest ticker-tape parade in history.



















MacArthur addressing an audience of 50,000 at Soldier Field, Chicago, April 25, 1951.


The Diet (Japanese parliament) passed a resolution of gratitude MacArthur, and Emperor Hirohito visited him at the embassy in person, the first time an Emperor had ever visited a foreigner with no standing. The Mainichi newspaper said: "MacArthur's dismissal is the greatest shock since the end of the war. He dealt with the Japanese people not as a conqueror but a great reformer. He was a noble political missionary. What he gave us was not material aid and democratic reform alone, but a new way of life, the freedom and dignity of the individual. We shall continue to love and trust him as one of the Americans who best understood Japan's position."

MacArthur left Japan on April 16, 1951. That morning, 250,000 Japanese lined the street to say goodbye to their respected General "Makassar." Signs read:"We Love You, MacArthur," "With Deep Regret," "Sayonara," and "We are Grateful to the General."


Press Distortion???
The widespread support for MacArthur may have been a distortion by the press. Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang wrote in their landmark study "The Unique Perspective of Television and Its Effect: A Pilot Study," that television coverage distorted the lackluster, or even boring nature of MacArthur's welcoming parades "at the expense of reality." 

One spectator reported that: "The camera followed the General's car and caught that part of the crowd immediately opposite the car and about 15 rows above it. Thus it caught that part of the crowd that was cheering, giving the impression of a solid mass of wildly cheering people. It did not show the large sections of empty stands, nor did it show that people stopped cheering as soon as the car passed them."

An observer in Chicago reported: "Everybody strained but few could get a really good glimpse of him. A few seconds after he had passed most people merely turned around to shrug and to address their neighbors with such phrases: "That's all," "That was it," "Gee, he looks just as he does in the movies," "What'll we do now?" Mostly teenagers and others with no specific plans flocked into the street after MacArthur, but very soon got tired of following as there was no place to go and nothing to do. Some cars were caught in the crowd, a matter which, to the crowd, seemed amusing."





















On his return from Korea, after his relief by President Truman, Douglas MacArthur encountered public popularity, which aroused expectations were that he would run for the United States presidency as a Republican in 1952. However, a Senate Committee investigation of his removal, chaired by Richard Russell, contributed to amarked cooling of the public mood and, once his presidential hopes had died
away, MacArthur spent the remainder of his life quietly in New York.


























MacArthur's Military Career

   * 1899 -- attends the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York
   * June 11, 1903 -- graduates first in his class, commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers
   * ? - ? -- assigned to the Philippines
   * April 23, 1904 -- promoted to 1st Lieutenant
   * 1905 - 1906 -- serves as an aide to his father in the Far East
   * 1907 -- aide-de-camp to President Roosevelt
   * February 27, 1911 -- promoted to Captain
   * 1914 -- military expedition to Veracruz, Mexico
   * ? - ? --serves on the General Staff
   * 1917 - 1919 -- joins the 42nd Infantry Division
        o is credited with naming the Division, "The Rainbow Division"
        o serves as divisional Chief of Staff, 84th Infantry Brigade Commander, and as the divisional commander
        o June 26, 1918 -- promoted to Brigadier General (National Army)
   * 1919 -- becomes Superintendent of the US Military Academy
   * 1922 - 1930 -- serves in the Philippines, commanding the District of
     Manila and the 23rd Brigade
   * January 17, 1925 -- promoted to Major General (Regular army)
   * January 1925 -- returns to US as a corps area commander
   * 1928 -- leads the US Olympic Team to Amsterdam
        o returns to Manila as commander of the Philippine Department
   * October 1930 -- commander of the Ninth Corps Area
   * November 1, 1930 - 1935 -- Chief of Staff of the United States Army
   * 1935 -- serves as the Military Advisor to the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines
   * December 31, 1937 -- retires from the US Army and becomes Field Marshal of the Philippine Army
        o April -- marries Jean Faircloth
   * February 21, 1938 -- Arthur MacArthur IV born
   * July 26, 1941 -- returns to active duty as the Major General in command of USAFFE
        o July 27 -- promoted to Lieutenant General
   * December 18, 1941 -- promoted to General
   * February 22, 1942 -- President Franklin Delano Roosevelt ordered MacArthur out of the Philippines as the American defense of the nation collapsed. Upon leaving he promises to return.
   * February 5, 1945 -- He fulfils a promise and returns to liberated Manila.
   * September, 1945 -- Becomes military governor of Japan
   * July 8, 1950 -- Named commander of UN forces in Korea
   * September 15, 1950 -- Leads highly succesful Battle of Inchon
   * April 11, 1951 -- After he publicly criticizes White House policy in Korea, Harry Truman sacks him
   * April 19, 1951 -- As farewell address before Congress, gives famous Old  Soldiers Never Die speech


After President Truman installed Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway  as commander in chief. Gen. James Van Fleet then took command of the 8th Army. On July 10, 1951, General Ridgway began truce negotiations with the North Koreans and Chinese, while small unit actions, bitter but indecisive, continued. Gen. Van Fleet was denied permission to go on the offensive and end the “meat grinder” war.

May 27, 1953 - In an address of major significance, Republican Sen. Robert Taft of Ohio, the majority floor leader, declared tonight that the United States "might as well forget the United Nations as far as the Korean war is concerned".
























Typical Terrain Near The 38th Parallel In The West


The war's unpopularity played an important role in the presidential victory of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had pledged to go to Korea to end the war.





















Korean Armistice Talks.

Negotiations broke down four different times, but after much difficulty and nuclear threats by President Eisenhower, an armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953.


















United States Navy Hospital men R.E Rosegoom and Frank J. Yasso give first aid to a wounded North Korean.


Casualties in the war were heavy. United States losses were placed at over 54,000 dead and 103,000 wounded, while Chinese and Korean casualties were each at least 10 times as high.

Korean forces on both sides executed many alleged civilian enemy sympathizers, especially in the early months of the war.















A United States military Officer overseeing South Korean soldiers executing Korean Civilians.


Today's historians, who have the luxery of hindsight, tend to favour the stance of President Truman. In 1953, this view was not shared by the majority of American people. The polls taken then indicated that 47% of those questioned saw little risk in America entering a into a 'long drawn-out war' with China.

The Korean War which was the fourth bloodiest conflict in the nation's history,  and has never been officially resolved with little diplomacy being employed since the signing of the armistice in 1957.

Technically we are still at war.





















Korean men replace plain headboards with crosses on graves in the 1st Cavalry Division Temporary Cemetery, in Taegu,


Overview of Korean War Battles/Offensives



























































































General Time Frames

    * North Korea attacks South Korea 25 June 1950
    * Task Force Smith at Osan, South Korea 5-6 July 1950
    * Kum River Line defense (Taejon) 11-22 July 1950
    * Pusan Perimeter defense 4 Aug -- 16 Sept 1950
    * Inchon Landing 15 Sept 1950
    * Liberation of Seoul (1st return) 21-30 Sept 1950
    * Advance into North Korea (west coast) 1 Oct -- 27 Oct 1950
    * Withdrawal to Ch'ongch'on River Defense Line and second advance toward the Yalu (west coast) 28 Oct -- 25 Nov 1950
    * Landing at Iwon and race to the Yalu (east coast) 31 Oct -- 27 Nov 1950
    * Withdrawal to Imjin River Line (west coast) 28 Nov -- 23 Dec 1950
    * X-Corps withdrawal (east coast) 1 Dec -- 24 Dec 1950
    * Withdrawal to Defense Line "D" (roughly along the 37th Parallel -- P'yongt'aek [W] to Samch'ok on east coast) 26 Dec 1950 -- 29 Jan 1951
    * Advance to Line Boston(south bank of the Han River south of Seoul - I Corps) 18 Feb 1951 -- 6 Mar 1951
    * Advance to Phase Line Kansas ( north of Seoul to just north of the 38th Parallel - east coast [2nd Liberation of Seoul) 4 -- 21 April 1951
    * 1st Chinese Spring Offensive 22 -- 29 Apr 1951
    * Defense lines Golden (I Corps) and No Name (IX & X Corps) 29 Apr 1951 -- 19 May 1951
    * 2nd Chinese Spring Offensive 17 -- 22 May 1951
    * Advance to Phase Line Kansas (3rd Liberation of Seoul) 22 May 1951 -- 10 Jun 1951
    * Advance to Phase Line Wyoming (Imjin River in I Corps sector north of Seoul to north of 38th Parallel in IX Corps and X Corps sectors) 13 Jun 1951 -- 4 Oct 1951
    * Line Jamestown (MLR in I Corps Sector -- West) 7 Oct 1951 -- 27 July 1953
    * Line Missouri (MLR in IX Corps Sector -- Central) 23 Oct 1951 -- 27 July 1953
    * Line Minnesota (MLR in X Corps Sector -- East) 16 Oct 1951 -- 27 July 1953


MAJOR COMMUNIST OFFENSIVES

    * NKPA 1st Phase (Seoul) Operations 25 Jun 1950 -- 29 Jun 1950
    * NKPA 2nd Phase (Suwon)Operations 30 Jun 1950 -- 6 Jul 1950
    * NKPA 3rd Phase (Taejon) Operations 7 Jul 1950 -- 20 Jul 1950
    * NKPA 4th Phase (Naktong) Operations 21 Jul 1950 -- 30 Aug 1950
    * NKPA 5th Phase (Pusan) Operations 31 Aug 1950 -- 15 Sep 1950
    * CCF (PLA) 1st Phase (warning) Operations 25 Oct 1950 -- 24 Nov 1950
    * CCF (PLA) 2nd Phase (main attack) Operations 25 Nov 1950 -- 24 Dec 1950
    * CCF (PLA) 3rd Phase (counterattack in Wonju - Chipyong-ni areas) Operations 11 Feb 1951 -- 17 Feb 1951
    * CCF (PLA) 4th Phase (First Spring Offensive) Operations 22 Apr 1951 -- 29 Apr 1951
    * CCF (PLA) 5th Phase (Second Spring Offensive) Operations 17 May 1951 -- 22 May 1951
    * CCF (PLA) 6th Phase - canceled and strategic objectives switch to limited operations 1 Sep 1951
    * CCF attack on Western & Central Fronts 6 Oct 1952 -- 13 Oct 1952
    * CCF Kumsong River Offensive (ROK II Corps) 14 July 1953 -- 20 July 1953


MAJOR WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS BY US FORCES

    * Withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter 3 July 1950 -- 3 Aug 1950
    * Evacuation of Hungnam 1 Dec 1950 -- 24 Dec 1950
    * Withdrawal from North Korea to Line "D" 2 Dec 1950 -- 16 Jan 1951


MAJOR UN OFFENSIVES

    * Inchon Landing & capture of Seoul 18 Sept 1950 -- 30 Sept 1950
    * Breakout from the Pusan Perimeter 16 Sept 1950 -- 27 Sept 1950
    * Operation Thunderbolt 25 Jan 1951 -- 20 Feb 1951
    * Operation Killer 21 Feb 1951 -- 7 Mar 1951
    * Operation Ripper (Flanking of Seoul) 7 Mar 1951 -- 4 Apr 1951
    * Operation Rugged (securing Phase Line Kansas) 1 Apr 1951 -- 15Apr 1951
    * Operation Dauntless (securing Phase Line Utah) 10 Apr 1951 -- 22 Apr 1951
    * Operation Detonate (3rd return to Seoul and retaking Phase Line Kansas north of the 38th Parallel) 20 May 1951 -- 8 Jun 1951
    * Operation Piledriver (securing Phase Line Wyoming and The Iron Triangle) 3 Jun 1951 -- 12 Jun 1951
    * Operation Commando (Securing Phase Line Jamestown) 3 Oct 1951 -- 15 Oct 1951
    * Operation Nomad and Polar (Securing Phase Line Missouri) 13 Oct 1951 -- 22 Oct 1951


PURSUIT AND MOPPING UP OPERATIONS

    * Pursuit and mopping south of the 38th Parallel 28 Sept 1950 -- 30 Nov 1950
    * Pursuit north of the 38th Parallel to Yalu River 5 Oct 1950 -- 27 Oct 1950
    * Iwon Landing and pursuit to Yalu River (east coast) 31 Oct 1950 -- 27 Nov 1950


LIMITED OPERATIONS -- 26 JUNE 1951 THROUGH 27 JULY 1953
(After peace talks initiated)

 
I CORPS

    * Operation Doughnut (to seize dominate terrain features in the Sobang Mountains) 1-4 July 1951
    * Raid on Kwijon-ni 3-8 Aug 1951
    * Operation Citadel (to move MLR forward to then existing Outpost Line of Resistance -- OPLR) 18-19 Aug 1951
    * Operation Clean-Up (attempt to sweep enemy forces from front of I Corps positions) 9-10 Sept 1951
    * Operations Clean-up II (to secure railroad running north from Uijongbu) 29 Sept -- 3 Oct 1951
    * Operation Polecharge (to secure dominate three hills) 16-18 Oct 1951
    * Attack on Hill 199 24-30 Oct 1951
    * Defense of Hill 200 5-10 Nov 1951
    * First battle of Porkchop Hill 22-25 Nov 1951
    * Operation Clam-up (ceased activity to lure enemy patrols) 10-16 Feb 1952
    * Operation Counter (to secure 11 key terrain features on outpost line) 7-25 Jun 1952
    * First Battle for Old Baldy 26 June -- 17 July 1953
    * Second Battle for Old Baldy 17 - 22 July 1952
    * Third Battle for Old Baldy 1-4 Aug 1952
    * Forth Battle for Old Baldy 18-21 Sept 1952
    * Defense of Outpost Kelly 18-30 Sept 1952
    * Fifth Battle for Old Baldy 23-26 Mar 1953
    * Third Battle for Porkchop Hill 23-26 Mar 1953
    * Defense of Outpost Carson, Elko, and Vegas 28-30 Mar 1953
    * Forth Battle for Porkchop Hill 6-11 July 1953
    * Defense of Outpost Dale & Westview 23-24 July 1953

 
IX CORPS

    * Operation Cat & Dog (to destroy enemy positions and capture prisoners.) 26-28 June 1951
    * Attack on Hill 272 and 487 12-15 July 1951
    * Operation Cow Puncher (to move Phase Line Utah forward to Phase Line Wyoming) 2-3 Aug 1951
    * Operation Ohio-Sloan (to secure new positions on Phase Line Wyoming) 8-12 Sept 1951
    * Operation Cleaver (Tank/Infantry raid into Iron Triangle) 21 Sept 1951
    * Operation Clam-up (to lure enemy patrols and capture prisoners) 10-15 Feb 1952
    * Operation Showdown (to secure Hill 598) 14-24 Oct 1952
    * Defense of Hill 301 24-28 Oct 1952
    * Defense of Outpost Charlie and King 28 Oct - 4 Nov 1952
    * (IX Corps withdrawn Nov 1952)


X CORPS

    * Attack on Hills 1059, 1120 and 1179 26-30 July 1951
    * Battle of Bloody Ridge (ridge between Hills 900 & 983) 27 Aug -- 5 Sept 1951
    * First battle of Heartbreak Ridge 9-12 Sept 1951
    * Second battle of Heartbreak Ridge 13-29 Sept 1951
    * Attack on Hills 851, 1220 & adjacent ridges 7-15 Oct 1951
    * Operation Clam-up (to lure enemy patrols and capture prisoners) 10-15 Feb 1952
    * Defense of Heartbreak Ridge area 6-7 Sept 1952
    * Defense of Heartbreak Ridge area 3-4 Nov 1952

From 1953 through October 1966, eight Americans were killed in Korean clashes. However, as US involvement in the Vietnam War escalated, the tempo of incidents and violations of the Korean armistice also increased. Though it was not readily apparent at the time, there was speculation of a connection between the war in Southeast Asia and hostile acts committed by the North Koreans.

South Korea had deployed ROK army troops to Vietnam to join the fighting as United States allies. Next to the United States, the ROK commitment to the war in Vietnam was the largest of the free-world forces and consisted of nearly three combat divisions.

From late 1966 through 1969, the Korean peninsula provided the background for a military confrontation that included guerrilla warfare, sabotage and terrorism directed against the people of South Korea and the Americans serving there. The situation tested the willpower and reserve of the Unified States and the Republic of Korea (ROK).